

AFRO-ASIAN POLITICS
IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations General Assembly during the period 1952-1960. This period was chosen for several reasons which render it particularly useful for studying Afro-Asian political behavior. First, the phenomenal increase in the proportion of Afro-Asian members between 1952 and 1960 makes it possible to study the effects of the decolonization process on the politics of the Afro-Asian coalition. Second, this period saw the gradual transformation of the Afro-Asian coalition from an ad hoc gathering of a small minority of the Assembly's membership to a more institutionalized interaction of a near majority. Third, the 1952-60 period saw the coalition tend toward and finally become a general grouping of Afro-Asian states increasingly representing all areas and views of the two continents. Finally, it was a period in which the United Nations was increasingly concerned with matters of great interest to Afro-Asia, a fact which led to greater initiative and deeper involvement of the Afro-Asian states. In brief, the 1952-60 period revealed the Afro-Asian coalition from many sides and in many situations.

Furthermore, the 1952-60 period was a crucial period for the United Nations itself. It opens in the midst of the

organization's first involvement in a war--the Korean War. These were years of brinkmanship, relative reconciliation, and near hysteria, all of which were reflected in the work of the United Nations. They were years in which, at first, the United Nations seemed to be destined to atrophy, as a world organization, into a League-like European-American caucus and in which, finally, the United Nations became the first political international organization to approach universalism in membership and interest.

The realization by Afro-Asian states that individually they are likely to exert very little influence on world affairs led them to an attempt to pool their modest political capabilities in the expectation that they might be more successful in promoting their individual and regional interests as they saw them. The basic purpose of this study is to explore the major objectives which the Afro-Asian states, as a political alignment, sought to promote through use of the United Nations, and to assess the effectiveness of their efforts.

The study is organized under two parts. Part I is basically an examination of the Afro-Asian states' efforts to establish a coalition in the General Assembly, and it consists of five chapters. Chapter I is a historical survey of Afro-Asian attempts at policy co-ordination. It seeks to show that the emergence of an Afro-Asian alignment in the General Assembly was prepared for by a series of similar, though more restricted, experiments outside the United Nations.

It will also show that the alignment was dictated by the historical experiences of Afro-Asians as its leaders and spokesmen interpreted them. It was born out of a belief that Afro-Asian states shared similar grievances, adversaries, and aspirations, and that the fate of one of them was related to the fortunes of the others.

Before an alignment is analyzed and discussed, it must be shown that such an alignment does in fact exist. It is not enough that Afro-Asian states demonstrate a desire for policy co-ordination. This subjective requirement of coalition must be fortified by the objective test of actual performance. The primary purpose of Chapter II is to study the over-all voting record of Afro-Asian states in order to determine whether or not they do in fact possess a high degree of affinity, which is not representative of conditions prevailing in the Assembly.

Chapter III is a fairly detailed analysis of the Afro-Asian states' voting record during the period 1952-60. Solidarity among Afro-Asian states is determined in relation to the various types of issues which were dealt with by the General Assembly during the period studied. The primary purpose of the analysis is to determine the relationship between Afro-Asian solidarity and the type of problem with which the coalition is faced. The discussion will also include an analysis of Afro-Asian non-voting. For purposes of analysis, questions which were dealt with by the United Nations are classified into major categories. These categories of issues are racial, colonial, cold war, general political, procedural,

and agenda issues. The method used for classifying roll-call votes into various types of issues is described in the Note on Method, found immediately after the text of this dissertation. Also, Appendix G identifies all roll-call votes used in this study, and indicates the type of issue under which each roll-call vote was classified.

Chapters IV and V deal with subgroups within the Afro-Asian coalition. It was found that the coalition consists of two types of subdivisions. The first type is based on affiliations created by considerations which transcend the United Nations and its operations. These factors may be ethnic, political, or military in nature, and they all have in common the fact that they are not a function of the United Nations membership of the states concerned. These groups caucus for the purpose of identifying and increasing agreement among their members on all or some matters with which the United Nations is concerned. The second type of subgroups found in the coalition consists of voting clusters. Chapter IV identifies the major caucusing subgroups of which the Afro-Asian coalition consists and discusses changes in the internal composition of the Afro-Asian group.

The caucusing activity of a political alignment is not necessarily a measure or even an indicator of solidarity among its members. It may be assumed to indicate a (subjective) desire to enhance solidarity, but it does not necessarily indicate the success of such efforts. For this reason, Chapter V investigates the question of whether or not and how

far caucusing activity coincides with voting affinity present among Afro-Asian states. It is hoped that the analysis will increase our understanding of Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations by revealing attitudinal similarities and differences among the coalition's members.

Part II of this study deals primarily with the objectives which Afro-Asian states sought to promote in the United Nations, and makes an attempt at evaluating their success in doing so. Chapter VI is basically a statement of Afro-Asian views on various types of international problems. Its intent is to delineate their basic objectives, mainly by stating their grievances against and expectations from the international system. Chapter VII will also point out cleavages within the coalition by discussing the conflict of views among its members.

Factors affecting the ability of Afro-Asian states to co-operate with each other outside the United Nations are obviously relevant to the operations of the coalition within the framework of the international organization. Conflicts among Afro-Asian states, regardless of their origin, cannot help but impair the solidarity of their coalition in the United Nations. Similarly, factors which bring Afro-Asian states closer together outside the United Nations tend to facilitate their representatives' efforts to co-operate within it. For this reason, Chapter VII will identify factors which, although they may or may not be directly related to their status as United Nations members, nevertheless influence

the efforts of the Afro-Asian states to engage in coalition politics in the General Assembly. The emphasis will be placed on the identification of cohesive and divisive influences on the coalition stemming from the realities of Afro-Asian relations outside the United Nations.

Chapter VIII is an evaluation of the impact of the Afro-Asian coalition on the General Assembly. It is an assessment of how successful the coalition has been in promoting its objectives through the General Assembly. The discussion will center around the problem of what the Afro-Asian states wished the Assembly to do about the grievances and aspirations outlined in Chapter VI, and how fruitful their efforts were.

Two more points deserve to be emphasized. First, a study of group politics must often sacrifice some accuracy for the sake of clarity. A study as this, which aims to identify and to explain patterns of behavior of a large number of states, often makes it necessary to ignore individual deviations from the identified collective patterns of behavior. Otherwise, there is a risk of seeing the forest as nothing more than a number of trees which, of course, it is not. Group behavior is not only the sum total of the behaviors of a group's individual members, it is also a mood or an atmosphere which only all the members interacting together can create.

In some cases, however, the behavior of a group varies substantially from the behavior of its constituent

parts. What is generally true of the whole may not be true of the parts. For this reason, an attempt is made throughout the dissertation to discover and to discuss significant deviations from the general behavior of the whole group. Special attention is paid to factionalism within the group.

Second, it must be noted that this study does not and was not intended to cover all aspects of Afro-Asian politics in the General Assembly. Among the questions which are not raised in this study in spite of their relevance to it, one question is particularly important. This is the question of inter-group relations. The Afro-Asian coalition is one of several political alignments in the United Nations. It is to be expected that on some questions, two or more of these alignments attempt to co-ordinate their efforts to achieve their respective aims. As individual states often modify their views when they seek the support of other states, it is reasonable to assume that groups often modify their views to gain the support of other groups. A study of the Afro-Asian group's relations to other groups in the Assembly may very well add to our understanding of the Afro-Asian group's operations.

An attempt to answer the question of inter-group relations, however, necessarily requires a somewhat detailed discussion of the aims and methods of all these groups. Such a discussion will unjustifiably broaden the scope of this dissertation. Although such a discussion will undoubtedly add a useful dimension to the following analysis of Afro-Asian

politics, it will also make it more difficult to focus attention on the primary object of the study. To answer the question adequately, the dissertation may very well develop into a general study of group politics instead of remaining as it is intended to be--a study of Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations.

PART I

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Writing in 1955, an Indian author and diplomat observed: "Till 1946 it was an axiom in international diplomacy that the affairs of Asia were to be determined by a conference of Western powers."¹ A similar statement could have been made regarding Africa with at least equal validity. Yet today, the states of Asia and Africa not only play an important role in determining their own affairs, but they also participate in shaping the lives of other nations. The transition was almost sudden. In less than a decade after the end of World War II, Afro-Asia ceased to be primarily the subject of, and became an important participant in, international affairs. This study is not concerned with how or why this transition came about. It is concerned with the use Afro-Asian states sought to make of their opportunity to make their voices heard.

The Afro-Asian states' efforts to formulate and to pursue common objectives predate the formation of an Afro-Asian coalition in the United Nations, and even the international organization itself. This chapter is mainly concerned with the historical background of this search for Afro-Asian

¹X. M. Panikkar, "Afro-Asian Conference: Symbol of Independence," The Nation, April 2, 1955, p. 287.

solidarity. Since the historical roots of the Afro-Asian coalition in the United Nations are found in these efforts at co-operation and mutual support, as it will be shown later, it is hoped that this introductory discussion will add to our understanding of similar Afro-Asian efforts in the General Assembly.

Before the discussion is begun, it is necessary to emphasize that this chapter will not represent a complete chronological account of Afro-Asian efforts at political co-operation. Although this chapter is a historical background, the study itself is analytical and not a historical account. For this reason, the emphasis in this chapter will be on the identification of patterns of collective Afro-Asian political behavior. It is this pattern which, it is hoped, will add to our understanding of Afro-Asian coalition politics in the General Assembly.

When World War II ended there were very few independent countries in Afro-Asia, and the overwhelming majority of its peoples depended for their government upon one or another of the European powers. One of the consequences of this state of affairs was the emergence of fairly effective restrictions on intra-Afro-Asian intercourse. Partly for political reasons, and partly due to Europe-oriented communications routes, Afro-Asian leaders and peoples found it difficult to communicate with each other. Reminiscing about this period in an address shortly before his country became independent, Jawaharlal Nehru

said:

I remember when I was in Europe just twenty years ago, I attended a conference in Brussels, at which many Asian and European countries were represented. Then those who came from Asia met together, and we talked about developing some kind of contacts so that we could meet occasionally, somewhere in Asia, and develop political, economic and other relations, and, at any rate, get to know each other better. But though everybody agreed, and there were plenty of people from China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Ceylon, India, some from Syria, and I think one or two from Iran, an odd fact emerged: that this conference or meeting that we might have, of representatives from Asia, could not meet anywhere in Asia!

A major effect of British rule in India, Nehru continued, was the isolation of India from the rest of Asia. British rule, he said, "partly deliberately, and partly as a result of the development of sea routes, cut us off completely from these [Asian] countries and our contacts with each other were broken except by way of sea routes controlled by Europe--more especially by England."³

Nehru's statements about the experience of India have a familiar ring to the ears of other Asian and African peoples. Whenever Arab political leaders and activists wished to meet in order to discuss the predicament of their nation under Ottoman rule, they invariably had to meet outside their own territory.⁴ European capitals were the only places where Asian nationalists could air the grievances of their continent.

²Jawaharlal Nehru, "Inter-Asian Relations," India Quarterly, II (October-December, 1946), 323;

³Ibid., p. 325.

⁴George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 79-125.

Africa, of course, fared no better than Asia in this regard. Although it should have been theoretically easier for African nationalist leaders to communicate with each other and with their Asian counterparts, due to the achievement of independence of many Asian countries after World War II, their ability to do so was in reality limited. A delegation from Zanzibar which wished to participate in the 1958 Peoples Solidarity Conference in Cairo, for example, was forbidden to do so. The British Resident informed Sheikh Ali Muhcin, the head of the delegation, that "it is the express desire of H. M. Government, endorsed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, that you and those with you should not attend the Cairo conference. You are unaware of the real inspiration of the conference."⁵ In their efforts to shield their colonial subjects from the contamination which might result from contact with undesirable influences in the independent Afro-Asian states, colonial powers even limited student travel to these areas. It has been reported that although no less than four thousand Africans arrive in Cairo every year, most of them have met with opposition in wanting to travel there. "Uganda's 30 students who tried to get visas to come to Cairo were refused, and their every effort to get out of the country failed. They then waited until the pilgrimage, when they crossed the frontier under the pretext of going to Mecca."⁶ These restrictions

⁵"Cairo Conference," African Affairs, LVII (April, 1958), 92.

⁶"The Story of Afro-Asian Solidarity," The Arab Review, I (December, 1960), 16.

on Afro-Asian intercourse obviously handicapped the development of co-operation and policy co-ordination. Contacts among people are necessary for the discovery of shared interests and grievances as well as for the formulation of a common approach to deal with them.

The relative absence of Afro-Asian intercourse, then, was largely imposed and was not due to a lack of awareness of its desirability or the need for it. As Nehru put it in the above-quoted address, "everybody agreed" to such contacts. This general agreement on the desirability of increased Afro-Asian intercourse stemmed from the belief that the various Afro-Asian countries shared the same problems, espired toward similar goals, and that, weak as they were individually, they could make their voices audible if they joined them together. These shared beliefs were expressed as early as 1926 during the International Conference for World Peace, held at Bierville, France. In this early manifestation of solidarity among Asian nationalists, Asian representatives to this conference submitted a joint statement entitled Asia and Peace,⁷ in which they expressed their belief that they basically shared the same problems and faced the same adversary. There exists, the statement read, "a union of European Powers for the exploitation of Asia and for the subordination of new peoples. European nations have indeed their rivalries against each

⁷For a text of the document see India Quarterly, II (May, 1946), 192-195.

other in Asia, but as against Asiatics they are one."⁸ This belief in a shared grievance and in the oneness of the adversary was augmented by the belief that the fortunes of individual Afro-Asian countries were not entirely unrelated. The dominance of a colonial power in one part of Afro-Asia was thought to necessitate and to make possible its dominance over other territories. They believed, for example that "the whole problem of Asia centers round Great Britain's position in India."⁹

All these factors--the belief in the similarity of Asia's problems and goals, the oneness of the adversary, and the relevance of the outcome of the struggle in one area to the fortunes of the continent--argued for the co-ordination of national movements throughout Asia. In the case of Africa, these factors were also present, perhaps in a more pronounced form. The existence of a union of colonial powers was at least as real as it was in the case of Asia.¹⁰ As in the case of Asia, Africa often was not even paid the compliment of being fought over by the colonial powers. A conspicuous example of how Africa's fate was determined by the colonial powers was Franco's agreement to give Britain a free hand in Egypt

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-94.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁰ This belief in the inter-relationship between the fates of various Afro-Asian territories is so significant in terms of Afro-Asian co-operation that it will be discussed at length in Chapter VII, dealing with cohesive and divisive factors.

in exchange for Britain's consent to give France an equally free hand in Morocco.

In the circumstances which they presented, and in the hopes they wished to realize, the peoples of Asia and later of Africa found a bond which related them together. This discovery was to lead Afro-Asian states to mutual support and to an attempt to create a political alignment. These attempts have taken such a large portion of Afro-Asia's political energies as to make it possible to assert that they are "in large measure the history of international relations of Asia and Africa since the First World War."¹¹

Because the major parts of Asia and Africa were non-self-governing territories, and because of consequent restrictions on intra-Afro-Asian intercourse, the countries of Asia and Africa had to wait until the 1940's before they found it possible to meet, on the governmental level, to discuss a problem of common concern. The first effort of this nature took the form of a meeting among the governments of the then independent Arab states¹² for the purpose of establishing a regional organization to promote co-operation among them. The outcome of this attempt was the establishment of the League

¹¹J. P. Tripps and H. E. Cock, "Asian-African Coalition and International Organization--Third Force or Collective Impotence?" Review of Politics, XXI (April, 1959), 419.

¹²Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans-Jordan, and Yemen.

of Arab States whose Pact was signed in Cairo on March 22, 1945. It was agreed that the aims of the League shall consist of "strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States," and to "support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts towards the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, and the realization of their aspirations and hopes."¹³ Article 2 stated that one of the League's purposes is to co-ordinate the policies of the member states. The Pact also prohibited the use of force to settle disputes among the members¹⁴ and provided for the inauguration of an Arab collective security system.¹⁵ Although the Pact made it clear that the League would be concerned with disputes which were likely to threaten the peace of the region, it made it equally clear that it would be concerned with the promotion of co-operation among the member states in economic and financial affairs, communications, cultural and social affairs, health problems and legal matters.¹⁶

The Arab League was not, nor was it intended to be, a nucleus of an Asian or an Afro-Asian coalition. Its

¹³League of Arab States, Pact of the Arab States, Presable.

¹⁴Ibid., Art. 5.

¹⁵Ibid., Art. 6.

¹⁶Ibid., Art. 2.

membership, actually and potentially, was limited to independent Arab states. In spite of this fact, the establishment of the League was significant in terms of Afro-Asian co-operation because, for the first time, it institutionalized an effort aiming at policy co-ordination among a group of Afro-Asian states.

The second attempt at Afro-Asian co-operation took place in 1949. On January 20th of that year, fifteen African and Asian states¹⁷ met at New Delhi, upon the invitation of the Indian government, in order to discuss the situation in Indonesia precipitated by the second "police action" undertaken by the government of the Netherlands against the new Republic of Indonesia. The fifteen members of the conference adopted a resolution which called for the "restoration of the Indonesian Republic, establishment of an interim federal government, general elections for a constituent assembly, a transfer of sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Dutch troops."¹⁸

What was more significant, however, in terms of Afro-Asian co-operation was the realization that continuous consultation among Asian and African countries was essential if their agreements, reached in conferences, were to become co-ordinated policies on questions of common concern. Thus,

¹⁷Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

¹⁸Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates, The State of Asia, A Contemporary Survey (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 427.

the second resolution adopted by the Delhi Conference of 1949 recommended that the participating states "should keep in touch with one another through normal diplomatic channels," and that they "should instruct their representatives at the Headquarters of the United Nations or their diplomatic representatives to consult among themselves."¹⁹ Moreover, the conference expressed the opinion that "participating Governments should consult among themselves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, for promoting consultation and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations."²⁰

The next attempt at co-operation came in the form of a regional conference held at Baguio, the Philippines, between May 26 and 30, 1950. This conference was convened at the initiative of the Philippines' government for the purpose of promoting social, economic, and cultural co-operation among the participating countries.²¹ In his opening speech Carlos P. Romulo, the chief delegate of the Philippines' government and the president of the conference, suggested the establishment of a permanent organization to be charged with

¹⁹S. L. Poplai, Asia and Africa in the Modern World (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1953), p. 197.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

the task of promoting the objectives of the conference.²² But instead of setting up a permanent organization as Roxulo suggested, the conference charged its president with keeping the participating states informed of the progress achieved in relation to the recommendations adopted. As in the case of the 1949 New Delhi Conference, the Baguio meeting considered the existing "normal diplomatic channels" and the delegations to the United Nations as adequate means of communication. This attitude was expressed in resolutions recommending that the participating governments should

(a) act in consultation with each other through normal diplomatic channels to further the interest of the people of the region;

(b) seek joint action so as to exercise due influence in the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations....

(c) ensure that in the consideration of the special problems of South and South-east Asia, the point of view of this area, is prominently kept in mind, by any conference dealing with such problems...²³

In order that the point of view of South and South-east Asia could be "kept in mind" by an international conference dealing with problems of that area, such a point of view had to be made known. This opportunity arrived with the convening of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The prime ministers of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon held a conference between April 28 and May 2, 1954, in Colombo and in Kandy, Ceylon, for discussing problems of common interest. "It was a happy coincidence," their final communique

²²The New York Times, May 27, 1950.

²³Text of resolutions in Poplai, pp. 198-201.

said, "that the Prime Ministers...should have met together at a time when problems vital to the stability and peace of the Far Eastern and Asian region were being considered by the Geneva Conference."²⁴ The prime ministers supported independence for Indo-China, Morocco, and Tunisia, urged an end to nuclear weapons testing, condemned colonialism, supported the rights of Palestinian refugees, disagreed on communism, and resolved to explore the possibility of holding a general Asian-African conference.²⁵

Before this historical sketch of Afro-Asian co-operation proceeds any further, it must be pointed out that, up to this point, these attempts at political co-operation were marked by two main characteristics. First, they either established or considered the establishment of permanent structures to facilitate continuous consultation. Second, they all were efforts restricted in one way or another. It was said that the Arab League was born out of the efforts of seven independent Arab states and was designed as an organization exclusively for the use of these states and any other Arab territories which might attain independent status. Membership in the League was not open to non-Arab states then or in the future. The 1949 New Delhi Conference was attended by independent states scattered all over Afro-Asia, but it limited itself to the consideration of a specific problem in which the participating countries professed to

²⁴Ibid., p. 202.

²⁵Ibid.

have an interest--the problem of Indonesia. The Baguio Conference, although it dealt with a variety of matters, was limited to the independent states of South and Southeast Asia. The 1954 conference in Ceylon dealt with a large number of subjects, but its membership was narrowly limited. All of these conferences either had a broad geographic representation but a limited interest, or they had an interest in a large number of matters but a restricted participation.

Although these restrictions were somewhat reduced when delegates of the Afro-Asian members to the United Nations began to consult among themselves on questions coming before the international organization,²⁶ it was not until 1955 that a governmental Afro-Asian conference was held which was general both in terms of participation and scope of interest. This was the Afro-Asian Conference which met at Bandung, Indonesia, between April 18 and 24, 1955.

It will be remembered that one of the resolutions which were adopted by the prime ministers of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon in 1954 called for the exploration of the possibility of holding a general Afro-Asian conference. The conference delegated the responsibility of implementing this resolution to Ali Sastroamidjojo, the prime minister of Indonesia, who originated the proposal. On the 28th and 29th of December, 1954, the five states met again at Bogor, Indonesia, to discuss the Indonesian prime minister's report on the progress of his efforts. The

²⁶This point will be discussed in the next chapter.

Bogor Conference agreed that the participating countries should sponsor, jointly, a general Afro-Asian conference to be held in Indonesia during the last week of April, 1955. The conference was assigned the following general objectives:

1. To promote goodwill and co-operation.
2. To consider social, economic and cultural problems.
3. To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African countries, e. g., colonialism and racialism.
4. To consider the contributions toward world peace and co-operation which the countries of Asia and Africa should make.²⁷

It was further agreed by the prime ministers that the proposed conference "should have a broad and geographical basis and that all countries in Asia and Africa which have independent governments should be invited. With minor variations and modifications of this basic principle"²⁸ they decided to invite twenty-five countries²⁹ all of which, with the sole exception of the Central African Federation, agreed to attend. Their acceptance, as the final communique of the Bogor Conference stated, implied that they were "in general

²⁷A. K. Hassounah, Report to the Arab League on the Asian African Conference (Cairo, 1955), pp. 30-31.

²⁸Popel, pp. 211-214.

²⁹Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Federation, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam, and Yemen.

agreement with the purposes of the Conference."³⁰ This implication constitutes a reasonable explanation for the Central African Federation's refusal to participate, considering its position on racial questions.

The "minor variations and modifications" of the principle of geographic representation, it will be noted, resulted in the exclusion of both North and South Korea, Nationalist China, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and the Union of South Africa. Also, "there never was any suggestion that the Soviet Asian Republics or Outer Mongolia be asked" to participate.³¹

Before proceeding any further, it must be pointed out that there never existed any fixed rules for determining a country's Asian or African identity. Thus, Australia was one of the Asian participants in the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia. New Zealand also was invited to attend, but it was satisfied with sending observers. For the purposes of non-governmental Afro-Asian conferences the term "Asian" was interpreted more loosely.³² At various times, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Tibet and the "Asian" Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Georgia were participants in such conferences. At the time of the Baguio Conference of 1950, however, a trend began

³⁰Poplai, p. 212.

³¹George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian African Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 3.

³²These non-governmental conferences will be dealt with briefly later in this chapter.

to assert itself which was to lead to the practice of requiring that a state which wished to qualify as Afro-Asian had to meet political as well as geographic specifications. The political requirement usually took the form of an advance declaration, explicit or implied, that the country in question was in general agreement with the purposes of the conference in which it wished to take a part. This attitude was first manifested in the Baguio conference which "in a preliminary meeting...voted any participation by Nationalist China,"³³ because Chiang Kai-Shek demanded that the conference adopt a strong anti-communist stand.³⁴ The declaration of the sponsors of the Bandung Conference that an acceptance of their invitation implied a general agreement with the purposes of the conference was a continuation of this trend.

The exclusion of Israel most likely was the result of the sponsors' belief that if Israel were invited the Arab states would boycott the conference. On the 20th of December, 1954, the Secretariat-General of the Arab League transmitted a note to the sponsors of the proposed Afro-Asian Conference which stated in part:

It is known that this conference will be a regional one. It has been the policy of the Arab States not to participate in any regional conference where Israel is represented. The Arab States do not have any doubt that Israel will not be invited to this conference and will not participate therein.³⁵

³³The New York Times, May 26, 1950.

³⁴Ibid., May 23, 1950.

³⁵Hassanah, p. 22.

Unlike the exclusion of Israel, which was motivated by a desire to retain the adherence of a large minority of Afro-Asian states, the exclusion of Australia and New Zealand can best be explained on the ground of these two countries' attitudes toward the question of colonialism in Southeast Asia. On the question of West New Guinea, for example, Australia had taken a stand "directly opposed to that of her Asian neighbors."³⁶ Therefore, Australia had to mend its ways before it could be included in an Afro-Asian coalition, and the same factor applied to New Zealand.³⁷

The Australians' claim that "geographically we are an Asian nation"³⁸ was considered inadequate, because they failed to meet the political qualification which Asians were beginning to consider as "fundamental to a country's membership in the coalition."³⁹

After eliminating a potential cause of disunion by excluding African and Asian states which were known to be lacking in support for the declared purposes of the

³⁶Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1950-1955 (Melbourne: P. W. Chechire, 1957), p. 203.

³⁷"While Australia and New Zealand have a claim to be...associated with an Asian Union...they must clearly take a more positive line for the ending of the last vestiges of colonialism in East Asia before that could be done." H. Venkatesubbiah, "Prospects of an Asian Union: Lessons from the Organization of American States," Indic Quarterly, V (July-September, 1949), 216.

³⁸Greenwood and Harper, p. 223.

³⁹Venkatesubbiah, Indic Quarterly, V (July-September, 1949), 216.

conference, the twenty-nine states which accepted the invitation met at Bandung, Indonesia, from April 18 to April 24, 1955. This conference was of paramount importance to the developing relations among the Afro-Asian states. The Secretary General of the Arab League, in his report on the Bandung Conference to the League's Council, wrote:

There is no doubt that this conference has brought about a change in the atmosphere of Asian-African relations. The views exchanged at the sessions of the conference and the private talks which went on outside the conference rooms were highly instrumental in fostering friendships and the elimination of suspicion and mistrust which had overshadowed the relations between the countries of this part of the world.⁴⁰

A Western reporter who had covered international conferences since the Peace Conference of 1919 concluded that the Bandung Conference was "the most important of them all."⁴¹ Writing in The New York Times of April 17, 1955, Tillman Dardin expressed the opinion that "in scope and importance [the Bandung Conference] will rank second in world affairs only to a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

The foregoing statements undoubtedly exaggerated the effect of the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian relations, but the fact remains that it went farther in the direction of their harmonization than most observers expected and, to all appearances, even exceeded the sponsors' expectations--

⁴⁰ Haseounah, p. 14.

⁴¹ Vernon Bartlett, "The Awakening of the Afro-Asian Nations," African Affairs, LIX (April, 1960), 105.

considering the fact that three of the sponsors--Nehru, U Nu, and Kotselawale--were not enthusiastic or optimistic about the feasibility of the project.⁴²

When the conference decided to adopt resolutions only by unanimous consent, few people saw anything definite coming out of it except condemnation of Western colonialism. Thus, The New York Times of April 17, 1955, prophesied that "the probability of a definite stand on specific issues is small. But the probability of sharp criticism of Western policy in general, and United States policy in particular, is large." The U. S. State Department was reported as viewing "the prospects at Bandung with considerable distaste but no great alarm."⁴³ These reactions to the conference were characteristic in the United States and Western Europe in general.⁴⁴ Even a leading Pakistani newspaper rhetorically asked: "Can it not be that a sort of inferiority complex, magnified to international proportions," underlies the urge to bring the Asian and African countries together for the Bandung Conference?⁴⁵

Indeed the unanimity rule and the composition of the conference did not lend themselves to evoking high expectations

⁴²Kahin, p. 2.

⁴³The New York Times, February 20, 1955.

⁴⁴Hessounah, pp. 32-33. Also, The New York Times of February 26, 1955, reported that "Western diplomats expect the Bandung meeting will serve as a sounding board for diatribes against 'white' colonialism and 'aggressive' United States foreign policy in Asia."

⁴⁵The New York Times, January 3, 1955.

of agreements on specific questions. "The chief characteristic of the nations meeting in Bandung is diversity," The New York Times of April 17, 1955, correctly observed.

At least eight different religions and some forty languages and dialects are represented by the Bandung powers. Their political systems run the spectrum from totalitarian rule to Western-style democracy. Their cultural and historic ties are few, their current levels of economic development very sharply.

No wonder, then, that little agreement was expected from the conference. After six days of meetings, however, the delegates were able to "note with satisfaction, and some surprise, that they had achieved unanimity of some sort from Tokyo to Tripoli."⁴⁶

No doubt, the conference failed to reach meaningful agreement on some questions which were relevant and avoided others which were controversial. An example of the first type was the inability of the conference to agree on a draft resolution condemning colonialism (of all things!). Some participants held that colonialism included the communist as well as the more familiar West European type of domination.⁴⁷ Others argued that the countries of Eastern Europe were not Russian colonies and that colonialism merely signified Western domination of Eastern countries. "After two-and-a-half hours of heated discussion," a subcommittee "was unable to reach an agreement over the text of a unified draft resolution."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ibid., April 25, 1955.

⁴⁷ Haseounah, p. 99.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 105.

Finally, the conference had to settle for condemning colonialism "in all its manifestations."⁴⁹

In spite of the fact that some controversial questions were avoided, like the issue of Formosa, the conference did achieve unanimity on many important questions dealing with a wide range of subjects including such "specific" issues as Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, and Aden. Moreover, the agreements reached by the conference and which the final communique contained did not tell all of the story. Personal contacts outside of the conference halls were valuable in promoting better understanding among the leaders of the region. The opinion to this effect which was expressed by the Secretary General of the Arab League, quoted earlier, was affirmed by Prime Minister Nehru in an address to the Indian Parliament on April 31, 1955, in which, after speaking of the resolutions adopted by the conference, he said:

So much for the actual work and achievement within the Conference itself. But we must refer to the many contacts established, the friendships that have been formed and the prejudices that have been removed.⁵⁰

One of the fruits of these informal contacts was the conclusion of an agreement between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China dealing with the vexing question of the status of overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 was a landmark in the history of Afro-Asian co-operation, and not necessarily for

⁴⁹ A text of the official communique issued at the end of the conference is found in ibid., pp. 123-133.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 153-154.

the agreements it reached. Its greatest significance lay in the fact that it gave the leaders of Asia and Africa a sense of confidence in their joint ability to make their voices heard not only in the affairs of their region, but also in world affairs. In his speech of April 31, 1955, quoted above, Mr. Nehru said: "We believe that our great organization, the United Nations, has derived strength from Bandung. This means in turn that Asia and Africa must play an increasing role in the conduct and the destiny of this world organization."⁵¹

This consciousness of collective strength--whether real or apparent is not the point--was revealed in the delegates' speeches to the conference. One after another they came to the rostrum and spoke of the voice of "two-thirds of mankind" whom they represented. This confidence in the collective strength of Asia and Africa found its extreme manifestation in the words of the Syrian delegate who proclaimed:

We are not negligible....With our combined will, if we earnestly will, we can veto a catastrophic war or bring it down to a minimum [sic]. Without us a world war cannot be waged. We command the greatest of manpower, of raw material, of war fuel, of military bases and of strategic positions. What a great asset to arrest war and establish peace.⁵²

It must be repeated that whether these remarks were justified or not is beside the point. The point is that the Bandung

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 153-54.

⁵²Khaled El-Azou, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, pp. 1278-79.

Conference seemed to have created among the participants a feeling of greater security, which could not fail to argue for further co-operation among the countries of Asia and Africa.

In addition to strengthening the belief of Afro-Asian nations in the desirability of co-operation, the conference also provided a guide for the Afro-Asian representatives in the United Nations. A casual reading of the general debates of the General Assembly during the tenth session (1955) reveals that Asian and African delegates placed the Bandung Declaration on the same level with the United Nations Charter. They "have been looking upon the Declaration as an official document which guides their actions. They see no need for consulting their governments on the Conference resolutions."⁵³ And during the 1960 session of the United Nations, President Nasser offered the Bandung resolutions as "solutions to the problems facing us."⁵⁴

No governmental conferences on the model of Bandung have been convened since 1955. Beginning with 1958, the scene of activity shifted to Africa where it took the form of conferences of independent African states. The first of these was the Accra Conference which met from April 15 to

⁵³Hassounah, p. 173.

⁵⁴United Arab Republic, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Text of Statement Delivered by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 September 1960, n. d., p. 27.

April 22, 1958, at the invitation of the government of Ghana. The participants in the conference were Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. The conference had a seven-point agenda covering a wide variety of subjects headed by the inevitable questions of colonialism and racialism. When the conference ended, it had adopted resolutions which urged upon independent Africa a foreign policy of non-alignment; advocated the adoption of a deadline for setting dependent Africa free; recognized the Algerian Front of National Liberation as the only legitimate spokesman for the Algerian people, and urged France to end the war by negotiating with it; condemned racialism in the Union of South Africa, the Central African Federation, and Kenya; appealed to the great powers to stop nuclear weapons testing and production; agreed to constant consultation through their delegations to the United Nations, and to hold a similar meeting every two years. Before they adjourned, the delegates accepted an invitation from the Ethiopian government to hold the next conference, in 1960, at Addis Ababa.⁵⁵

When the Addis Ababa conference met on June 14, 1960, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, and Cameroun had attained independent status and participated in the conference. Although the conference was able to agree, in most cases unanimously, on fifteen resolutions "bearing on the question of ending colonialism in Africa and on promoting the political and economic

⁵⁵The New York Times, April 16, 1958.

welfare of Africans,"⁵⁶ disagreement became apparent when the conference tackled the problem of African unity. In his opening address to the conference the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, called collaboration and unity "prime necessities" for furthering Africa's freedom. His conception of unity seemed to have been functional, for he advocated the construction of roads connecting African countries, trade exchange, African airlines, and an African development bank.⁵⁷ As the conference developed, however, different participants revealed very different ideas about African unity. While Ghana's delegation, for example, advocated a United States of Africa, the Nigerians called plans for a union premature and dangerous. Liberia favored a loose association of states, and Tanganyika preferred regional alliances for states with common political and economic interests and needs.⁵⁸ It is needless to say that no plans for an African union emerged from the conference.

The conferences of independent African states which were held beginning with 1958 seemed to reflect the African leaders' desire to proclaim their belief that they had outgrown their dependence upon Asia in their continent's struggle for freedom. Nkrumah's declaration to the Accra Conference of 1958 that the independent African states must seek

⁵⁶Ibid., June 25, 1960.

⁵⁷Ibid., June 15, 1960.

⁵⁸Ibid., June 26, 1960.

to create a "distinctive African personality"⁵⁹ is symbolic of this attitude. Africa was beginning to favor a distinct, although not a separate, wing within the Afro-Asian coalition. The rapidly increasing number of independent African states resulted not only in a separate African effort, but also reduced the political homogeneity of African states.

By 1960, when several ex-French territories achieved autonomy, a cleavage began to appear within the African group. African states formerly ruled by France began to hold separate conferences which made it clear that they thought of themselves as a distinct group within the African community of states. When thirteen French-speaking African states⁶⁰ met at Brazzaville in December, 1960, in order to work out common policies for the African states d'expression française, their meeting was condemned by a conference, held the same month by the heads of states of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. These three African states condemned "all forms of African regroupment based on the languages of the colonial powers," and appealed to the heads of the thirteen French-speaking African states "to follow a higher and more healthy conception

⁵⁹Ibid., April 22, 1958. Speaking before the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society on June 5, 1958, E. O. Asefu-Adjaye, High Commissioner for Ghana said: "We Ghanaians regard our independence as an opportunity to help evolve an African personality." E. O. Asefu-Adjaye, "Ghana Since Independence," African Affairs, LVII (July, 1958), 185.

⁶⁰Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Congo (Leopoldville).

of African unity."⁶¹ This division of Africa into English- and French-speaking countries became a "major barrier to integration or even co-operation in Africa today."⁶² The increasing heterogeneity of African states which followed the increase in the number of independent African countries, therefore, diminished the ability of those states to adhere to common attitudes, and made it more of a problem for them to co-operate on matters of policy.

This split was formalized with the formation of two distinct groups of African states--the Casablanca group and the Brazzaville group. The Casablanca group, which derived its name from the place of its first meeting during the first week of 1961, consisted of Morocco, the U. A. R., Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Libya. It considered the Brazzaville group, or French-speaking group of sub-Sahara states, as too subservient to French interests and, therefore, as traitors to the cause of African freedom.⁶³ When the Lagos, Nigeria, conference of independent African states met early in 1962, it was boycotted by the Casablanca group, because the conference yielded to the Brazzaville group and refused to invite the Provisional Government of Algeria. Tunisia, Sudan, and Libya also withdrew for the same reason.⁶⁴ On the other hand, the

⁶¹"Co-operation by African States," African Affairs, LX (April, 1961), 129.

⁶²Erasmus M. Klonan, Jr., "New Directions in the Drive Toward African Unity," Orbis, VI (Winter, 1963), 579.

⁶³"African Eleven," Economist, December 31, 1960, p. 1388.

⁶⁴"Nonprovisos Muddle Through," ibid., February 3, 1962, pp. 431-32.

proceedings of the conference implied a condemnation of the Casablanca group "which has been accused of inciting subversion in other African states."⁶⁵

Another factor which tends to reduce the ability of African states to co-operate is the division between North and sub-Saharan Africa. An incident which served to bring out this fact was the opposition of Nigeria's prime minister to holding a preliminary meeting of independent African states in Tunis on the ground that it was inappropriate for such a meeting to be held in the predominantly white North Africa.⁶⁶ Referring to the Arab members of the Casablanca group of states, the head of the delegation of a French-speaking state remarked during the Lagos conference of 1962: "We will not be dictated to by white Africans."⁶⁷ Moreover, the existence of two apparently competitive movements within Africa also militates against the effectiveness of a joint African endeavor. "The intensive Egyptian effort to promote Islam as an instrument for projecting Arab influence in Africa conflicts sharply with the Ghanaian advocacy of a traditionally all-black Pan-Africanism."⁶⁸

The preceding historical account of African and Asian countries' attempts at co-operation was limited to their efforts on the governmental level. A word must be added about

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

⁶⁶ Klsman, *Orbis*, VI (Winter, 1963), 589.

⁶⁷ "Monrovia's Muddle Through," *Economist*, February 3, 1962, p. 431.

⁶⁸ Klsman, *Orbis*, VI (Winter, 1963), 581.

analogous attempts in which the participants were non-official groups representing these countries, since in most Asian and African countries such groups are, in varying degrees, arms of the states under which they exist.

The first non-governmental conference of this type was the Conference on the Defence of Nationalities and Subject Races which met in London from June 28 to 30, 1910. This conference, of which only scanty records are available, seems to have been limited in its purpose to an appeal for a more humane treatment of colonial peoples. It adopted a resolution urging that "utmost care should be taken not only to prohibit slave-trading and slavery, but that no system of forced, indentured, or contract labour should be permitted whereby the labour of the natives is exploited for the economic advantage of the other races."⁶⁹

It was not until 1926, however, that Asia claimed a right to express its views on international problems. In August of that year, an International Conference for Peace was held at Brierville, France, under the auspices of French and German organizations. The Asian delegates to the conference grouped themselves into an "Asian delegation" and submitted their views to the conference in a joint memorandum.⁷⁰

By 1947, Asia was well on its way to becoming a land of independent nations. An Asian conference finally became possible in Asia. Such an event took place when an Asian

⁶⁹The Times (London), June 29, 1910.

⁷⁰See footnote 7.

Relations Conference was held in New Delhi in March-April, 1947, under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs in order to consider such problems as national movements for freedom, racial problems, colonial economy, industrial development, inter-Asian migration, the status of women, and cultural co-operation. For the purposes of this conference, the term "Asian" was interpreted broadly enough to include all Asian countries, including the Soviet Republics of Central Asia.⁷¹ By the time the conference was held, Asian national movements were well developed and somewhat co-ordinated. The Asian Relations Conference demonstrated the willingness of Asian leaders to lend their support to each other's causes. The proceedings of the conference demonstrated that "whenever any colonial power would attempt to re-establish its power in an Asian country it would have to contend not only with the freedom movement of the country concerned, but with a hostile public opinion of the whole of Asia."⁷² This, perhaps, was what Nehru aimed for when he advocated the holding of such a conference in a speech he gave on August 22, 1946. In his speech, Nehru said that such a conference would cause no revolutionary changes in Asia, but it would make the people of Asia "think in terms of closer co-operation with each other."⁷³

⁷¹A. Appadorai, The Bandung Conference (New Delhi: The Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955), p. 1. Also, Pople, p. 4.

⁷²Pople, p. 5.

⁷³Nehru, India Quarterly, II (October-December, 1946), 325.

The most ambitious attempt to express solidarity among the peoples of Asia and Africa was made in 1957 when an Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference was held in Cairo. The most significant achievement of the conference was the establishment of a permanent organization called the Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Council, with permanent headquarters in Cairo. An example of the Council's work was the designation of March 30 as Algeria Day, during which Asians and Africans were called upon to support Algerian independence morally and materially.⁷⁴

After 1958, such non-official efforts took the form of All-Africa Peoples Conferences aiming at promoting co-operation among African national movements. In 1958, Accra was the scene of the first of these conferences during which a split became evident which paralleled the cleavage on the governmental level. The sub-Saharan French-speaking countries were not represented except by dissident factions.⁷⁵

The countries of Asia and Africa, then, have been engaged in a persistent and an extensive effort to assert themselves in international relations by seeking to establish common grounds for concerted action. A survey of this effort at Afro-Asian co-operation reveals several patterns of behavior. First, in its initial stages it was characterized by a tendency to become more general both in terms of

⁷⁴The New York Times, January 2, 1958.

⁷⁵"Africans in Congress," Economist, February 20, 1960, p. 730.

geographic representation and in terms of interest. It was also characterized by the emergence of political qualifications which the participants were expected to meet before they could be included in the coalition. After 1955, two major trends emerged. The first was an increased and separate African effort at co-operation. The second was the emergence of a schism within the African segment of the coalition.

The non-governmental Asian and African attempts at solidarity also underwent an evolution which closely resembled similar efforts on the governmental level. The parallel is most clearly seen in the shift of the scene of activity to Africa, and in the emergence of a split within the ranks of African participants.

The analysis further shows that although Afro-Asian conferences have at times, as in the case of the Bandung Conference, expressed an interest in the international situation in general, their work clearly demonstrates a concentration on problems directly relevant to Afro-Asia. The preoccupation with the problems of colonialism and racism is evident in all of the conferences—governmental and non-governmental.

Finally, it was evident that Afro-Asian states attached great importance to the United Nations as an instrument of Afro-Asian intercourse. While the need for continuous consultation among them was generally recognized, suggestions for the establishment of permanent methods of communication

could not gain sufficient support, and contacts among Afro-Asian representatives at the United Nations were thought to be sufficient for that purpose.

In 1947, Afro-Asian delegates to the United Nations began to meet for the purpose of consultation on matters coming before the international organization. This form of consultation continues today. How successful has this effort been at sustaining and enhancing Afro-Asian solidarity? What has it accomplished for Afro-Asia? These and related questions will be the theme of the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

THE EXISTENCE OF THE GROUP

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Afro-Asian members of the General Assembly constitute a political alignment.¹ First it is necessary to define the problem and to state and justify the criteria on the basis of which a judgment will be made. Before the existence of the group can be demonstrated, we must answer the question of what is a group and how it can be identified.

A survey of studies of group politics in the United Nations reveals a widespread disagreement on what actually is being studied. The absence of an agreed definition of a group, and generally accepted criteria for identifying it, often lead to the discovery of dissimilar groups operating within the same body. No two studies agree on what groups operate within the General Assembly or on the membership of these groups.² The reason for this disagreement is that political groupings in the United Nations have been identified in three different ways, each of which was bound to

¹For a list of members of the Afro-Asian group studied in this dissertation, see Appendix A.

²For a brief description of this problem see Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," The American Political Science Review, LVII (December, 1963), 902-917.

yield different results. First, political alignments have been viewed as groupings whose existence can be postulated or inferred from the existence of certain common conditions like geographical propinquity, ideology, religion, form of government, etc. Second, political alignments have been identified on the basis of censusing activity. Third, they have been identified on the basis of voting agreement.

None of these methods of identifying political alignments is sufficiently reliable when used alone. Common characteristics of states do not necessarily indicate group behavior. Some of these characteristics may be either irrelevant or unequally relevant to the political behavior of different states. Although it is obviously true that there exists in the Assembly a group of Moslem states, for example, it would be going beyond what the evidence warrants to assert that a common tie such as religion "doubtless provide[s] a sense of cohesion in particular issues."³

In addition to the question of their relevance, the common characteristics of states are unreliable indicators of group behavior because they are not always susceptible of objective determination. The geographical location of a state, for example, may be viewed as one of its more easily ascertained characteristics. But in some cases, a determination is complicated by the fact that a state may choose to view its geography differently than the map or the

³Thomas Hovet, Jr., bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 45.

region-definer would indicate. Is Turkey, for example, a Near Eastern or a European power? Its recent political behavior certainly cannot be explained without reference to the fact that it has considered itself and has been considered by others "sometimes...as part of the Middle East, sometimes as part of Eastern Europe, and sometimes even as part of Western Europe."⁴

The exclusion of several Asian and African states from Afro-Asian conferences, mentioned in the previous chapter, and from participation in the caucusing activities of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, further indicates the unreliability of using the common characteristics of states as indicators of group affiliation. A state may have many ties in common with other states without considering itself or being considered affiliated with them in a political alignment.

Caucusing--the second method which has been used for determining the political affiliations of states--indicates a desire on the part of participating states for concerted political endeavor. But that is all it indicates. Whether or not caucusing states do in fact represent a distinct political alignment cannot be assumed from their caucusing activities.

Finally, voting agreement is a fairly reliable measure of shared political views. But it is not sufficient to

⁴ Sydney D. Bailey, The United Nations: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 45.

indicates group behavior. Voting agreement, for example, may result from the fact that the issues voted upon are not controversial. On the other hand, it ignores the psychological commitments of states. A state which thinks of itself as a member of a certain political faction but is unable to accept its position frequently enough, is excluded although it might have agreed less frequently if it did not consider itself to be a member. Voting agreement alone, then, disregards a factor which often conditions the political behavior of states.

The position taken here is that a number of states qualify as a political alignment when they meet a subjective and an objective condition of affiliation. The subjective condition is met when the states concerned make a conscious effort to act in concert. The objective requirement is fulfilled when in fact they do so to a degree where they can be distinguished from the rest of the members. The subsequent discussion will show that the Afro-Asian group meets these qualifications.

Consultation among representatives of like-minded states is implicit in international parliamentary diplomacy. In a body like the United Nations General Assembly, where success and failure are measured according to the ability to secure enough favorable votes for the measures states advocate, consultation prior to meetings can be very important. It gives interested states the opportunity to expound their views with the hopeful intention of securing support for them in an atmosphere of greater freedom than is usually

found in plenary meetings. More important, perhaps, is the fact that such consultation acquaints interested states with the objections sympathetic members might have to their proposed course of action. A knowledge of such possible objections, if known sufficiently in advance, can be beneficial in three important ways. First, it gives an interested state the opportunity to debate them under less formal rules. Second, it gives it the time to readjust its tactics to the situation, as for example by removing some of the objectionable aspects of its proposals. Third, it gives it the time to seek, through the home government, a change in instructions to other delegations. Under the circumstances found in the operation of the Assembly, it is important for states to know who is willing to support them, how far this support will go, and to have time for an effort to seek its increase.

For these reasons, it is not surprising that on several occasions it was either proposed or resolved in Afro-Asian conferences that representatives of Asian and African states should consult with each other and engage in joint action in the United Nations.⁵ Afro-Asian delegates to the United Nations did not wait to be instructed by their governments to do so. The first known occasion for a meeting of Afro-Asian delegates held for the purpose of co-ordinating policy took place almost two years before consultation and joint action were first urged by the New Delhi Conference

⁵Chapter I, footnotes 19, 20, and 23.

of 1949. This first meeting of what was then called the Arab-Asian group was planned during a discussion between Mohammad Fadhil Jamali, the Iraqi delegate, and the late Asef Ali, the Indian ambassador. The meeting, which was held in the spring of 1947, was called by ambassador Ali "to unify the policy of the group on the question of Palestine in the United Nations."⁶

From that first meeting until shortly after the Bandung Conference of 1955, similar meetings continued to be held on an ad hoc basis. The group held meetings to unify the views of its members on such problems as Libya (1949), Korea (1950), and Tunisia (1951).⁷

During this initial phase in the life of the Afro-Asian group, its caucusing activity was limited in two ways. First, it caucused on an ad hoc basis only, and it did not seek to deal with all or even most of the items on the Assembly's agenda. Second, its membership was neither clearly defined, nor was it inclusive enough to include all Afro-Asian states. In addition to the Asian and African states which seem to be excluded on a permanent basis--China, Israel, South Africa--the group did not include Turkey, the Philippines, Liberia, Ethiopia, or Thailand as regular participants.⁸

⁶Mohammad Fadhil Jamali, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1259.

⁷Hovet, pp. 78-79. Hovet erroneously states that the group met for the first time in 1949 in connection with the question of Libya.

⁸For changes in the membership of the group see ibid., pp. 78-84.

The group's attempt to act as a mediator in the Korean conflict, for example, resulted in the exclusion from participation in it of the above mentioned states which were participants in the armed conflict. Instead of caucusing with other Afro-Asian states, they caucused with the group of sixteen members which were then fighting in Korea.

These two limitations on the caucusing activity of the African and Asian states, it is interesting to note, were the same limitations which during that same period characterized governmental Afro-Asian conferences. Prior to the Bandung Conference, as it was said in Chapter I, such conferences either limited themselves to dealing with only one or a few questions, or participation in them was less than general. The Bandung Conference ended these limitations on Afro-Asian consultation outside as well as inside the United Nations.

Beginning with the tenth session (1955), the Afro-Asian group expanded its caucusing activity in three ways. First, participation became more general. States which until then participated only occasionally became regular members. Second, it began to meet on a regular, instead of on an ad hoc, basis. And third, it began to deal with an increasing number of items.⁹

Meetings of the Afro-Asian group are designed to harmonize views within the limits imposed by instructions from home governments and not to reach binding agreements. Votes are occasionally taken but they are not binding. The

⁹Ibid.

frequency of meetings depends on the number and the nature of the issues on the Assembly's agenda, but they sometimes reach as high as three or four a week--a frequency not matched by any other caucusing group. The meetings may last for or exceed two hours. They are somewhat informal, and the chairmanship rotates monthly among the members. The agenda is planned by an agenda committee, but a state may request a meeting and place its own item. No records are kept, but delegations often report to their governments on important business.¹⁰

The Afro-Asian group is one of the most active caucusing groups in the United Nations. A study of such groups shows that, if sub-divisions of the Afro-Asian group like the Arab faction are not considered, the Afro-Asian group ranks a close second among six groups in its proximity to an ideal caucusing group. This determination--based on twelve criteria of caucusing behavior such as frequency, formality, and length of meetings, voting, preparation of an agenda, etc.--shows that only the Latin American states caucus more vigorously than the Afro-Asian group.¹¹

Caucusing Afro-Asian states were apparently convinced,

¹⁰This description of meetings is mostly based on the participants' own responses, reported in Jack Ernest Vincent, The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations--An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization ("Oklahoma State University: Social Studies Series," No. 12; Stillwater, Oklahoma: Oklahoma State University Press, n. d.), pp. 23-31. Also see Hovet, pp. 78-84 and Robert E. Riggs, Politics in the United Nations: A Study of U. S. Influence (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), p. 22.

¹¹Vincent, pp. 21-31, especially Table 6, p. 31.

even before the group was stabilized and enlarged, that their activities were beneficial not only to themselves but also to the United Nations. Ambassador Zeinuddin of Syria expressed this attitude in a speech during the eighth session (1953) when he said: "My country fully supports the Asian-African group as a beneficial force in the United Nations, and constantly seeks to align its policy with that of the other members in a common endeavour."¹² The ability of the group to arrive at an agreement on particular items, as in the case of Libya in 1949, soon began to impress non-participating Afro-Asian states, and they began to participate more frequently. Even China, which was explicitly refused participation in Afro-Asian conferences--as in the Baguio Conference mentioned in the last chapter--and which never took part in the group's meetings, requested that it be kept informed of Afro-Asian views on various matters.¹³ By 1958, the Bolivian representative in the Assembly expressed the opinion that the Afro-Asian group had mastered the art of outwitting so well that the Latin American countries--which he said originated the idea of intercontinental solidarity in modern times--"are now lagging behind the backward countries of Asia and Africa."¹⁴ By seeking to resolve by joint effort the problems which the small countries can no longer resolve individually and separately," he continued, they are "pointing out

¹²GAOR, Session VIII, 1953, p. 149.

¹³Hovst, p. 79.

¹⁴GAOR, Session XIII, 1958-1959, p. 287.

avenues for action" which other small states can use to their mutual benefit.¹⁵

It is clear, then, that the Afro-Asian states possess the desire to discover and to enlarge consensus among them, and that they make a conscious effort to fulfill this desire. By so doing, they meet the subjective requirement of political affiliation. The subsequent analysis will show that during the 1952-1960 period under study they did in fact act as a distinct grouping on objective grounds. It will be shown that they consistently possessed a degree of solidarity not characteristic of the General Assembly.

Before this analysis is continued, a word must be said about the degree of agreement which must exist among a number of states before they could be said to constitute a distinct political alignment. Two points can be made regarding this matter, the validity of which seems to be beyond reasonable doubt. First, there is no particular level of agreement which is clearly and objectively superior as an indicator of group behavior. Ninety per cent agreement is a more demanding test of solidarity than 80%, but there is no reason to believe that it is more accurate. Second, an absolute level of agreement may be a meaningless test of group behavior. For example, do a number of states which agree 70% of the time constitute a voting alignment? The position taken here is that the answer depends on the level of agreement

¹⁵Ibid.

prevailing among other states. The states which have the 70% level of agreement are a political alignment--on the basis of votes--if agreement among the rest of the states is a rare occurrence. If 70% is the level of agreement found throughout the organ studied, then it does not indicate group behavior. The necessary level of agreement, then, must not only indicate solidarity among a group of states, but it should also distinguish them from the Assembly as a whole. Keeping this position in mind, let us see if the Afro-Asian group possesses the voting agreement necessary for meeting the objective requirement of political alignment.

Calculated by using Rice's index of cohesion--explained briefly in the Note on Method found immediately after the text of this study--the graphs at the end of this chapter show the over-all cohesion of the Afro-Asian group in comparison with the cohesion of the General Assembly as a whole, for each of the regular sessions studied (Sessions VII through XV), and for the 1952-1960 period as a whole. The graphs also show the cohesion of all non-Soviet bloc members. As the graphs show, the Afro-Asian group is consistently far more cohesive than the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Afro-Asian cohesion is shown to be greater than that of the Assembly even when the frequently dissenting Soviet group is excluded. The Afro-Asian group has a larger number of votes in the high cohesion segment of the scale, and a smaller number of votes in the lower cohesion area than either the Assembly as a whole or the Assembly minus the Soviet group.

The conclusion to be drawn from these graphs is that the Afro-Asian group consistently shows a relatively high degree of solidarity which is clearly not a reflection of conditions prevailing in the Assembly. It, therefore, meets the objective requirement of political alignment.

The preceding analysis shows that the Afro-Asian group does possess the attributes of a political group. The existence of the group was shown on both subjective and objective grounds. The subjective criterion is derived from the fact that the members of the group make a conscious effort, by caucusing, to discover and to cultivate a shared attitude toward the preoccupations of the General Assembly. The objective evidence is found in the group's voting record, which demonstrates the existence of substantial voting solidarity which cannot be considered as the reflection of an Assembly-wide consensus.

This chapter gives no detailed analysis of the nature of the attitudes which Afro-Asian countries share. It was not meant to do so. Now we must go on to ask: when is the consensus pronounced, and when does it weaken? Is the degree of Afro-Asian solidarity related or irrelevant to the type of issue which the group faces? These and related questions will be the subject of discussion in the following chapter.




Fig. 11.-Comparative cohesion: Session VII




Fig. 2.-Comparative cohesion: Session VIII




Fig. 3.-Comparative cohesion: Session IX




Fig. 4.-Comparative cohesion: Session X




Fig. 5.-Comparative cohesion: Session XI




Fig. 6.-Comparative cohesion: Session XII




Fig. 7.-Comparative cohesion: Session XIII




Fig. 8.-Comparative cohesion: Session XIV




Fig. 9.-Comparative cohesion: Session XV




Fig. 10.-Comparative cohesion: all sessions

CHAPTER III

COHESIVENESS OF THE GROUP

The Afro-Asian group in the United Nations consists of member states whose political, ethnic, social, religious, cultural, and economic characteristics vary, and in several instances vary sharply. This statement may not be equally true of the several smaller subgroups of which the coalition is composed,¹ but in the case of the total group it is a demonstrable fact. The cementing element in the coalition, as the case is in most political alignments, must then be sought in the constituent members' belief in the existence of significant shared interests among them. The belief in the existence of such interests is generally apparent in the utterances of the leaders and representatives of the affiliated states. In a typical statement, made on July 29, 1958, Kwame Nkrumah reiterated what many other African and Asian leaders often said before him and since when he told a meeting of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations:

Our group is not bound by any formal rules, but we are linked together in close association because we share a common understanding of many of the problems that face the world today. All of us here this afternoon represent countries which subscribe to the principles which were

¹ These subgroups will be identified and discussed in the next two chapters.

laid down at the Bandung Conference of 1954 [sic].²

To gain an understanding of the nature of the coalition, then, one must investigate the nature and the extent of these shared interests as the members of the group see them.

The present chapter's contribution toward this understanding consists of a determination of the extent of the group's shared attitudes on the numerous questions which were dealt with by the General Assembly during the period under study. This analysis is based on the 352 non-unanimous roll-call votes taken during that period. For the purpose of analysis, these votes were classified into the following major categories of issues: racial, colonial, cold war, general political, procedural, and agenda. The classification was made on the basis of the predominant features of the resolutions voted upon. In some cases, the task of classifying a resolution was an easy one. The issue involved was clear. In other cases, more than one type of issue could be discerned. In such cases, it was necessary to weigh the importance of the points involved, and the vote was placed under the category of issues to which it seemed to be most relevant. In the case of several votes, the vote was assigned to two types of issues. Now let us look at the cohesion of Afro-Asian states on these various types of questions.

²Ghana Information Service, Ghana at the United Nations (Accra: October, 1958), p. 23. Emphasis added. Conference met in April, 1955.

Racial Issues:

As was indicated in the first chapter, the policy and practice of racial discrimination have always been among the outstanding preoccupations of Afro-Asian states. They have always found a place for this item on the agenda of their general conferences on both the governmental and non-governmental levels. This attitude is understandable in view of the fact that, by and large, most members of the group are either considered or consider themselves as "colored peoples." In his opening address to the Bandung Conference, for example, the president of the host country declared the gathering to be "the first international conference of colored people in the history of mankind."³ The Afro-Asian states' constant concern with questions related to the policy and practice of racialism is also naturally manifested in their behavior in the United Nations. Since they generally view racialism as a violation of the United Nations Charter as well as a generator of international antagonism,⁴ they took the position that it was within the authority of the organization to deal with it. The problem was first brought to the Assembly by India in 1946, and it has since returned to the agenda in every regular session.

There were 33 roll-call votes taken on racial issues

³ Ahmed Sukarno, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1250.

⁴ See Chapter VII for a discussion of Afro-Asian views on racialism and other questions.

in the General Assembly during the 1952-1960 period--about 9.4% of the total. All of these votes reached the United Nations as a consequence of the apartheid policy of the Union of South Africa, and the treatment of people of Indian and Pakistani origin in that country. An analysis of the Afro-Asian group's voting record on these questions shows that it consistently possessed an exceedingly high degree of solidarity which, as will be shown shortly, was not even approximated in the case of any of the other types of issues. On all of the 33 votes on racial questions studied, the group's index of cohesion exceeded 90. Actually, on 32 of these votes there was no intra-group opposition, and the cohesion was perfect. On one occasion only, the group's cohesion fell to 94 due to an opposition position taken by Japan. In contrast, the Assembly as a whole attained the high cohesion of 90 or better on only 13 votes (about 39.3% of the total). Figure 11 shows Afro-Asian cohesion on racial votes, compared with the cohesion of the Assembly as a whole, and the cohesion of all non-communist members.

The group's attitude toward racial questions can be further illustrated by looking at its members' record of abstention and absenteeism. The total number of abstention votes cast by Afro-Asian members on racial issues was 30. The whole Assembly cast 363 abstention votes on the same issues during the same period. The Afro-Asian group's abstention vote amounted to only 3.8% of its total vote, while all the Assembly members abstained 15.1% of the time. The




Fig. 11.-Comparative cohesion: racial votes

two groups of states, however, manifested no appreciable difference regarding absenteeism and non-voting. Afro-Asian non-voting amounted to 2.5% of the total, while the total Assembly membership did not vote on 2.3% of the roll-calls.⁵

On the basis of the record, then, it can be concluded that, on racial questions, the Afro-Asian states exhibit a high degree of solidarity. Moreover, their solidarity is based on the actual presence of substantial agreement. Not only is intra-group disagreement negligible, but the percentage of cases when an Afro-Asian state evades taking a definite position by abstaining or not voting is very small. In contrast, the rest of the Assembly members are plagued by a relatively high level of disagreement on racial questions. Moreover, they very often evade the issue by resorting to abstention.

Colonial Issues:

As in the case of racial questions, the Afro-Asian states have shown persistent concern with the affairs and the future of non-self-governing territories on their continents. The historical survey of Afro-Asian co-operation presented in Chapter I indicated that the first expression of solidarity among Asian and African peoples took the form of a plea on behalf of colonial peoples at the 1926 Bierville

⁵The rate of abstention and non-voting on racial questions is not affected to any significant degree when the Soviet bloc members are excluded. When they are excluded, Assembly abstentions total 358 or 17.3%, and non-voting amounts to 54, or 2.6% of the total votes.

Conference. This expression of concern continued to be a principal element in all subsequent collective Afro-Asian political endeavors.

This constant concern with the colonial problem may be traced to three main factors. First, almost all the Afro-Asian states have simultaneously shared the experience of colonial rule. When European empires in Asia and Africa began to give way to independence, the process was relatively swift. Consequently, the newly independent states have not had time to forget their colonial experience, and their psychological bond with areas still under colonialism has not yet begun to weaken.

A second reason for the Afro-Asian states' particular concern with colonialism is that Afro-Asian leaders tend to consider the existence of colonialism anywhere on their continents as a potential threat to their own countries' independence. "We are aware that as long as all Africa is not free, Guinea will feel threatened,"⁶ said Sékou Touré. "Ghana's independence was meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the African Continent,"⁷ concurred Kwame Nkrumah. This feeling that Afro-Asia cannot live half-slave half-free, gave the leaders of independent Asian and African states a more concrete justification for diverting some of their energies and resources to their

⁶Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 157.

⁷GAOR, Session XI, Part I, 1956, p. 24.

involvement in the colonial question even after it lost its direct relevance to their own countries. The fight against colonialism became, in their opinion, entangled with their own national interests.

The third factor which tends to suggest the interest of Afro-Asian states in the colonial question is that Afro-Asian leaders often view colonialism as a master-problem, the existence of which inevitably gives rise to other problems detrimental to international peace and security, including their own. Speaking to the Bandung Conference, the Indonesian prime minister and the president of the conference blamed colonialism for being a major cause of tension in the world.⁸ Ghana's foreign minister, Ako Adjei, went so far as to attribute to colonialism "all the troubles which afflict mankind in our age."⁹ The question of whether or not Afro-Asian leaders tend to exaggerate the role of colonialism as a contributing factor in world tensions is irrelevant to the question of how much importance they attach to it. The fact is that they do consider it to be of major significance in international relations.

The United Nations General Assembly has consistently afforded the Asian and African states ample opportunity to express themselves on colonial matters. There were more roll-call votes taken on colonial affairs during the period with

⁸ Ali Bastromidjojo, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1253.

⁹ Francis O. Wilcox, "U N and the Nonaligned Nations," Headline Series, No. 155, (September-October, 1962), p. 13.

which this study is concerned than on any other type of question. They emanated from a wide range of disputes over the affairs of non-self-governing territories, invariably on Asian or African soil. The questions of Irian, Algeria, South West Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and others of similar nature have been presented for the Assembly's attention at one time or another during the period 1952-1960, and most of them persisted on the agenda for several sessions. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that the Afro-Asian attack on colonialism tended to subside as the success of the anti-colonial cause became more evident toward the end of the 1950's. The more Afro-Asian states attained their independence and were admitted to membership in the international organization, the more comprehensive and intense the attack seemed to become. Measured on the basis of the number of Afro-Asian states which became independent and members of the United Nations, the anti-colonial cause was more successful in 1960 than ever before. Yet the anti-colonial drive was more vigorous than in any previous session.

Although the question of whether or not colonialism constituted an objectionable state of affairs was never grounds for quarrelling among the states of Asia and Africa inside or outside the United Nations, it was not always possible for them to adopt similar or parallel attitudes toward specific questions arising from the general topic of colonialism. This fact was shown, for example, in the Bandung Conference, the most successful manifestation of general

Afro-Asian solidarity to date. As it was said in Chapter I, attaining a unanimous resolution on colonialism was one of the most difficult tasks with which the conference was faced. A similar statement can be made about the Afro-Asian states' performance within the United Nations General Assembly. The record shows that, although a considerable degree of solidarity may be expected on colonial problems, it cannot be taken for granted.

Analysis of the 96 recorded votes on colonial issues reveals that on 61 votes (63.6% of the total), the Afro-Asian states achieved the high index of cohesion of 90 or better. The second largest number of their votes (nine votes) fell in the second highest cohesion category (80-90). Although there was enough disagreement among Afro-Asian states to place some of their votes in the lower areas of the cohesion scale, the preponderant number of their votes fell in the higher cohesion categories. Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial issues failed to match the nearly perfect cohesion they showed on racial issues, but it was substantial nevertheless. Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial questions appears to be even more significant when contrasted with the record of all the Assembly members, who had only 18 (or 18.8%) of their total votes in the high cohesion segment of the scale. In addition to having considerably fewer votes in the 90 or higher cohesion category, the members of the whole Assembly had a considerably larger number of votes close to the bottom of the cohesion scale than did the Afro-Asian states.

Although the large majority of Afro-Asian votes on colonial disputes clustered around the high cohesion end of the scale, it should be pointed out that they often found themselves in conflict when faced with the necessity of taking a definite position on a specific colonial problem. On 25 occasions (26.0% of the total), there was sufficient disagreement among the group's members to lower its cohesion below 70. As in the case of high cohesion, however, the degree of disagreement among Afro-Asian states appears in a different light when contrasted with the record of the whole Assembly. While more than half of the Assembly votes (49 votes, or 51.0% of the total) fell below 40 on the cohesion scale, only 9 votes (or 9.4% of the total) cast by Afro-Asian states were in the same low cohesion area. This higher cohesion of the Afro-Asian group remains when contrasted with the cohesion of all the non-Soviet members of the Assembly. Figure 12 shows the relative cohesion of the three groups.

As in the case of racial questions, the Afro-Asian states abstained less frequently on colonial issues than the Assembly members, although the difference between the two groups of states was not as great as it was on racial issues. While the Afro-Asian states abstained on 14.1% of the total votes, the Assembly members abstained on 20.3% of all their votes. Also as in the case of racial issues, there was no appreciable difference between the two groups' non-voting records, although non-voting was somewhat higher for both groups than it was on racial issues. While the Afro-Asian




Fig. 12.-Comparative cohesion: colonial votes

states abstained on 14.1% of the total votes, the Assembly members abstained on 20.3% of all their votes. Also as in the case of racial issues, there was no appreciable differences between the two groups' non-voting records, although non-voting was somewhat higher for both groups than it was on racial issues. While the Afro-Asians refrained from voting on 4.4% of the total votes, the organization's members failed to vote on 4.9% of the total.¹⁰

Although, as the record shows, the Afro-Asian states possessed a substantial degree of solidarity on colonial issues, especially when contrasted with the whole Assembly, they failed to match their own record on racial issues on two counts. Disagreement was greater; this was indicated by the lower index of cohesion. And non-agreement was more prevalent; this was shown by the higher rate of abstention.

Cold War Issues:

One of the mixed blessings which independence brought to the Afro-Asian states was the fact that the great majority of them joined the ranks of decision-makers in a world of turmoil. Along with other challenges and privileges of sovereignty, their independence placed upon them the responsibility of determining their respective countries' relations to other states, including two powerful adversaries both of

¹⁰The rate of abstention and non-voting on colonial questions is not affected to any significant degree when the Soviet bloc members are excluded. When they are excluded, Assembly abstentions total 21.6%, and non-voting amounts to 4.6% of all votes.

whom possessed the capability to affect the Afro-Asian states' effort to approach their chosen national goals. Their efforts to formulate and to follow paths compatible with these goals often seemed to be unduly burdened, even endangered, by the necessity of charting their relationships to the superpowers. This factor tended to accentuate among the African and Asian states an aversion to the cold war and a resentment toward the ever-present possibility of their further involvement in it. In addition to their belief that the cold war placed upon them additional burdens, the Afro-Asian states tended to view it as a perpetual threat to their newly-acquired independence. An analysis of the Afro-Asian states' voting record also shows that they found it difficult to exhibit a common attitude when a cold war question confronted them.

Roll-call votes on cold war issues taken during the period studied amounted to 94, or 26.7% of the total. On 49 of these votes (52.1%), the Afro-Asian states possessed an index of cohesion of 90 or higher. In comparison, all the Assembly members attained a similarly high index of cohesion on only one of their votes on the same issues. While the majority of Afro-Asian votes were in the 90-100 cohesion category, the bulk of Assembly votes (59.4%) fell below a cohesion of 70.

The cohesion of the Afro-Asian group on cold war issues appears to be more significant than it really is. There are two reasons for their exaggerated solidarity. First, Afro-Asian solidarity on cold war questions appears to be

great in comparison to the cohesion of the whole Assembly due to a bias against the Assembly caused by the presence of the Soviet bloc members, a group of perpetual dissenters on cold war questions. When Afro-Asian cohesion is measured against the cohesion of the whole Assembly minus the Soviet bloc, the Assembly's cohesion slightly surpasses that of the Afro-Asian group. Figure 13 illustrates this point.

Second, the fact that on most cold war votes there was a very small degree of disagreement among the Afro-Asian states does not necessarily mean that they possessed considerable solidarity. It will be shown shortly that such a conclusion would be unwarranted by the facts. The only defensible interpretation of the data at this point is to note that on a majority of cold war votes there was very little disagreement among the group's members; and that there was considerably less disagreement among them than among the members of the whole Assembly.

A look at the Afro-Asian states' abstention record is revealing of their attitude toward cold war issues, perhaps even more so than their index of cohesion. The members of the group cast abstention votes totaling 39.2% of their entire vote on cold war questions. This is a much higher percentage than that of all the Assembly members, whose abstentions totaled 18% of all votes cast on the same issues.

It is here that the record shows most clearly the difficulty of arriving at a general attitude on a specific cold war issue very often was resolved by a resort to




Fig. 13.-Comparative cohesion: cold war votes

abstention or non-voting. More significantly, the group's high abstention vote is indicative of more than the fact that Afro-Asian states tried to avoid involvement in East-West disputes by refraining from taking sides on specific matters. It also indicates that the group's solidarity on cold war issues was made to appear more significant than it actually was. The index of cohesion used in this study is more a measure of disagreement than of agreement within a given group. When the rate of abstention is very low, the extent of disagreement will naturally reflect accurately the degree of agreement also.

Therefore, in the case of both racial and colonial issues, where abstention votes comprised a small percentage of the total, the index of cohesion represented not only the degree of disagreement but also the degree of actual agreement and shared attitudes among the group's members. The same statement, however, cannot be made with equal validity in the case of cold war issues, where abstentions amounted to 39.2% of the group's total vote.

Moreover, the assumption that the index of cohesion measures accurately the extent of disagreement without necessarily indicating the extent of prevailing agreement, is borne out by a closer examination of the Afro-Asian group's abstentions on cold war votes. It was pointed out previously that the group attained the high index of cohesion of 90 or better on 49 votes (52.1% of the total). A separate examination of these votes reveals that Afro-Asian abstentions on

the 90 or better cohesion votes reached 45.2%, compared with 39.2% recorded for all cold war votes. This extremely high rate of abstention on high-cohesion votes makes inescapable the following conclusion: The measure of solidarity, if it may be so called, which the group demonstrated on cold war issues is attributable, to a considerable extent, to a lack of intra-group opposition rather than to the existence of substantial agreement.

As in the case of racial and colonial votes, no significant difference was shown between the Afro-Asian group's record of absenteeism and that of the whole Assembly. While Afro-Asian states were absent on 2.5% of all their votes, the corresponding figure for all Assembly members was 1.5%. All non-Soviet members were absent 1.6% of the time.

General Political Questions:

Under this category of issues are considered political disputes and situations in which racial, colonial, and cold war considerations were either absent or of minor importance. The most important issues considered under this heading, and on which the great majority of roll-call votes to be analyzed were taken, were those arising from Palestine's partition, the post-independence crisis in the Congo, and the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956.

During the 1952-1960 period, there were 57 roll-call votes taken in the General Assembly on general political

questions, which amount to 16.2% of all votes considered in this study. The group's voting record on these issues represents a departure from its record on other issues so far considered. For here the group failed, for the first time, to attain the high cohesion of 90 or better on a majority of its votes. This degree of cohesion was attained on 24 votes, or 41.9% of the total. The rest of the votes were scattered almost evenly all the way down the cohesion scale.

Afro-Asian cohesion on general political questions becomes more significant when contrasted with the cohesion of the whole Assembly and with its non-Soviet membership. The Assembly's votes in the 90-100 cohesion category numbered only 5 (8.8%), and all the non-Soviet members had 8 votes (14.1%) in the same cohesion area. Not only did the Afro-Asian group have more votes in the high cohesion portion of the scale, but it had fewer votes in the low cohesion areas. Figure 14 shows these results.

As far as abstentions are concerned, there is no significant difference between the Afro-Asian group and the whole Assembly. While the first group abstained on 18.0% of all its votes, the latter group abstained 20.1% of the time. The non-Soviet members of the Assembly abstained on 21.0% of their votes. Similarly, the difference in their record of absenteeism was negligible. Afro-Asian absenteeism accounted for 1.7% of all votes, while absenteeism for the whole Assembly and for its non-Soviet members was 2.1% and 2.3%, respectively.




Fig. 14.-Comparative cohesion: general political votes.

Procedural Questions:

It is reasonable to assume that a group, any kind of group, would make a greater effort to enlarge agreement among its members on issues which it considers important than on issues which it considers to be marginal to its objectives. In the case of the less important questions, dissent is obviously less detrimental to the group's objectives and can be more safely tolerated. For this reason, the group's members may not deem it wise to devote much time and effort to the task of achieving the greatest possible degree of solidarity on such matters. In the General Assembly, procedure has not yet developed into an effective parliamentary instrument of control over the fate of substantive matters, as it is very often used in the more highly developed national parliaments of many countries. This tendency partially explains the fact that, on procedural votes, the index of cohesion of both the Afro-Asian group and the other two groups is considerably lower than on other issues and that the rate of abstention is quite high.

Another important reason for the low level of agreement is the fact that votes on procedural matters are usually taken without allowing time for advance consultation. Although the need for a speedy decision on procedural matters does not eliminate the possibility of consultation--because there always exists an opportunity for a swift exchange of views during a plenary meeting--the opportunity is almost always too limited for the purpose of searching for and

formulating a general attitude.

In view of these factors, it is not surprising that the Afro-Asian states and all the Assembly members showed a very high level of disagreement as well as considerable non-agreement on procedural questions.

During the period under consideration, there were 35 votes taken on procedural matters, about 10% of the total. As Figure 15 shows, the Afro-Asian group achieved the high index of cohesion of 90 or higher on only 5 votes (14.2% of the total). This is by far the lowest percentage of votes in the high cohesion category for all types of issues. A similar result was also obtained in the case of all the Assembly members. They attained a similarly high cohesion on only one vote (2.9% of the total). All the Assembly members except the Soviet bloc had 3 votes (8.6%) in the 90-100 cohesion category.

In agreement with previous findings for the other types of issues, the low cohesion attained on procedural questions was accompanied by a relatively high rate of abstention for all three groups of states. The Afro-Asian states abstained on 28.7% of their total procedural votes, the entire Assembly abstained 22.2% of the time, and the non-Soviet members 25.2%.

Once again, there was no significant difference among the three groups regarding absenteeism. Afro-Asian states were absent on 3.1% of all their votes on procedural issues. Absenteeism accounted for 2.0% of the votes of all the




Fig. 15.-Comparative cohesion: procedural votes

Assembly members, and for 2.5% of the votes of all non-Soviet members.

Agenda Issues:

Analysis of Afro-Asian votes on questions dealing with the adoption of items for inclusion in the Assembly's agenda yields the conclusion that its attitude toward such items was related to the degree of agreement or disagreement which prevailed among its members on the substantive issues involved in those items. The group exhibited a high degree of cohesion when voting on the inclusion of items dealing with racial and colonial questions, on which the group's cohesion was shown to be high. When voting on the inclusion of items dealing with cold war or general political questions, where the group's cohesion was shown to be considerably lower, the Afro-Asian states' lack of agreement was reflected in their agenda votes also. This direct relationship between cohesion on agenda and on substantive votes also holds in the case of the whole Assembly.

Although this observation is true for both groups, its applicability is qualitative rather than quantitative. In other words it is not equally true in both cases. On issues where a relatively low cohesion was shown, the cohesion of both groups was lower in placing the item on the agenda than on the substantive vote. This discrepancy in cohesion, however, was greater in the case of the Afro-Asian group than in the case of all the members of the General

Assembly. This fact may be reasonably interpreted to mean that both groups were reluctant to see placed on the agenda items on which a relatively high degree of intra-group disagreement existed. Furthermore, it indicates that the Afro-Asian states' reluctance was greater than that of all the Assembly members.

This aspect of the Afro-Asian states' voting behavior in the United Nations indicates that although they often argued and worked for enlarging the powers of the General Assembly, they did so within limits. These limits seem to be at least partially set by the degree of solidarity which the group possessed on a particular question. Figure 16 illustrates the relationship between cohesion on substantive issues and related agenda items.

As in the case of all previous votes considered, the record pertaining to agenda votes reveals the existence of an inverse relationship between the Afro-Asian group's cohesion and its abstention vote. This relationship is shown in Figure 17.

Abstention:

In addition to remarks already made in connection with the abstention record of the Afro-Asian group, one more observation deserves separate consideration. During the period under discussion, there were 58 votes (16.5% of the total) on which the Afro-Asian states cast more abstention votes than their combined affirmative and negative votes.




Fig. 16.-Comparative cohesion on substantive and agenda votes




Fig. 17.-Abstention on agenda votes

The whole Assembly cast only 6 of these high-abstention votes, or 1.7% of the total. The significance of this finding lies only partially in the extent of the high-abstention vote, and in the disparity which existed between the two groups on this point. It becomes more revealing of Afro-Asian voting behavior when the high-abstention votes are related to the types of issues on which they were cast.

While racial issues comprised 9.4% of all votes studied, they accounted for only 3.4% of all high-abstention votes (2 of 58 such votes). Colonial issues, on which 27.3% of all recorded votes were taken, were represented by 18.9% of the high-abstention votes (11 out of 58). In other words, both issues on which Afro-Asian cohesion was high, were "under-represented" in the high-abstention votes. On the other hand, issues on which the group's cohesion was relatively low were found to be "over-represented" by high-abstention votes. This over-representation was particularly evident in the case of cold war issues. While such issues comprised only 26.7% of all votes studied, they were responsible for 56.8% of the high-abstention votes. Figure 18 shows this distribution.

Although all the Assembly members cast only 6 high-abstention votes, it is interesting to note that 5 of these votes were taken on colonial issues and 1 vote on racial questions. On this point, there was no difference between the total Assembly and its non-Soviet membership.




Fig. 18.-Afro-Asian high-abstention votes

Conclusions:

From the preceding discussion of the record, the following conclusions concerning the cohesiveness of the Afro-Asian group emerge:

First, Afro-Asian solidarity varied so greatly from one type of issue to another that it is meaningless to speak of such solidarity without reference to a specific type of issue. Their solidarity on racial questions, for example, was nearly perfect. On general political questions and on procedural matters, Afro-Asian solidarity was an occasional manifestation rather than a general rule of behavior.

Second, in speaking of Afro-Asian solidarity, even on a particular type of issue, one must take into account not only the degree of disagreement among Afro-Asian states, but also the extent of non-agreement. Otherwise, their solidarity would appear to be deceptively greater than it actually was. The cohesiveness of the group on cold war issues is a case in point. The extremely high rates of abstention on such issues indicates that the group's cohesion must be viewed largely as passive solidarity since it was based to a considerable extent on a lack of disagreement rather than on the presence of actual agreement.

Third, there was an inverse relationship between the frequency of abstentions and the group's cohesion on all types of issues.

Fourth, intra-group agreement or disagreement on placing items on the Assembly's agenda was directly related

to intra-group agreement or disagreement on the substantive issues involved.

Fifth, on all issues studied, whether the cohesion was high or low, the Afro-Asian group's cohesion was appreciably greater than that shown by the whole Assembly, and it was not representative of conditions prevailing in the Assembly as a whole. With the exception of cold war questions, the Afro-Asian group's cohesion was still considerably higher than the cohesion of the whole Assembly when the Soviet bloc members were excluded. In the case of cold war votes, the non-communist members of the Assembly were slightly more cohesive than the Afro-Asian group. This relationship is summarized in Figure 19.

Cohesion




Fig. 19.-Comparative cohesion: total period

CHAPTER IV

GROUPS WITHIN THE GROUP:

CAUCUSING GROUPS

No political alignment, regardless of how cohesive it may be, is in fact devoid of disagreement on objectives and methods of realizing them. Individuals or states affiliate themselves with other individuals or states into groups even though they are in less than total agreement with all other members. Although there are no universally accepted rules on the degree of agreement necessary for the existence of a group, it is generally conceded that total agreement is not a requirement. Making such a requirement would undoubtedly preclude the very existence of the concept of groups in political life, national or international.

The Afro-Asian group is not an exception on this point. It was shown in the last chapter that disagreement ranging from negligible to substantial existed among its members on the various types of issues with which the Assembly was concerned. This disagreement can be traced to either or both of the following two sources. First, it can be caused, partially or totally, by dissenting positions taken by individual member states. Second, it can be caused, partially or totally, by dissenting positions taken by occasionally

clashing factions. Agreement and disagreement, therefore, may or may not be evenly distributed throughout the group.

So far, this study has dealt with the Afro-Asian group as a whole without attempting to penetrate the outer shell which contains it. This and the following chapter will go beyond the group's outer limits for an analysis of its internal composition and behavior. The aim is to show that, like all group politics, the politics of Afro-Asian states are politics of coalition. The analysis is motivated by the hypothesis that no political grouping can be found whose basic units, whether they be individuals or states, are equally separated in their attitudes and behavior. Instead, they cluster into factions within which there is greater subjective and objective affinity than is found between them.

The coalition-like nature of the Afro-Asian group will be demonstrated on the basis of subjective affiliation as well as objective behavior. The present chapter will be devoted to a discussion of self-chosen affiliations of the group's members. The next chapter will deal with groupings on the basis of the members' voting behavior.

The problem of identifying factions within the Afro-Asian group poses the same problem encountered in the discussion concerning the existence of the group. On what criteria should the identification of sub-groups be based? If we are to decide their identity and respective memberships

on the basis of common characteristics we will be confronted with the contradictory conclusion that they are--at one and the same time--one and several groups, depending on the characteristics chosen or emphasized. Some characteristics unite them all, like their colonial experience, lower level of economic and political development, and geographic proximity. Other characteristics, on the other hand, tend to suggest fragmentation. Such characteristics include cultural, religious, and ethnic differences, as well as differences in the level of development, and the type of colonial experience. The difficulty will be resolved by studying how Afro-Asian states are in fact clustered within the total group, rather than how they might be expected to cluster on the basis of common characteristics or other possible grounds for affiliation.

The Group's Internal Composition

A General View:

Before the clusters of states found within the Afro-Asian group are identified and discussed, changes in the internal composition of the group will be traced. The object of this part of the discussion will be to point out changes which have relevance to factionalist behavior. Such changes include the emergence of political affiliations and loyalties among the group's members, and fluctuations in the relative strength of clusters of states so affiliated.

The embryo of today's largest political alignment of

United Nations members--the Afro-Asian group--consisted of twelve states when it came into being.¹ Seven of the group's members were Charter members of the United Nations,² and with the sole exception of Egypt the group's membership was entirely Asian. Two of the group's members--India and Pakistan--were also members of the Commonwealth of Nations.³

The first decade in the life of the United Nations was characterized by a relatively slow increase in its membership. The deteriorating relations among the permanent members of the Security Council which culminated in the Korean War helped cause a deadlock over new applications for membership by obstructing the process of admitting new states. The conclusion of hostilities in Korea was followed by a substantial improvement in East-West relations, and by the end of 1955 it became possible to terminate the deadlock by the conclusion of the so-called package deal. The deal resulted in the admission of sixteen new members on December 14, 1955. This was the first large-scale influx of members since the signing of the Charter.

Of the sixteen new members admitted during the tenth (1955) session of the General Assembly, six were Afro-Asian states which had already established their claims to

¹ Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. For a list of members and dates of admission see Appendix A.

² Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

³ Ethiopia, Liberia, the Philippines, and Thailand were until 1955 part-time members, since their participation in the group's activities was on an ad hoc basis.

membership in the group by having participated in the Bandung Conference a few months earlier.⁴ This new addition to the Afro-Asian group did not alter significantly its internal composition or its size relative to that of the total membership of the General Assembly.⁵ It caused a slight increase in the representation of the Commonwealth members, and a slight decrease in the proportion of Arab states. The division between the Asian and African components remained substantially the same, and the size of the Afro-Asian group relative to the Assembly as a whole increased very little.

The fact that there were no significant changes in the internal composition of the group due to changes in its membership, however, does not mean that it remained the same in other respects. The internal structure of a political alignment may change regardless of whether or not its membership changes. In the case of the Afro-Asian group, the most important change was due to political events taking place outside the United Nations and not to changes in its membership. In 1954 and 1955, two military alliances (SEATO and the Baghdad Pact) came into being whose membership partially consisted of states members of the Afro-Asian group. The involvement of Afro-Asian states in these alliances introduced a new affiliation to an outside factor. As will be shown in the next chapter, militarily allied Afro-Asian states tend to

⁴The six Afro-Asian new members were Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal.

⁵See Figure 20, below, for these and subsequent changes.

represent a distinct political attitude on various types of issues.

During the five-year period which followed the package deal and the first simultaneous influx of members, seven states were admitted to membership of the United Nations, all of which were Afro-Asian states.⁶ This new addition to the group's membership was the beginning of a process whereby the imbalance between Asian and African representation in the group began to diminish. Five of the seven new members were African states, and their admission caused the greatest change in the group's internal structure. The Arab sub-group's numerical significance within the group remained almost constant. The Commonwealth contingent increased by almost 3% of the total group, and the Aligned states' share in the coalition's membership decreased by about 5%. The Afro-Asian group's contribution to the total membership of the General Assembly increased by about 5.5%.

The most important change affecting the Afro-Asian group's internal structure through a change in its membership took place during the General Assembly's fifteenth session (1960-1961). During the first part of that session, seventeen new members were admitted to the United Nations,⁷ all of which except Cyprus were newly independent African states.

⁶Ghana, Guinea, Japan, Federation of Malays, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

⁷Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta.

The most obvious change in the group's internal composition due to this increase in membership was the fact that the group ceased, for the first time in its history, to be predominantly Asian. African representation in the coalition increased from about a third to a majority of the members. The group's numerical strength in the General Assembly also registered an appreciable increase. All other subdivisions of the group diminished in their numerical significance within it.

As the case was at the time of the package deal, one of the most important changes in the Afro-Asian coalition's internal structure at this stage was only indirectly related to the increase in its membership. This refers to a new division within Afro-Asian ranks, a division which followed but was not caused by the increase in the group's membership which occurred during the fifteenth session. This division took the form of a split among the African states into two separate factions: the Casablanca and the Brazzaville groups.

From this brief sketch of changes in the internal composition of the Afro-Asian group four observations can be made. First, the group's membership grew much faster than the General Assembly as a whole. While it amounted to only 20% of the Assembly in 1950, it reached 44.4% in 1960. Second, as the group's membership increased, so did the number of political subdivisions within it. Third, the African wing of the coalition began its affiliations with the group as a minor element within it (8.3% of the total)

Affiliation	1950		1950-55		1955		1955-60		1960	
	members in subgroup	% of total group	members in subgroup	% of total group	members in subgroup	% of total group	members in subgroup	% of total group	members in subgroup	% of total group
Arab	6	50.0	6	37.5	8	36.4	11 ^a (10) ^a	35.7	10	22.7
Commonwealth	2	16.7	2	12.4	3	13.6	5	17.9	6	13.6
Aligned	4	25.0	4	18.2	5 ^b (4) ^b	14.3	4	9.0
Brazzaville	12	27.9
Casablanca	5	11.4
Asian	11	91.7	13	81.2	18	81.8	20 ^a (19) ^a	67.8	19	43.2
African	1	8.3	3	18.8	4	18.2	9	32.2	25	56.8
Total	12	100	16	100	22	100	29 ^a (28) ^a	100	44	100

Fig. 20.-Changes in the internal composition of the Afro-Asian group: 1950-60

^aSyria relinquished its seat in 1958.^bIraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1959.

and in 1960 grew to be the major partner (56.8% of the total). And fourth, not all important changes in the internal structure of the group were due to changes in its membership.

Now let us look at each of the main subdivisions of the group which, due to the fact that they caucus separately as well as with the group as a whole, might represent political factions. In the next chapter, we will see if, on the basis of the voting record, they do in fact represent varying political attitudes.

The Arab Subgroup:

The Arab members of the United Nations have always constituted an important element within the Afro-Asian coalition. From the creation of the group until this day, they have shown a high level of interaction with the Afro-Asian world, and problems of particular concern to them--like Palestine, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria--have always received a great deal of attention and considerable support in Afro-Asian gatherings.

The importance of the Arab faction within the group derives from four main sources. First, the Arab states have always amounted to a sizeable minority within the coalition. Until the admission of a large number of sub-Saharan African states to the United Nations during the fifteenth session (1960-1961), the Arab states comprised more than a third of the group's total membership. Even after the influx of African members in 1960, they still accounted for almost a

fourth of all its members, although they ceased at that point to be the largest of the subgroups. Figure 21 shows the changes in Arab numerical strength within the group during the 1952-1960 period.




Fig. 21.—Proportion of Arab members in the group: 1950-60

The second reason why the Arab states have been an important subdivision within the Afro-Asian coalition is that several of them became independent early enough to be charter members of the United Nations and founding members of the Afro-Asian group. Their modern involvement in Afro-Asian affairs dates back to the 1926 Bierville Conference mentioned in Chapter I. Most movements involved in a struggle for

independence, especially in Africa, have at one time or another been represented in Cairo.

The third cause of Arab importance in the coalition derives from the fact that the Arab states came to the group as an already functioning caucusing alignment. Their claim to the future status of a distinct subdivision within the coalition had already been established through their association in the Arab League, an exclusively Arab organization aiming at policy co-ordination. This distinct status of the Arab faction may be said to have been recognized by the rest of the coalition when the organizers of the Bandung Conference invited not only the Arab states individually, but also the Arab League, which participated as an observer. Although it is not definitely known to be the case, the prior existence of an Arab caucusing group possibly contributed to the emergence of the Afro-Asian alignment. The first known suggestion to form an Afro-Asian caucusing group was claimed by an Arab statesman during the Bandung Conference in 1955.⁸

The fourth factor which tends to assign to the Arab states an important place in the coalition is the fact that they constitute a link between Asia and Africa. They, and only they, are literally Afro-Asians. The Arabs' function as a link between Asia and Africa, although dictated by geography, is more than geographical. It is also cultural, for they have carried their "presence"--mainly through religion and

⁸Chapter II, footnote 6.

language--not only east to Asia but also south to sub-Saharan Africa.

Their role as a link is also political. Their geographic position led to their involvement in the politics of both continents to a greater extent than any other member or members of the Afro-Asian group. Although, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a general feeling among Afro-Asian states that the security of their independence is related to the fortunes of other Afro-Asian territories, this has been especially true of the Arab states. A great deal of their recent colonial history can be explained only in relation to colonialism in Afro-Asian lands other than their own. As President Nasser put it: "Fate decreed that we should be at the crossroads of the world. Many times we have been the channel for invasion and the prize of adventurers; and we have passed through so many vicissitudes that it is impossible to analyse the underlying factors in the souls of our people without giving them due respect and consideration."⁹

It would be a half-truth, however, to assert that Arab involvement in the political fortunes of Asia and Africa was limited to the type mentioned above. They were not only the subject of that involvement but also its originator, although these two aspects of Arab involvement are related. If the European empire builders needed to dominate Arab lands in order to secure their possessions elsewhere in Asia and Africa, then

⁹ Gamal Abd El-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Dar Al-Ma'arif, n.d.), pp. 41-42.

the security of Arab independence required the break-up of these empires. For this reason, Arab concern with the political fortunes of their continents has been justified as being relevant to their own security. After observing that Egypt was a part of three worlds--the Arab, the African, and the Islamic--and that its fate was related to theirs, Nasser concluded that "these are fundamental realities having a profound bearing on our existence; however we may try, we cannot overlook them or avoid them."¹⁰

The role of the Arab states as a subdivision of the Afro-Asian alignment cannot be fully appreciated without a reference to these pertinent considerations concerning the degree, type, and historical roots of Arab involvement in Afro-Asian affairs.

The Commonwealth Subgroup:

Commonwealth representation in the Afro-Asian coalition began with two founding members, India and Pakistan. Although the number of Afro-Asian Commonwealth members increased steadily, the increase was not great enough to substantially alter their proportional strength within the group. After increasing from the original 16.7% of all Afro-Asian members in 1950 to a high of 17.9% when Ghana became a United Nations member on March 8, 1957, their representation decreased to 13.6% during the fifteenth session. Figure 22 shows the changes in Commonwealth representation in the group.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 56-59. Direct quotation is on p. 59.




Fig. 22.-Proportion of Commonwealth members in the group: 1950-60.

There are two related factors which deserve particular consideration in connection with these states' association with the Afro-Asian coalition. First, the fact that they are members of the Commonwealth has no necessary relationship to their membership in the Afro-Asian group. This aspect of their association with the group differentiates them from some of the other subgroups within the coalition. In contrast to the Arab subgroup, for example, the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth do not owe their group identity to bonds which directly relate them to each other, but to a tie which they all have in common to an external

factor, i.e., the British Crown. The difference between these two types of intra-group relationships may be represented as in Figure 23.




Fig. 23.-Organizational relationships in the Arab and Commonwealth subgroups.

This difference in the type of relationship among the members of the subgroups accounts for the manner in which they pursue the goal of policy co-ordination. The Commonwealth members do so not as an autonomous faction like the Arab subgroup, but as a part of a larger body which transcends their identification with the Afro-Asian group. This body, of course, is the Commonwealth of Nations.

Another aspect of the Commonwealth subgroup which distinguishes it from most of the others in the coalition is related to the organizational factor mentioned above. The fact that their association with each other transcends their Afro-Asian identity results in their involvement in matters which may or may not be of any relevance to their role as partners

in the Afro-Asian coalition.

It will be shown in the next chapter that although the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth may be viewed as a subdivision of the group, due to the fact that they caucus separately from the other members, they are not a voting subdivision. This fact may indicate that the non-Afro-Asian matters with which they are concerned as Commonwealth members are not considered by them to be of a relatively great political significance. This, in fact, is the case as will be shown when the attitudes of Afro-Asian states on various issues and the cohesive and divisive factors within their group are discussed. It will be shown then that the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth subordinate their non-Afro-Asian commitments to what they conceive to be their Afro-Asian loyalty to a greater extent than other subgroups which similarly confront the problem of conflicting allegiances.

The Aligned Subgroup:

It was said at the beginning of this chapter that one of the most important changes affecting the internal composition of the Afro-Asian group was not related to changes in its membership, but it was a consequence of political developments occurring outside the framework of the United Nations. The particular developments alluded to there were conflicts between groups of states clustered around the United States and the Soviet Union. The consequences referred to included

the emergence of military alliances with Asian memberships, and the resultant creation of additional conflicting alliances within the Afro-Asian coalition.

East-West tensions gathered momentum after the signing of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union's reluctance to withdraw its forces from Iran, the international complications of the Greek Civil War, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and in China, the perennial problem of Berlin, and violence in Southeast Asia all contributed to the increasing tension. Then the struggle was dangerously intensified by the Korean crisis and the subsequent outbreak of armed conflict there. This situation helped bring about the adoption by the United States of the policy of containment, designed to check communist efforts--presumed or real--to alter the status quo in territories surrounding their land mass.

The methods which the United States used to achieve this containment included the creation or the encouragement of military alliances with and among the threatened states. Some of these alliances sought to recruit members from Asia and Africa. These efforts were rewarded when Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and when Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey became members of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. By 1955, a group of aligned states had been created within the Afro-Asian group which accounted for 25% of its total membership.

The general Afro-Asian aversion to further involvement in the cold war,¹¹ coupled with intense opposition to Afro-Asian involvement in military alliances by some of the group's most influential members like India and Egypt, led to eventual decline in the numerical significance of the aligned subgroup in the coalition. After the initial relative success in recruiting Asian members, the alliances failed to add any new members, and the proportion of aligned states diminished as the group as a whole grew. The only time when the membership of the aligned subgroup increased after its formation was when Japan--linked to the United States bilaterally and prior to its membership in the United Nations--was admitted into the international organization on December 18, 1955. This addition to the ranks of the aligned faction was subsequently cancelled out by the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. Changes in the relative size of the aligned subgroup are illustrated in Figure 24.

As far as the characteristics of the aligned subgroup are concerned, the following are the most relevant to its status as a faction within the coalition. First, like the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth, the aligned states pursue the problem of policy co-ordination as a part of a larger group whose existence transcends the Afro-Asian coalition. Also, as in the case of the Commonwealth subgroup, the

¹¹See Chapter VI.




Fig. 24.-Proportion of aligned members in the group: 1950-60.

concerns of the aligned states as alliance members may or may not have relevance to matters which preoccupy the coalition as a whole. Unlike the Commonwealth subgroup, however, the aligned states exhibit a greater loyalty to their non-Afro-Asian bond, and they are more reluctant to subordinate their commitments to the alliance. For this reason, they do emerge from analysis of the votes as a fairly distinct alignment and not as a part of larger subdivisions of Afro-Asian states as the Commonwealth members do. When the attitudes of Afro-Asian states on the various types of issues are discussed in the next chapter it will be seen that the aligned states'

commitments to their respective alliance systems are fairly strong and exert substantial influence upon their behavior within the Afro-Asian coalition.

The Brazzaville Subgroup:

About a month after the influx of African members during the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, The New York Times reported that "there is a new United Nations these days in the glass-and-granite capital city along the East River, a United Nations that is Africa-minded, and in a numerical sense at least, Africa-dominated."¹² The number of Asian and African states in the United Nations increased so rapidly after the deadlock over membership was resolved in 1955 that a student of the international organization speculated on the possibility of the Afro-Asian states taking over political control of the United Nations and the consequences of such an occurrence.¹³ Another scholar watched their numbers increase and hastily concluded that the Assembly was dominated by their votes.¹⁴ A top official in the French government was said to have "privately described the U.N. as no more than a band of Afro-Asian brigands."¹⁵

The exaggeration of power attributed to Afro-Asian

¹²The New York Times, October 16, 1960.

¹³Thomas J. Hamilton, "The United Nations in Crisis," Headline Series, No. 146 (March-April, 1961), p. 13.

¹⁴Sigmund, p. 33.

¹⁵Newsweek, January 1, 1962, p. 16.

states due to the phenomenal increase in their numbers may be understood when it is noted that such an increase had certain dramatic aspects. One observer expressed this phenomenon as follows:

In 1960-61 the three UN officials seated on the podium during the debates of the 15th General Assembly were: Dag Hammarskjöld, secretary-general, from Sweden; Frederick Boland, president of the General Assembly, from Ireland; Andrew Cordier, executive assistant to the secretary-general, from the United States. When the 16th General Assembly met in the spring of 1962 to consider the problem of Rwanda-Urundi, these three individuals had been replaced by U Thant from Burma, Mongi Slim from Tunisia, and C. V. Narasimhan from India.¹⁶

There is not always strength in numbers. On the contrary, they may very well breed weakness. This may happen when the increase in numbers is accompanied by a proliferation of factions within the whole. The African states are a case in point. New admissions during the fifteenth session made the African faction the largest in the Assembly and, for the first time, it became the majority partner in the Afro-Asian coalition. But soon thereafter, it became apparent that deep divisions existed among the African states, divisions which made the strength implied in their numbers only potential. The fifteenth session had hardly begun when most of the African states found themselves divided into two alignments with a large area of conflict separating them.

One of these African alignments came to be known as the Brazzaville group, and it consisted of ex-French African

¹⁶Francis O. Wilcox, Headline Series, No. 155 (September-October, 1962), p. 41.

colonies which, after independence, chose to retain their affiliation with France through the French Community.¹⁷ These African states were dissatisfied with the role the older African states were playing in international affairs. They hoped that by associating together in the form of a political alignment they could give Africa the type of leadership which they felt it needed but did not get from the older leaders such as President Nkrumah. This attitude of the Brazzaville faction was represented by the views of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, of the Ivory Coast, who hoped that the French-speaking African states could offset the neutralist leadership of Ghana and provide a more realistic way to African unity.¹⁸ In the next chapter, it will be shown that these French-speaking African states do in fact represent a distinct political alignment within the Afro-Asian coalition.

The Casablanca Subgroup:

Prior to the independence of the French-speaking African states members of the Brazzaville group and their admission to the United Nations, political conflict among African ranks was less intense. The usual manner in which the

¹⁷Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, and Mauritania.

¹⁸He favored a gradual and functional approach to unity, in contrast to Nkrumah's union-now approach. The New York Times, December 12, 1960. Chapter VI, dealing with Afro-Asian views, and Chapter VII, dealing with cohesive and divisive elements in the Afro-Asian coalition, will discuss differences among the various subgroups.

African states at that time sought to co-ordinate their policies took the form of conferences of independent African states to which all African members of the Afro-Asian group were invited.¹⁹ The inclusion of French-speaking African states, however, meant the emergence of new areas of disagreement among independent African states. It became no longer possible for them to reach meaningful agreement on vital questions. The result was that high level conferences on political matters were limited to those states which were in general agreement with the aims of the particular conference. This development paralleled the Bandung Conference's experience six years earlier. It was said in Chapter 1 that participation in the conference was limited to Afro-Asian states which were in agreement with its goals.

Thus it was that when the government of Morocco proposed a conference to deal with the problem of the Congo, it sent invitations only to those African states which were believed to be in general agreement with its views on the subject, although the conference's declared aim was to find an "African solution" to the problem.²⁰ The French-speaking states were excluded, and the split among Africa's independent states became more defined.

The conference called by the Moroccan government met in Casablanca from January 4 to 7, 1961. Represented in it

¹⁹These conferences were discussed in Chapter 1.

²⁰The New York Times, December 31, 1960.

were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic. These states came to be known as the Casablanca group.²¹ At the end of the conference on January 7, 1961, an African Charter--also known as the Casablanca Charter--was proclaimed. The Charter embodied specific and general principles to which the signees pledged themselves, including the intention to establish a NATO-like organization to co-ordinate their policies and insure common defense, the determination to liberate African territories still under foreign rule, and commitment to a policy of non-alignment.²²

The states members of the Casablanca group considered the rival Brazzaville powers as being too subservient to France.²³ This feeling was bluntly expressed by the Moroccan representative to the United Nations General Assembly during debate on the admission of Mauritania to membership. The Moroccan delegate, in an obvious reference to the newly-admitted French-speaking states, expressed his objection to Mauritania's membership by saying: "Now France has discovered the best trick of the fifteenth General Assembly. Whenever it wants to say something, it does so fourteen times; if Mauritania is admitted, it will do so fifteen times."²⁴ This

²¹ Libya, Ceylon, and the Algerian Government in Exile were also represented, but they were not fully associated with the conference. They did not sign the Casablanca Charter which stated the group's objectives. Tunisia and Liberia declined to attend.

²² The New York Times, January 8, 1961, p. 1.

²³ Economist, January 27, 1962, p. 306.

²⁴ GAOR, Session XV, Part II, 1960-61, p. 349.

mutual suspicion of the wisdom and loyalty of the other party which characterized the relations between the Brezzaville and the Casablanca groups represented one of the deepest divisions among the various subgroups of the Afro-Asian coalition.

On the basis of the affiliations of its members, then, the Afro-Asian group consisted of several factions which may or may not be found to represent varying political views. Let us now examine their voting record in order to determine the extent to which these caucusing subgroups correspond to voting alignments.

CHAPTER V

GROUPS WITHIN THE GROUP:

VOTING GROUPS

If the Afro-Asian group subdivides into five subgroups from a censusing point of view, then we must also see if the voting behavior of these subgroups correlates with their censusing activity. Do the members of the total group cluster in the same manner when they vote as when they census? If not, how do they regroup, and are the alignments always the same or do they vary from one type of issue to another? Are there any states which do not affiliate themselves with any of the voting alignments? These and related questions will be the basis of discussion in this chapter.

Before these questions are answered, it is necessary to explain the method used for the identification of voting groups. The method chosen for use in this chapter works as follows:¹ a calculation is made of how often every Afro-Asian state agreed and disagreed with every other Afro-Asian state on every type of issue throughout the period studied. The frequencies are then expressed in percentages in the form

¹This method was developed by Arend Lijphart, The American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1963), 902-917.

of 45 x 45 tables.² The next step is to decide on the minimum net agreement³ which members have to possess in order to qualify as a voting cluster. The level of agreement may vary from +100% (for states which agreed on all votes), to -100% (for states which disagreed on all votes).

It is obvious that by varying the level of required agreement, one varies the composition of subgroups. The higher the level is set, the smaller the clusters will be. It is also likely that raising the required level of agreement will increase the number of voting clusters. Lowering the required level of agreement will naturally produce opposite results.

Since there is no universally accepted operational definition of a voting group, any level of net agreement may be challenged on the grounds that it is too lenient or too demanding. The only safe assumption which can be made is that the required level of net agreement need not represent total agreement and must not represent more disagreement than agreement. In other words, it must be somewhere between 0 and 100%.⁴

For the purposes of this chapter, a net agreement of

²These tables are presented as Appendixes B, C, D, E, and F.

³Agreement minus disagreement. If state A agreed 80% of the time and disagreed 5% of the time with state B, then net agreement between them was 75%.

⁴One must keep in mind that zero net agreement does not mean a total lack of agreement. It means an equal number of agreements and disagreements.

at least 50% was deemed reasonable. This cut-off point for separating members of a voting cluster from non-members, it must be emphasized, is not halfway on the net agreement scale. It is located 75% of the way to total agreement. Figure 25 illustrates the degree of agreement required for membership in a voting cluster.




Fig. 25.-Voting cluster defined in terms of net agreement.

The shaded area represents the extent of agreement which must exist among several states to qualify them as a voting cluster. The "limit" line at the extreme left of the shaded area separates the members of a voting cluster from all other members of the total Afro-Asian group.

This method of identifying clusters has two main advantages which justify it. First, it does not presuppose the existence of any particular voting clusters, and it does not

predetermine their composition. The existence of clusters and their respective memberships are determined solely on the objective basis of common attitudes expressed by voting agreement. Second, the method does not impose on anyone the definition of a voting group used in this study. Any one who feels that 50% net agreement among states is too lax or too restrictive a requirement for belonging to a voting group may move the "limit" line on the net agreement scale to the right or to the left to suit his own definition of a cluster. By moving it to the right (i.e., by raising the required level of net agreement), he may expel marginal members⁵ of a certain group. By moving the line to the left (i.e., by lowering the required level of net agreement), he may add to the cluster states which are just outside of it.

Keeping in mind the preceding operational definition of a voting cluster, let us now identify and examine voting subgroups which make up the Afro-Asian coalition, and see how these subgroups are related to the various types of questions which came before the Assembly. The questions are grouped under the categories of racial, colonial, cold war, general political, and procedural.

Racial issues:

In Chapter III, discussing Afro-Asian cohesion on various issues, we found only one case between 1952 and 1960 when one Afro-Asian state opposed another on a recorded vote

⁵Members whose net agreement with some or all other members of the voting cluster is not much higher than 50%.

on a racial question. But in all other cases, the absence of disagreement cannot be construed to mean the presence of actual agreement. On racial issues, although there was only the one opposition vote mentioned above, the level of net agreement among pairs of Afro-Asian members was very often less than 100%.

Appendix B shows the frequency of voting agreement and disagreement for every pair of Afro-Asian states on racial issues. Analysis of this data shows that all members of the Afro-Asian group, with the sole exception of Japan, represent a unified bloc when voting on racial questions. Japan fails, on the basis of its voting record, to qualify for membership in the Afro-Asian group, as a voting alignment, because it failed to reach the required level of net agreement with eight of its members.⁶

One qualification, however, should be made. Although both Togo and Liberia met the minimum net agreement standard, they failed to reach that level of agreement with each other. The net agreement between these two states was only 20%.⁷ They were included in the group because both of them possessed the required net agreement with all other members. Although by excluding either one of them the other becomes fully qualified for membership in the group, each logically equally

⁶The eight members are: Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and Upper Volta.

⁷They did not disagree on any of the racial votes, but they actually agreed only 20% of the time. On all other votes, they voted differently.

qualifies for inclusion.⁸

We have defined a voting group as one in which states have a net agreement of at least 50% with each other. The above analysis shows that members of the Afro-Asian group, except Japan, do in fact constitute a voting alignment on racial questions. The analysis does not, however, show whether they constitute a solid alignment or one in which most members barely reach the chosen level of net agreement with each other. Figure 26 shows the extent of net agreement among all pairs of members on racial votes.

As the graph shows, the Afro-Asian group--Japan excluded--not only constitutes one voting bloc on racial issues, but it is a solid bloc where the level of net agreement between the great majority of pairs of members is very high. In the case of racial questions, then, it is meaningless to speak of subgroups within the Afro-Asian group. There is only one "subgroup" and its membership is practically identical with the total group. All of the caucusing subgroups discussed in the previous chapter are parts of the same voting alignment and not distinct factions within it. As will be shown shortly, racial issues are the only questions which do not lead to fragmentation of the Afro-Asian coalition.

⁸There are other cases (on other types of issues) when two states are included in a voting subgroup because each of them attained the required degree of net agreement with all members but not with each other. Such cases will be indicated whenever they occur in the subsequent part of this chapter.




Fig. 26.-Afro-Asian* net agreement: racial issues

*Excluding Japan.

Since Japan failed to attain the required 50% net agreement with all other members of the group, it was not considered a member of the group. Since it did, however, attain that level of agreement with a majority of the group's members, it will be referred to as an associate member. The subsequent analysis of other types of issues will show that in every case there were Afro-Asian states which did not achieve the required level of agreement with all members of any subgroup, but that they did reach that level of agreement with a majority of members. Such states will also be referred to as associate members of a particular subgroup.

Colonial Issues:

It was concluded from the analysis of Afro-Asian votes on colonial questions in Chapter III that although there existed a considerable degree of cohesion, Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial questions could not be taken for granted. It was shown that solidarity often suffered from the lack of agreement as well as from the presence of disagreement.

This diminished solidarity on colonial questions will now be shown to stem from two causes. First, it is partly traced to the fact that the group breaks down into three fairly distinct factions. Second, the cohesion is further diminished by a lack of agreement and by disagreement among the members of each of these factions. These two aspects of diminished solidarity on colonial questions will now be discussed.

The frequency of agreement and disagreement between all pairs of Afro-Asian states on colonial votes is given in Appendix C. Analysis of the group's agreement-disagreement record shows that, on colonial issues, the Afro-Asian group fractures into three fairly distinct subgroups which meet the definition of voting clusters, and a few states which qualify as associate members. The largest of these voting subgroups consists of 25 states. This subgroup includes all of the Arab states, all of the Casablanca caucusing group, most of the original members of the Afro-Asian group, but none of the aligned states. For purposes of identification, this segment of the Afro-Asian coalition will be referred to as the neutral subgroup.

The second voting cluster is very similar in its membership to the Brazzaville caucusing subgroup. The only members of the Brazzaville faction which fail to qualify for membership in this group on the basis of their voting record are Togo and Dahomey. Togo's votes on colonial questions place it within the neutral voting subgroup mentioned above. Dahomey, on the other hand, is affiliated with the Brazzaville subgroup as an associate member, having attained the required level of net agreement of 50% or higher with half of its full members.

The third and the smallest of the voting clusters consists of 5 states. This faction will be referred to as the aligned voting subgroup since all of the aligned states except one belong to it, and they together comprise the great

majority of its membership. Figure 27 shows the voting subdivisions of the Afro-Asian group on colonial questions.

	NEUTRAL	ALIGNED	BRAZZAVILLE
M	Afghanistan	Fed. of Malaya	Cameroun*
E	Burma	Japan	Cent. Afr. Rep.**
M	Ceylon	Pakistan	Chad
B	Egypt	Philippines	Congo (B)
E	Ethiopia	Thailand	Gabon*
E	Ghana		Ivory Coast
S	Guinea		Madagascar
	India		Niger**
	Indonesia		Senegal
	Iraq		Upper Volta**
	Jordan		
	Lebanon		
	Liberia		
	Libya		
	Mali		
	Morocco		
	Nepal		
	Nigeria		
	Saudi Arabia		
	Somalia		
	Sudan		
	Syria		
	Togo		
	Tunisia		
	Yemen		
ASSOC. MEMBERS	Fed. of Malays Iran Pakistan		Cambodia Dahomey Laos
NON- MEMBER	Congo (L)		

Fig. 27.-Voting subgroups: colonial votes

* Cameroun and Gabon agree with all Brazzaville members except with each other.

** Niger and Upper Volta agree with all Brazzaville members except with each other.

As the table shows, only two of the caucusing subgroups discussed in the last chapter seem to represent distinct political subdivisions within the Afro-Asian coalition. These are the aligned and the Breznevite subgroups. They are not only cohesive enough to qualify as voting clusters, but they are sufficiently different from the rest of the Afro-Asian states in their voting behavior to be identifiable as distinct elements. Even they, however, qualify as voting subdivisions in a slightly modified form, since their memberships as voting clusters are not identical to their memberships as caucusing subgroups.

All the other caucusing subgroups do not seem to represent similarly distinct strands within the total group. Although the votes of the Arab caucusing subgroup, for example, show that its members share a common attitude on colonial questions, they do not show that it represents an attitude distinct from other Afro-Asian states. This is indicated by the fact that its members are a part of a larger subdivision to which 14 non-Arab states also belong. The same observation is also true of the Casablanca caucusing faction. The Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth are divided between the neutral and the aligned subgroups.

In addition to the loss of cohesion due to chaos separating groups of Afro-Asian states, the group's solidarity suffers because of a lower level of agreement among individual members. This is shown by the fact that the level of net agreement among the respective members of each voting

subgroup is in many cases barely sufficient to keep them in their respective voting clusters. Figure 28 represents the net agreement existing among pairs of states members of the three voting subgroups identified from colonial votes. As the illustration indicates, members of the voting subgroups are not equally cohesive, which is to say that they are not equally responsible for diminished Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial questions. The members of the aligned voting subgroup and the members of the Brazzaville subgroup are more responsible for the lower cohesion than the members of the neutral subgroup. The aligned states not only fail to possess 50% or higher net agreement with the rest of the Afro-Asian group's members, but net agreement among themselves is relatively low. Net agreement among pairs of aligned states was below 70% on 70% of their votes. Only 10% of the time did the level of agreement among them reach 80% or higher. Similarly, the Brazzaville group is characterized by a relatively low level of agreement among its members. On 64.4% of their votes, members of the Brazzaville voting subgroup had less than 70% net agreement. On only 4.4% of their votes they possessed a high level of agreement of 80% or higher.

In contrast, the members of the neutral subgroup were considerably more cohesive on colonial issues than the other two groups. The level of net agreement among the members of the neutral faction was 80% or higher on 67.1% of all colonial votes. Only 5.4% of their votes were found in the lower portion of the net agreement scale (below 70%).




Fig. 28.-Cohesion of the voting subgroups: colonial issues

The fact that the three voting subgroups are not equally cohesive on colonial issues should not be surprising. The fact that the aligned and the Brazzaville members have affiliations and commitments which bind them to ex-colonial powers, against whose interests Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial affairs is largely directed, goes far to explain the low level of agreement which they have among themselves, and between them and the other members of the group. The members of the Brazzaville faction, for example, were "torn between their loyalty to President de Gaulle and their strong anti-colonialism and sympathy with Algerian Arab Nationalism."⁹ This double commitment often made a choice of position difficult and a "correct" stand less than clear. The question of non-Afro-Asian commitments of Afro-Asian states will be returned to in Chapter VII, when the cohesive and divisive forces to which the coalition is subject are discussed.

Before the voting subgroups are identified and discussed in relation to other types of issues, two more observations must be made about the voting subdivisions on colonial questions. The first point is that although the voting record shows that the Afro-Asian group consists of three distinct subgroups, the three subgroups do not seem to be equally separated from each other. The aligned and the neutral subgroups are more closely related, as voting clusters, than the Brazzaville group is related to either of the other two. This fact is shown by overlapping memberships. Two of the five members

⁹The New York Times, November 27, 1960.

of the aligned subgroup are associate members of the neutral subgroup. Pakistan and the Federation of Malaya--both members of the aligned voting subgroup--each possesses 50% or greater net agreement with all but two of the members of the neutral subgroup. On the other hand, no member of the Brazzaville group is similarly associated with either of the aligned or the neutral subgroups. Graphically the relationship between the three voting clusters may be represented as follows:




Fig. 29.-Voting affinity of the subgroups: colonial questions.

The last point about Afro-Asian subdivisions on colonial questions is that five states are not members of any voting cluster. Of the five, three states are associate members of the Brazzaville group. It is interesting to note that all of these three states (and only they among the five non-members) are ex-French colonies. These states are

Cambodia, Dahomey, and Laos. The other non-affiliated states are Iran and the Congo (Leopoldville). The Congo's non-affiliation, however, is statistically meaningless. It is not caused by insufficient agreement with other states, but largely due to the fact that it did not cast enough roll-call votes on colonial issues to reveal its voting affinity with any sub-group. The reason for its non-voting was the fact that it was not until well after the fifteenth (1960-61) session, in which it was admitted to membership, began that the Assembly resolved the controversy over which of two competing Congolese delegations to seat.

Cold War Issues:

Analysis of agreement-disagreement data on cold war issues¹⁰ reveals considerable similarity between the voting subgroups on cold war and on colonial questions. The group's voting record on cold war issues shows the existence of three voting subgroups and a number of states which do not belong to any of the subgroups. Moreover, the three voting subgroups have a surprisingly strong resemblance to the three clusters identified in the case of colonial votes.

The largest of these subgroups consists of sixteen members and two associate members. Fifteen of the members and both of the associate members belonged to the same subgroup when colonial votes were analyzed. This group includes

¹⁰The frequency of agreement and disagreement between all pairs of Afro-Asian states on cold war votes is given in Appendix D.

among its members most of the original members of the Afro-Asian group, most of the Arab states, and all of the Casablanca states. Due to the similarity between this subgroup and its counterpart on colonial votes, it will also be referred to as the neutral subgroup.

The second voting cluster consists of seven members. Its membership is characterized by the predominance of aligned states, all of which belong to it. The other members are Liberia and the Federation of Malaya.

The third voting cluster consists of thirteen states most of which are French-speaking African members. All of the members of the Brazzaville group are either full or associate members of this voting cluster. Figure 30 shows the three subgroups.

As the table shows, although there is some realignment of states, the three voting subgroups identified from cold war votes have a strong resemblance to their counterparts identified from colonial votes. It also shows that, as in the case of colonial questions, the Brazzaville and the aligned caucusing subdivisions come closest to being distinct political factions within the Afro-Asian group. All other caucusing subgroups discussed in the last chapter are either not cohesive enough or are not distinct from other parts of the total group. The Arab states, for example, are not cohesive enough on cold war questions to belong to the same voting cluster. Although most of them (seven out of eleven) are either full or associate members of the neutral subgroup, one

of them (Tunisia) belongs to the Brazzaville voting cluster, and three Arab states (Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya) are not affiliated with any subgroup. The Commonwealth members are divided, again, between the neutral and the aligned subgroups. The Casablanca caucusing group behaves just as it did on colonial matters. It is cohesive enough to belong to the same voting cluster (the neutral subgroup), but it is a part of a larger subgroup rather than a distinct faction.

	NEUTRAL	ALIGNED	BRAZZAVILLE
MEMBERS	Afghanistan	Fed. of Malaya	Cent. Afr. Rep.
	Burma	Iran	Chad
	Cambodia	Japan	Congo (L)
	Ceylon	Liberia	Dahomey
	Egypt	Pakistan	Fed. of Malaya
	Ghana	Philippines	Gabon
	Guinea	Thailand	Ivory Coast
	India		Laos
	Indonesia		Madagascar
	Mali		Niger
	Morocco		Somalia
	Nepal		Togo
	Nigeria		Tunisia
	Sudan		
	Syria		
	Yemen		
ASSOC. MEMBERS	Iraq Saudi Arabia	Congo (L) Laos	Cameroun Congo (B) Upper Volta
NON-MEMBERS	Ethiopia, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Senegal		

Fig. 30.-Voting subgroups: cold war issues

Although the three subgroups on cold war issues bear considerable resemblance to subgroups based on colonial votes, they vary in the manner in which they are related to each

other. It was said earlier that, in the case of colonial votes, the neutral and the aligned subgroups were closer to each other than the Brazzaville subgroup was to either of the other two. In the case of cold war issues, however, the aligned and the Brazzaville subgroups are more closely related to each other than either one of them is to the neutral states. This relationship is shown by the fact that no member or associate member of the neutral subgroup is a member or an associate member of either of the other two subgroups. On the other hand, the aligned and the Brazzaville subgroups have one full member in common. The Federation of Malaya has 50% or more not agreement with all members of these two subgroups. Also, the two associate members of the aligned subgroup are full members of the Brazzaville subgroup. This relationship between the subgroups is illustrated by Figure 31.




Fig. 31.-Voting affinity of the subgroups: cold war questions.

When the votes of the three voting subgroups on colonial issues were analyzed, it was found that the neutral subgroup was by far the most cohesive of the three. This is not true of cold war votes. In this case, the neutral and the Brazzaville subgroups are almost equally cohesive. The surprising aspect of the voting record was that the faction whose members predominantly belonged to military alliances was by far the least cohesive of the three subgroups. The fact that their commitments as members of Western alliances would give them particular concern with East-West disputes may reasonably lead to the assumption that they would possess greater solidarity on such issues than other groups of Afro-Asian states. This assumption is obviously not correct. Figure 32 shows the cohesion of each of the three subgroups on cold war questions.

A comparison between this graph and Figure 27--which showed the cohesion of the three voting subgroups on colonial questions--shows that while both the aligned and the Brazzaville clusters are somewhat more cohesive on cold war votes than on colonial votes, the neutral subgroup is considerably more cohesive on colonial than on cold war issues. This discrepancy in the voting behavior of the three subgroups underlines the importance of looking beyond the group's outer limits in an effort to understand its attitudes. What is true for a segment of the coalition is not necessarily true for the other subdivisions within it.

As in the case of colonial questions, the three voting




Fig. 32.-Cohesion of the voting subgroups: cold war issues

subgroups identified from cold war votes do not absorb all the members of the Afro-Asian group. There are 5 states which do not have 50% or higher net agreement with half or more of the members of any subgroup, and are therefore not affiliated with them either as full or associate members. These states are Ethiopia, Senegal, and the three Arab states of Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya.

General Political Questions:

Analysis of agreement and disagreement data between all pairs of Afro-Asian members on general political issues¹¹ shows that the pattern of voting subdivisions which existed in the case of colonial and cold war issues also prevails in the case of general political votes. Not only does the Afro-Asian group break into three fairly distinct voting subgroups, but the composition of these subgroups is clearly similar to the composition of the subgroups based on colonial and cold war votes.

The first voting subgroup consists of 17 members and 5 associate members. These states include the Arab states, the Casablanca faction, and most of the original members of the Afro-Asian coalition. The second voting cluster consists of 12 states, including 11 members of the Brazzaville caucusing subgroup and the Congo (Leopoldville). The third subgroup contains 5 states, 4 of which are aligned countries. The following table shows these three subgroups.

¹¹Agreement-disagreement data is given in Appendix E.

	NEUTRAL	ALIGNED	BRAZZAVILLE
	Afghanistan	Japan	Cameroon
	Burma	Pakistan	Cent. Afr. Rep.
	Ceylon	Philippines	Chad
	Egypt	Syria	Congo (B)
	Ethiopia	Thailand	Congo (L)**
M	Ghana		Dahomey
E	India		Gabon
M	Indonesia		Ivory Coast
B	Iraq		Madagascar
E	Libya		Niger
B	Mali*		Senegal**
S	Morocco		Upper Volta
	Nepal*		
	Saudi Arabia		
	Sudan		
	Syria		
	Yemen		
ASSOC. MEMBERS	Cambodia	Iran	
	Guinea	Liberia	
	Jordan		
	Lebanon		
	Tunisia		
NON- MEMBERS	Federation of Malaya, Laos, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo		

Fig. 33.-Voting subgroups: general political questions

* Mali and Nepal agree with all neutral members but not with each other.

** Congo (L) and Senegal agree with all other Brazzaville members but not with each other.

The resemblance between the voting clusters on general political questions and their counterparts on colonial and cold war issues is not limited to similarity in their respective memberships. An analysis of the agreement-disagreement record of each subgroup shows that the aligned voting subgroup continues to be the least cohesive of the three. As in the case of colonial and cold war votes, members of the aligned

subgroup failed to possess a net agreement of 70% or higher on the majority of their votes on general political questions.

The neutral voting subgroup is the most cohesive on general political votes, as it was on colonial issues. It has more votes in the 80% or higher segment of the net agreement scale and less votes in the lower portion of the scale than either of the other two voting subgroups. Figure 34 shows the extent of net agreement among the respective members of the three voting factions on general political questions.

Finally, five members of the Afro-Asian group did not show enough net agreement with any of the three voting clusters to qualify as members or associate members. These non-affiliated states are the Federation of Malaya, Laos, Nigeria, Somalia, and Togo. None of these states had 50% or more net agreement with half or more of the members of any voting subgroup.

Procedural Votes:

So far, our analysis shows that whenever the Afro-Asian group broke down into voting subgroups--as it did on every type of substantive issue except racial questions--the subgroups did not change radically from one type of issue to another. Although some shifting did take place, the subgroups remained basically similar in their composition. In the case of votes on procedural questions, however, the record shows that although the coalition did fracture into three voting clusters, these subgroups reflected substantially greater




Fig. 34.-Cohesion of the voting subgroups: general political issues.

changes in membership than was the case in any other type of issue.

The degree of agreement and disagreement between pairs of Afro-Asian states on procedural questions is given in Appendix P. The search for voting clusters based on these votes yielded the following subgroups.

	1	2	3
M	Afghanistan	Guinea	Cent. Afr. Rep.
E	Burma	Iraq**	Congo (B)
M	Cambodia*	Libya	Gabon
B	Ceylon	Mali	Japan
E	Ethiopia*	Morocco	Madagascar
R	Egypt	Nepal	Niger
S	Ghana	Nigeria	Philippines
	India	Somalia	Thailand
	Indonesia	Sudan	
	Mali	Syria**	
	Nigeria	Togo	
	Saudi Arabia	Tunisia	
	Somalia		
	Togo		
	Yemen		
ASSOC. MEMBERS	Liberia Syria	Lebanon	Cameroun Chad Ivory Coast
NON- MEMBERS	Congo (L), Dahomey, Federation of Malaya, Iran, Jordan, Laos, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Upper Volta		

Fig. 35.-Voting subgroups: procedural votes

*In subgroup 1, both Cambodia and Ethiopia agree with all other members but not with each other.

**In subgroup 2, Iraq and Syria agree with all other members but not with each other.

As this breakdown of voting clusters shows, there are three main differences between voting subgroups on procedural

questions and voting clusters on all other types of issues. The first difference is that most of the states listed under Groups 1 and 2 have so far belonged to the same voting cluster, and not to two separate subgroups as in the case of procedural votes. A look at these states shows that they are substantially the same states which so far have been identified as the neutral cluster. It may be said, then, that procedural votes seem to cause the neutral states to break up into two separate voting clusters.

The second way in which voting subgroups on procedural questions differ from voting clusters on all other issues is that the majority of the aligned and the Brazzaville states belong to the same voting cluster, a combination which did not exist in any of the previous voting subgroups.¹²

Another way in which voting subgroups of the coalition on procedural votes differ from voting subgroups on all other issues is that--in the case of procedural votes--not one of the caucusing subgroups is cohesive enough to have all of its members in the same voting cluster. This is the only time when such dispersion of the members of caucusing groups took place. In each previous case all the members of at least one caucusing subgroup belonged to the same voting cluster. In the case of procedural questions, however, members of all caucusing subgroups belonged to either more than one voting cluster, or to one cluster and to the non-affiliated states.

¹²This statement excludes racial questions, in which case there were no distinct voting subgroups.

The main similarity between the composition of the subgroups on procedural and on other types of questions is the fact that the aligned and the Brazzaville states remain, as in other cases, largely isolated from other Afro-Asian states. As the listing of voting subgroups shows, not one of the states which have been identified as neutral states is found in Group 3, and Togo is the only member of the Brazzaville caucusing subgroup which is affiliated with the neutral states.¹³ Also, no aligned states are found to belong to Groups 1 and 2 which are dominated by the neutral states.

Stability of the Subgroups:

Now that the voting subdivisions of the coalition have been identified for each type of issue, one final point about them will be considered. This point relates to the stability of the subgroups. Are there any Afro-Asian states which have sufficient political affinity to belong to the same voting alignment regardless of the type of issue involved? In other words, is there a stable core within each political subdivision which remains intact at all times, or are the subgroups only *ad hoc* alignments which emerge when faced with a particular type of question and dissolve when they are dealing with a different situation?

A study of the memberships of voting alignments on

¹³Togo is the least "loyal" of all Brazzaville states. Its voting record places it in the Brazzaville voting cluster in only one case, that of cold war questions.

substantive questions shows that each voting subgroup consists of a number of states which have 50% or more net agreement among themselves always, and a number of states whose affiliation with any particular subgroup is related to particular types of issues. The following table shows which Afro-Asian states belonged to the same voting cluster on all types of issues, and states which belonged to these clusters on some types of questions only.

	NEUTRAL	ALIGNED	BRAZZAVILLE
P E M R E M M A B N E E R N S T	Afghanistan Burma Ceylon Egypt Ghana India Indonesia Jelli Morocco Nepal Sudan Syria Yemen	Japan Pakistan Philippines Thailand	Cent. Af. Rep. Chad Gabon Ivory Coast Madagascar Niger
A P P M I L B I A R T E S D	Cambodia (2)* Ethiopia (3) Guinea (3) Iraq (3) Jordan (2) Lebanon (2) Liberia (2) Libya (3) Nigeria (2) Saudi Arabia (3) Senegal (2) Togo (2) Tunisia (2)	Fed. of Malaya (3) Iran (2) Liberia (2) Syria (2)	Cameroon (3) Congo (B) (3) Congo (L) (3) Dahomey (3) Fed. of Malaya (2) Laos (2) Senegal (2) Senegal (2) Togo (2) Tunisia (2) Upper Volta (3)

Fig. 36.-Voting subgroups: all substantive issues

*Numbers in parentheses are the number of times, out of a possible four, affiliated members belonged to the voting subgroups under which they are listed.

One interesting feature of the voting subgroups on important questions is that whenever a state belongs to a voting alignment, it tends to belong to the same alignment it belonged to on other types of issues. In other words, there is very little shifting from one voting subgroup to another. This is shown in Figure 37:

As the table shows, there were only four states which changed membership from one subgroup to another when the type of issue involved was changed.¹⁴ These states were Liberia, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia. All shifts in the membership of these states took place when the type of issue involved a change from colonial to cold war or visa versa. None of them were affiliated with any subgroup on general political questions.

Non-Joiners:

There were no Afro-Asian states which did not belong to any of the subgroups at least on two types of important questions. There were, however, five states which had a relatively low level of affiliation. These states were Cambodia, Iran, Jordan, Laos, and Lebanon. Each one of these states belonged to a voting cluster on two of the four types of non-procedural questions. If racial questions are eliminated, on the ground that all Afro-Asian states except Japan constituted one voting cluster, then their affiliation as members of voting clusters was limited to one type of important

¹⁴Racial issues were excluded since there were no separate subgroups on racial votes.

COUNTRY	COLONIAL	COLD WAR	GEN. POLITICAL
Afghanistan	n	n	n
Burma	n	n	n
Cambodia	none	n	none
Cameroun	b	none	b
Cent. Af. Rep.	b	b	b
Ceylon	n	n	n
Chad	b	b	b
Congo (B)	b	none	b
Congo (L)	none	b	b
Dahomey	none	b	b
Egypt	n	n	n
Ethiopia	n	none	n
Fed. of Malaya	a	ab	none
Gabon	b	b	b
Ghana	n	n	n
Guinea	n	n	none
India	n	n	n
Indonesia	n	n	n
Iran	none	a	none
Iraq	n	none	n
Ivory Coast	b	b	b
Japan	a	a	a
Jordan	n	none	none
Laos	none	b	none
Lebanon	n	none	none
Liberia	n	a	none
Libya	n	none	n
Madagascar	b	b	b
Mali	n	n	n
Morocco	n	n	n
Nepal	n	n	n
Niger	b	b	b
Nigeria	n	n	none
Pakistan	a	a	a
Philippines	a	a	a
Saudi Arabia	n	none	n
Senegal	b	none	b
Somalia	n	b	none
Sudan	n	n	n
Syria	n	n	na
Thailand	a	a	a
Togo	n	b	none
Tunisia	n	b	none
Upper Volta	b	none	b
Yemen	n	n	n

Fig. 37.-Voting affiliation by type of issue

Note: The letters "n," "a," and "b" represent the neutral, aligned, and Brazzaville voting subgroups, respectively.

questions. Cambodia, Iran, and Laos were full members of voting clusters only on cold war issues. The first state belonged to the neutral subgroup; Iran and Laos belonged to the aligned and Brazzaville subgroups, respectively. Jordan and Lebanon belonged to a subgroup only on colonial issues. They both belonged to the neutral faction. On other types of important questions, these five states did not possess enough political affinity with any of the voting subgroups to be full members.

Conclusions:

From the preceding discussion of subgroups within the Afro-Asian coalition, several generalizations can be made. The first is that on all except racial questions, the Afro-Asian group consists of three clusters of states which have considerable affinity to each other but not with the members of other clusters. Second, on all important questions, the voting clusters remain basically similar in their memberships. Individual Afro-Asian states do not usually abandon a voting cluster for another when the type of issue considered changes. With a few exceptions, an Afro-Asian state either belongs to the same voting cluster or to none. Third, each of the voting clusters includes a number of states whose affiliation with each other is permanent and does not seem to depend on the type of issue involved.

Another generalization about subdivisions within the group is that the association of Afro-Asian states into

caucusing subgroups does not necessarily reflect common political attitudes. Not one single caucusing subgroup belonged to the same voting cluster on all types of issues. The caucusing subgroups which came closest to being distinct political alignments on the basis of their votes were the aligned and the Brazzaville subgroups. Four of the five aligned states belonged to the same voting cluster on all important issues. Also, a majority of the members of the Brazzaville caucusing subgroup were always members of the same voting subgroup. In all other cases, caucusing subgroups were either not cohesive enough to be in the same voting cluster on all important issues, or were parts of larger alignments which included states from other caucusing subgroups.

PART II

CHAPTER VI

AFRO-ASIAN VIEWS

So far the discussion has been largely limited to an examination of the voting behavior of the Afro-Asian group. Very little has been said about the attitudes of its members toward the various types of problems on which the votes were taken. The purpose of this chapter is to identify Afro-Asian views on these problems.

The information used in this chapter was gathered primarily from the Official Records of the General Assembly. The discussion will be divided under the major types of substantive issues which have been used so far: racial, colonial, cold war, and general political questions. A statement will also be made of Afro-Asian views on economic matters.

Racial Questions:

United Nations' dealings with the problem of racialism originated from two sources. The policy of the Union of South Africa pertaining to apartheid and to the treatment of people of Indian origin in that country accounted for all agenda items and for all recommendations and resolutions dealing with racialism. The bulk of the debate on racialism also stemmed from the same source. In such cases, racialism was considered and dealt with as a problem in its own right.

The Afro-Asian states also raised the question of racialism in connection with their attack upon the colonial system. In such cases, racialism was viewed as an aspect of the colonial problem. It was held to be a major rationalization for it, and a characteristic which rendered the colonial system repugnant to and in violation of the Charter.

The first aspect of the racial question which confronted the United Nations, and which remained subject to controversy throughout the ten years with which this study is concerned, was the question of the organization's competence to deal with the problem. Since the Charter contained an express denial to the organization of the authority to deal with "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,"¹ and since the Union of South Africa and its supporters used this particular provision to deny to the United Nations the opportunity of placing on its agenda the item pertaining to racialism, the Afro-Asian states' first task was to establish the Assembly's authority to deal with it. This they did by arguing that Article 2, paragraph 7, was not applicable to the complaint against the Union of South Africa, by attaching greater importance to other Charter provisions which tended to support their case, and by resorting to extra-legal arguments.

In arguing against the applicability of Article 2, paragraph 7, Afro-Asian states advanced the view that the

¹United Nations, Charter, Art. 2, par. 7.

paragraph prohibited intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, but that discussing a problem did not constitute intervention. As Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate, put it in 1954, in connection with the item dealing with the treatment of Indians in South Africa: "India was not asking the U. N. to intervene in the Union of South Africa. It was merely asking the U. N. to express an opinion, to make an appeal."²

In addition to arguing that dealing with the racial question did not violate Article 2, paragraph 7, the Afro-Asian states adhered to the view that the right to invoke the domestic jurisdiction clause was restricted by other Charter provisions. In 1949, the Indian delegate took the position that since racialism fell within the scope of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter--dealing with states' obligations to respect human rights, etc.--it "could not be held to be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union of South Africa."³ In 1952, the Iraqi delegate rephrased the argument of his Indian colleague by asking the seventh session of the General Assembly the rhetorical question: "If a nation were to legislate the practice of genocide, what would be our position? Should we have the right to intervene and tell that nation that it is violating human rights?"⁴ In essence, the Afro-Asian states were arguing

²GAOR, Committee I a, Session IX, 1954, p. 33.

³GAOR, Session III, Part II, 1949, p. 454.

⁴GAOR, Session VII, 1952, p. 65.

that the obligation to respect human rights constituted a higher law, the violation of which deprived the offender of any legitimate refuge from prosecution.

Another way in which the Afro-Asian states sought to establish the United Nations' authority regarding the racial question was to interpret Article 14 in such a way as to render the domestic jurisdiction clause almost meaningless. Article 14 states in part that "the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin." This provision of the Charter was held by Afro-Asian states to mean that the Assembly may concern itself with matters which, though they stemmed from the domestic actions of a state, have international implications. Speaking during the sixth session the Indian delegate told the Assembly that

When domestic affairs are mishandled and lead to the creation of conflicts and tensions which might imperil not only the State concerned but the neighbouring areas as well, then this august body has to take notice of such tensions and has to try to solve them in order to establish peace and better balance in these areas. We are living in a very small world--it gets smaller every day--and events taking place in one corner affect the lives of millions situated far away. No country can indiscriminately carry on experiments on the social, political or economic planes without those experiments affecting other areas of the world.⁵

Finally, the Afro-Asian states' efforts to establish the Assembly's competence to deal with the race problem was not limited to legal arguments. As the delegate from India put it in 1950, the "question whether a matter was essentially

⁵GADR, Session VI, 1951-52, p. 376.

within the domestic jurisdiction of a State was not purely a question of law, but depended upon certain circumstances in each case."⁶ The implication, of course, was that the complaint against the Union of South Africa's racial policies contained these special circumstances which made the question of United Nations' competence to deal with it "not purely a question of law." Mr. Nehru, as quoted by the Indian representative, made clear what these circumstances were. Racial discrimination in Africa, he said, was "an insult to every Indian, all 360 million of them." He continued:

At no time are we prepared to put up with the doctrine of racial inequality whatever the consequences to India or to anyone else. Where policies are declared and followed, as for instance in South Africa, which I think are pernicious and insulting in the extreme, to expect me to remain silent about it is to expect the impossible.⁷

It can be seen that in their effort to establish the General Assembly's authority to deal with the problem of racialism, the Afro-Asian states followed a liberal construction of the Charter, and even went beyond its provisions to support their case. Since India was the Afro-Asian state most concerned with racialism in South Africa--partly because of South Africa's policy pertaining to the treatment of people of Indian origin--India's extra-legal approach to the operations of the United Nations came to be a major characteristic of the way in which Afro-Asian views on the question of

⁶GAOR, Committee I a, Session V, 1950, p. 248.

⁷GAOR, Session VIII, 1953, p. 204.

competence were presented.⁸

As far as the Afro-Asian case against the racial policies of South Africa is concerned, the argument was quite simple. It was based on the belief that racialism was not valid scientifically, that it involved a violation of human rights, and that it militated against the ideals of the United Nations by causing ill-will among nations. Perhaps every argument that the Afro-Asian states ever made against South Africa's racial policies can be found in a statement made by the Indian representative in 1959. The policy and practice of racialism, he told the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, were not only "totally contrary to the sense of human dignity," but also "likely to lead to racial conflict in Africa of a character which can only be inferred by people if they would just look at the numerals: 193 million people as against 5 million."⁹

Afro-Asian attacks upon the Union of South Africa's racial policies were not based upon a belief that South Africa was the only sinner, but on the belief that it was the only country with a racial problem which was trying to perpetuate the status quo. When the foreign minister of the Union of South Africa said in the General Assembly that other countries in addition to his own had a similar problem, the

⁸For a study of India's extra-legal attitude toward the United Nations see Rose N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958).

⁹GAOR, Session XIV, 1959, p. 423.

Indian delegate retorted:

I entirely agree with him, that there is not a country in the world, including my own, where there is not social discrimination based on race, caste, creed or colour or whatever it may be. There is not a country in the world which can say, "we are free from this." But equally, there is not a country in the world except the Union of South Africa which is not trying to get away from it.¹⁰

What did the Afro-Asian states wish the United Nations to do about racialism in South Africa? Initially they proposed and voted for resolutions recommending negotiations between the Union of South Africa and India. The language of the resolutions was invariably conciliatory, and their tone was always much milder than might be suggested by speeches made during debates. When it became evident that such recommendations were fruitless, the Afro-Asian states sought and did deepen the organization's involvement by offering the good offices of the United Nations in an effort to resolve the dispute. It was not until 1960 that the much larger group of Afro-Asian states proposed, and the General Assembly passed, a resolution calling for sanctions against the Union of South Africa.¹¹

The Colonial Problem:

A study of the views of Afro-Asian states on colonialism reveals a general belief that the problem is of critical importance to world peace, a tendency to see it as

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Chapter VIII will include a detailed discussion of what the Afro-Asian states advocated and how successful they were in getting the organization to adopt their policies regarding various problems.

a master problem which underlies all of their other grievances against the world, a feeling that they cannot afford to relax their vigilance against its reincarnation, and leads to the conclusion that the colonial experience of the Afro-Asian states is the most relevant conditioning factor in their outlook on world problems.

Although the Afro-Asian states agree that colonialism is an evil which must be brought to an end, the fact that their colonial experiences--especially the phase just before independence--were not equally harsh, seems to account for their divergent views on particular aspects of the problem. It appears that there is a relationship between the degree of difficulty with which an Afro-Asian state gained its independence and the severity with which it judges the colonial system. This fact will be evident throughout the following pages, but it is most dramatically apparent when the attitudes of Ghana and the Congo (Brazzaville) are contrasted.

On September 30, 1960, soon after the admission of the French-speaking African states, President Nkrumah said:

For years and years, Africa has been the foot-stool of colonialism and imperialism, exploitation and degradation. From the North to the South, from the East to the West, her sons languished in the chains of slavery and humiliation, and Africa's exploiters and self-appointed controllers of her destiny strode across our land with incredible inhumanity--without mercy, without shame, and without honour.¹²

¹²GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 61. It must be pointed out that the severity of a country's colonial experience is often exaggerated by its leaders. Although Ghana's struggle for independence was neither intense nor of a long duration, Ghanaian leaders certainly did not perceive of it as an "easy ascent."

While the Ghanaian delegate, in the course of his speech welcoming the newly-admitted African states, expressed a "wish to place on the record the honour my delegation holds to those who fell in the struggle for the political emancipation of their countries,"¹³ the delegates of the newly-admitted countries did not seem to be cognizant of the tragic episodes their Ghanaian colleague was reciting on their behalf. They hardly spoke of any struggle or of any martyr, but were lavish in their praise of their ex-rulers and their leader who facilitated the "decolonization process" and saw them safely to freedom. This attitude was most generously expressed by the delegate from the Congo (Brazzaville). In his maiden speech to the General Assembly on September 21, 1960, he said:

This easy ascent to the pinnacle of freedom has been made smoothly, without haste or undue display, but with straightforwardness, generosity and conscientiousness. It has been made with a smile and we have inherited from France a well-ordered and peaceful State, provided with the necessary structure, launched on the path of work and progress, and free of all the after-effects of colonialism.¹⁴

The view expressed by the Ghanaian delegate is shared by the majority of Afro-Asian states. This "radical" view on the colonial question is found to be associated with the neutral voting subgroup identified in the previous chapter (Figure 27). The view expressed by the Congolese delegate--the "moderate" view--is shared by the voting subgroup identified

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

as the Brazzaville faction (also Figure 27). This divergence of views between the older members of the group and the members of the Brazzaville faction largely accounts for the significant decrease in the total group's cohesion during 1960, shown in Figure 9 on page 63. The aligned voting subgroup holds an intermediate position, although its voting record as well as expressions of policy made by representatives of its members place it somewhat in closer proximity, on colonial questions, to the "radical" than the "moderate" point of view. Keeping the previous distinctions in mind, let us now consider predominant Afro-Asian attitudes on colonial problems.

Afro-Asian states tend to think that it is clear what they mean by "colonialism." It was said in Chapter I, however, that this was not always true. One of the problems of the Bandung Conference, for example, was to agree on a definition of colonialism. Although this issue was never settled, and most likely never will be, it is clear that Afro-Asian states usually think of European domination of Afro-Asia when they speak of colonialism.¹⁵

Members of the neutral subgroup of the Afro-Asian coalition are by far the most severe critics and the least compromising foes of colonialism. They attribute to it a most discreditable past, an unreasoning present, and an untrustworthy future. They see in their colonial experience

¹⁵An extensive debate on colonialism was conducted in the General Assembly during the fifteenth session (1960-61). Records of the debate include more than two hundred pages of GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, pp. 981 ff.

the root of all the evils they now suffer. They have no faith in the colonial powers' ability to reform voluntarily. And they constantly warn of the possibility that colonialism will try to re-emerge out of its own ashes.

During the general debate on the item entitled "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," the Saudi Arabian delegate, Ahmed Shukairy, expressed the opinion that "colonialism is the devil itself."¹⁶ He and many of his Afro-Asian colleagues made it quite clear why they believed it to be so.

First of all, Afro-Asian states, especially the so-called radicals, blame colonialism for one of the most serious problems facing them today--poverty. Whether they are justified or not is not the point here, but Afro-Asian states do strongly believe that the present underdevelopment and the consequent poverty of their countries are primarily due to exploitation by the metropolitan powers. In his customary way, Ahmed Shukairy stated the case in these strong terms:

Colonialism is not the white man's burden. It has proved to be the white man's spoil and prize. If it had been a burden at all, it is because the white man was overburdened with the wealth of the black, with the treasure of the brown and with the riches of the yellow. This is the burden of the white man with which he was overburdened.¹⁷

In addition to exploiting the natural and human resources of the colonies, colonialism was held to be responsible

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1014.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1069.

for the destruction of initiative and the will to work. The Liberian delegate said that "being forced to do things against their will and to work for masters instead of for themselves was too bitter a pill [for the colonial people] to swallow. Debt or indolence or shiftlessness was resorted to as a way of life."¹⁸

Even in cases where colonialism had not entirely sapped a territory of its vigor and its resources, the colonial powers were said to have blocked progress which was not necessary for the operations of the colonial regime. Speaking to the General Assembly on November 28, 1960, the Iranian delegate defined colonialism as "a political and economic system imposed and maintained by foreign Powers on the national territory of other peoples...designed mainly to serve the interests of the administering Powers."¹⁹ The system, he elaborated, included the use of unprovoked force "designed primarily to hold up the development of the colonial peoples whenever development was not seen to be essential in one way or another, to the development of the colonial interests."²⁰

Continued and successful exploitation inevitably resulted in adding insult to injury, because it led the colonial powers to indulge further in reprehensible actions against the colonial peoples. Continuing his remarks, the Iranian delegate said:

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., Vol. I, p: 990.

²⁰Ibid.

In order to maintain and increase its profits, to protect colonial enterprises against all risks and dangers and to perpetuate its rules, colonialism was forced to perpetuate an order based essentially on social stagnation and the maintenance of the status quo, and marked by the paralysis of progress. For these purposes, the colonial regime used such devices as racial discrimination, enslavement and humiliation, fear and ignorance, exploitation under paternalistic labels and other practices calculated to deprive the man living under colonialism of his identity and human dignity. As I have said, it permitted no progress of subject peoples unless such progress was seen to be essential to its own existence.²¹

Although the neutral Afro-Asian states occasionally admit that the colonial powers contributed to the colonies in one way or another, they always couple the admission with assertions designed to show that the exploitation charges are still valid. Thus speaking on December 1, 1960, U Thant, the delegate from Burma, said that although the Western colonizers brought some benefits to the colonies (for example they controlled or eliminated some of the worst excesses of primitive life such as the torture of prisoners or the tyranny of autocratic rulers, and introduced hospitals and better sanitation, attempting to combat ignorance as well as disease),

nevertheless, against these and other substantial reforms must be reckoned many features and tendencies which have counteracted these progressive influences. Chief among them is the fact that the primary motive of the colonial Power in developing the natural resources of the colony has been its own commercial profit.²²

U Thant cited the Congo (Leopoldville) as a classic example of conditions described above. In other words, whatever help the colonial powers gave their colonies was either dearly

²¹Ibid., pp. 990-91.

²²Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1053.

paid for by the colonies or was motivated by the colonialists' own interests.

It was said earlier in this chapter that the severity of a country's colonial experience and the difficulty or ease with which it attained its independence seem to condition its approach to world problems. In this connection, it is worthy of note that countries which had a slight or a happier experience with colonialism--like Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines--and countries which achieved independent status without great sacrifices and much delay--like the Brazzaville states--tend to differ from other Afro-Asian states in three ways in viewing the colonial problem. First, they tend to be less severe in their condemnation of the colonial powers. The Congolese delegate's statement, quoted previously, to the effect that France had handed the people of his country "a well-ordered and peaceful State...free of all the after-effects of colonialism" is in sharp contrast with statements of delegates from neutral states to the effect that colonialism had robbed them of their resources and sapped the will of their people.

The second way in which the "moderates" vary from the rest of the Afro-Asian states in their views on colonialism is that when the subject of colonialism comes up, they often try to soften the verbal blows of the "radicals" by shifting the discussion to the so-called new imperialism of the Soviet Union. Charles Okala, the foreign minister of Cameroun, attempted to do so in the first speech he made in the Assembly

in the name of his newly-admitted country:

After being subjected to a colonial regime based on profit, Cameroun refuses to undergo a new ideological colonisation just as pernicious as the first. Whereas the former regime made the coloured man a slave labourer for the purpose of enriching other continents while impoverishing Africa, the new ideological colonisation makes him a mere cipher in a huge mass. It purports to speak on his behalf but really seeks to obliterate him completely....²³

Restating the same idea in more picturesque language, the Thai delegate warned his Afro-Asian colleagues that while they were busy condemning a dead colonial system, a new and more dangerous threat to their freedoms might overwhelm them. Speaking to the General Assembly the Thai delegate announced that the old colonialism had died,

But like the Phoenix of old, while land-grabbing colonialism is no longer with us, out of its ashes a new type of colonialism is arising. It is far more dangerous, because it is cynically insidious; like the Kingdom of God, it seldom comes with observation; it often comes under the guise of liberation; it preaches a new gospel of salvation; it heralds a new millenium; and it comes in sheep's clothing. In my delegation's opinion, it is far more dangerous because of its deceptive ideological attraction. When it enters by one door, freedom flies out of the other.²⁴

Another way in which Afro-Asian states differ on the problem of colonialism is in their assessment of the good faith of the colonial powers as to their future relations with the ex-colonies. The radical view, represented by the neutral subgroup, is that the colonial powers were coerced into recognizing the independence of Afro-Asia, and they will continue to seek to re-establish their domination of the newly

²³Ibid., Vol. I, p. 30.

²⁴Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1185.

independent states. The Brazzaville end most of the aligned states, on the other hand, tend to be considerably less suspicious of the motives of their former rulers.

The opposing views on how independence was achieved by Afro-Asian states is perhaps best represented by the following two statements from the delegates of the Philippines and the United Arab Republic. Speaking to the Assembly on December 2, 1960, the Filipino delegate sought to remind some of his Afro-Asian colleagues that the colonial powers have been rather reasonable in regard to the question of self-determination of peoples. He gave them as evidence the fact that nearly forty countries achieved independence since the Charter came into effect, and then he continued: "It is the colonial Powers themselves who have borne the responsibility for the progressive interpretation of Article 73 of the Charter. It is they who have dared to carry the letter of this provision of the Charter to its logical conclusion."²⁵

During the same meeting of the General Assembly, the delegates from the United Arab Republic advanced the opposing point of view which denies that independent states in Asia and Africa owe their freedom to the good will of Europeans. "Colonialism has never given liberty to its victims as a gift," he said. "History is full of the heroic struggle of those who wrested their freedom from their oppressors."²⁶

²⁵Ibid., p. 1103.

²⁶Ibid., p. 1050.

The moderate view--represented by most of the French-speaking African states and the aligned countries--differs from the view of the other Afro-Asian states, not only in relation to the past performance of the metropolitan powers, but also in the amount of faith they have in their future intentions. While the moderates believe that the colonial powers have reformed and are willing to accept the equality of all states, the radicals constantly warn of dire consequences to Afro-Asian states should they relax their guard against the colonialist powers' schemes to regain control over their erstwhile colonies. The moderates generally agree with the delegate from Niger for admonishing some Afro-Asian states for attributing questionable motives to all colonial powers and for their inability to see that such powers are adapting to this modern age of self-determination and equality of all states. "I shall not abuse my right as an ex-colonial to censure them," he said. Then he continued:

The administering nations which have adapted or are adapting their ideas to modern life do not, I think deserve the systematic and impassioned charges made against them. They certainly still have much to do, and the best thing they can do is to hasten the liberation of all the peoples they still dominate. It is not my purpose to justify any form of domination. But we are dealing with a historical fact.²⁷

Most Afro-Asian states, however, have grave doubts about the colonial powers' adapting to "modern life." The so-called radicals not only believe that their freedom was dearly paid for, but they also express a fear that they will

²⁷ibid., p. 1125.

lose that freedom if they were to lower their guard against the machinations of the colonial powers. True, they generally believe that the days of overt colonialism are almost over, but they insist that colonialism is still very much with us in a more refined and subtle form which is nevertheless as objectionable. This new form of colonialism--neo-colonialism they call it--takes force other than direct military and political domination. It results in the creation of "client states," or states subject to foreign domination poorly hidden behind a facade of "fake independence." Speaking to the fifteenth General Assembly on September 23, 1960, Kwame Nkrumah used the post-independence situation in the Congo to explain neo-colonialism. He said:

it is only necessary to say that something has happened in the Congo which has justified my constant warning to the African countries to be on their guard against what I call "clientele sovereignty" or fake independence, granted by the metropolitan Power, with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a "client-state" and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones. What has happened in the Congo has more than justified my continuous outcry against the threat of Balkanization in Africa and my daily condemnation of neo-colonialism, the process of handing independence over to the African people with one hand only to take it away with the other.

The Congo question is a test case for Africa. What is happening in the Congo today may happen in any other part of Africa tomorrow.²⁸

Speaking to the Assembly four days later, President Nasser concurred with Nkrumah. He said that the

aggression on Suez was the end of unmasked imperialism and its graveyard. Today we find the Congo presenting us with masked imperialism, which does not shrink from exploiting

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 62.

the United Nations itself in order to realize its hidden designs and aims.²⁹

The delegate from Iran seemed to imply that those who believe that the colonial powers are adapting to modern life-- as the delegate from Niger said in the passage quoted above-- are deceived by appearances. What the colonial powers are doing, he said, is adapting the means of domination to the requirements of today. Their ends remain unchanged. His statement seems to convey the so-called radical view so well that it is worth quoting at length:

...traditional colonialism as such can henceforth be considered as a historical phenomenon belonging to the past ...the colonial system as a whole is already on its death-bed, already breathing its last, and its hysterical outbreaks of violence show even more clearly that its end is near and inevitable. Thus it is not the old colonialism, esthetic and with one foot in the grave, that now threatens to deprive peoples of genuine independence, but the young and virulent neo-colonialism. With its complex network of political, economic, ideological and other weapons, neo-colonialism is out to defend the same interests over the corpse of the old-style colonialism. The nature and purpose of both are the same, and on the whole only the tactics seem to have changed, to fit in with the political, economic and psychological requirements of the modern world. No one should be deceived by appearances...³⁰

The theory of fake independence which Nkrumah spoke of was bluntly applied by the Moroccan delegate who practically called the French-speaking African states French puppets. The French-speaking African states disagreed quite frequently with the so-called radical Afro-Asian states on colonial votes.³¹

²⁹ Ibid., p. 146.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 994.

³¹ See Appendix C for the frequency of agreement and disagreement on colonial votes.

When the Brazzaville states agreed with France in opposing Moroccan claims to Mauritania, the Moroccan delegate said that France's purpose in advocating independence and United Nations membership for Mauritania was its desire for an additional follower.³²

One of the major points of controversy between the Afro-Asian states and the metropolitan powers revolves around the fate of the still non-self-governing territories in Asia and Africa. Although the Afro-Asian states generally agree that old-style colonialism is dying, they do not believe that the time has arrived when it can be pronounced officially dead. As the Iranian delegate pointed out, a hundred million people in Afro-Asia were still under foreign rule at the end of 1960. The controversy over these last of the colonials centered around two points: First, some territories were said by the colonial powers to be not colonies but parts of the metropolitan countries and, therefore, not subject to discussion in a debate on colonialism. Second, the colonial powers argued that the non-self-governing territories had to be readied for self-government before they could be given independence.

The Afro-Asian states were, again, divided on this subject. The majority of them--the radicals consisting mostly of the neutral subgroup--rejected both arguments. The moderates--mainly the Brazzaville states--were again more inclined to see the colonial countries' point of view. This disagreement

³²See Chapter IV, footnote 24.

is clearly evident in the votes of both groups as well as in views expressed during debates.

During the first session of the General Assembly when the French-speaking African states were members of the United Nations, there were five roll-call votes taken on the question of Algeria. They revealed almost total opposition between the Brazzaville states and the rest of Afro-Asian countries.³³ The Brazzaville and the aligned states also withheld support from their Afro-Asian colleagues on a resolution seeking to commit the United Nations to the goal of putting a speedy end to colonialism. Although they did not oppose the rest of the group in this case--as they did on the Algerian question--they generally abstained from voting.³⁴

With the exceptions noted above, Afro-Asian views on the problem of the still non-self-governing territories were as follows: First, the Afro-Asian states were adamant against recognizing any territorial rights to a European power in Afro-Asia. French and Portuguese claims were not conceded the slightest justification. In answering Portuguese allegations that Angola was Portuguese territory, Nkrumah said that "Africa is not, and can never be, an extension of Europe," and that such Portuguese claims were repugnant to African

³³These recorded votes are found in *ibid.*, Session XV, Part I, Vol. II, pp. 1428-30.

³⁴Roll-call votes on the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples" are found in *ibid.*, pp. 1273-74.

freedom.³⁵ In his reply to similar French statements concerning Algeria, he remarked:

From whatever angle you view this problem, you cannot escape from the fact that Algeria is African and will always remain so, in the same way that France is French. No accident of history, such as has occurred in Algeria, can ever succeed in turning an inch of African soil into an extension of any other continent. Colonialism and imperialism cannot change this basic geographical fact.³⁶

As far as the colonial argument concerning the readiness of the non-self-governing territories for independence is concerned, the radical Afro-Asian states reject the idea that some conditions must be met by colonial peoples before they are entitled to self-government. This rejection is justified on several grounds. First, all peoples are held to be ready for self-government. The delegate from Guinea seemed to imply that all that was needed was a recognition--not an establishment--of this readiness. "Colonialist exploitation," he said, "will be ended only on the basis of respect for the equality of dependent peoples with all other peoples. There are no immature peoples; there are no incapable or inferior peoples."³⁷

The delegate from Ghana warned that time was running out, and the world could not wait for the colonial powers to prepare their colonies for self-government. On November 29, 1960, he said:

³⁵Ibid., Vol. I, p. 64.

³⁶Ibid., p. 65.

³⁷Ibid., p. 827.

The solution of the colonial problem has...become the most urgent problem of our time, and it is upon its solution that the peace, stability and orderly progress of the world depend. The profound aspirations of peoples who are still living under colonial rule in the Non-Self-Governing Territories must be fully realized if wars and racial conflicts are to be avoided. Reasons of inadequate economic, social or educational development must no longer be invoked as a pretext to delay the transfer of freedom and independence to these people.³⁸

The refusal to concede prerequisites for independence, and the urgency of a solution were augmented by some Afro-Asian states' lack of faith in the motives of the colonial powers. Some Afro-Asian states believed that the colonial powers were only stalling and had no intention of relinquishing the remnants of their empires voluntarily. The delegate of Iran expressed his lack of faith bluntly:

The inadequate level of political, economic, social and educational advancement has in the past always been used by the Administering Powers as a reason for delaying the independence of the colonial countries. A more objective scrutiny of the problem reveals the danger inherent in this pretext and the bad faith which has often been behind the use of this argument. In fact, the argument runs in a vicious circle which the colonial interests collectively have sought to perpetuate. Thus, on the one hand, they have delayed giving the peoples the necessary training for various aspects of their national life, while on the other hand they have argued that, since independence requires a certain minimum degree of training, it cannot be granted to them without this.³⁹

Agreeing with the above analysis, the Saudi Arabian delegate concluded that the ending of colonialism "can never be premature."⁴⁰

As in the case of most other aspects of the colonial

³⁸ Ibid., p. 1011.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 994.

⁴⁰ Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1021.

problem, the moderates--whose independence came relatively easily--tended to be more understanding of the colonial powers' argument. The delegate from Gabon expressed his annoyance with the arguments represented by the previously quoted remarks by saying:

Gabon wishes to play its part in restoring calm by recalling a few elementary truths; these are worth repeating after so many statements which, although perhaps inspired by very lofty considerations of political principle, have in many cases been distorted by what I might call a certain demagoguery....In our view it is not sufficient to clamor for the immediate liberation of thousands of beings who are still, in one way or another, dependent; the right conditions must be created for that liberation. There may be a desire--and a most laudable one--to bring the date of independence or self-government forward somewhat; but the main consideration is to have ready for the take-over the new structures without which there can be no viable and durable independence.⁴¹

To Afro-Asian states, colonialism is so evil that no honest man will tolerate it if he only understands its nature. For this reason, they tend to attribute the reluctance of some Latin American and other states to support the goal of ending colonialism, completely and now, to these countries' lack of experience with the horrors of colonialism. Speaking for Saudi Arabia, Ahmed Shukairy tried to explain this point to what he called neutral observers:

We understand these honest observations and criticisms which at first glance seem to be reasonable and sound for all neutral observers. We know how neutral observers, living in freedom, feel about colonialism in general.... But they cannot understand how we feel about colonialism, because they have always lived in freedom and never under colonial rule. It is convenient and easy for all neutral observers, living in freedom, to criticize, because they have never been subjected to the most abject degradation and humiliation, because they have never been foreignized

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 1180.

in their own country, because they have never fought and given their lives in wars which were not theirs and only added glory to their already glorious masters, and because they have never laboured to add more wealth to that of their already wealthy masters and to strengthen the hands oppressing them. One has to live under colonialism and experience these things for oneself in order to understand the full impact of colonialism.⁴²

He continued to say that this lack of first-hand knowledge of colonialism constitutes the basic difference between the ex-colonial peoples and those who are advising them to be patient:

If their countries were colonized at some time in history, they know it only from history books. Therein lies the fundamental difference between those delegations and ours, who have personal experience in colonial rule. Our knowledge is not based on hearsay or on what we learnt in school; we were for decades a living embodiment of that system. Ours was a generation which, on coming of age, did not have the right to vote in its own country.⁴³

What do the Afro-Asian states seek to accomplish by putting an end to colonialism? Practically a miracle. This answer is not chosen for sarcasm. It is so close to describing reality that it is too tempting not to give. Generally speaking, it is supposed to end oppression, exploitation and poverty, spiritual degradation, racial hatred, jealousy among the powers, and strengthen world peace.

As we have seen earlier in this chapter, most Afro-Asian states attribute most of their present difficulties to colonialism, in its old and new forms. The Saudi Arabian delegate affirmed that one of the most serious problems of

⁴² Ibid., p. 1021.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 1065.

our times, the disparity between the "haves" and the "have-nots," could be eliminated, and that its elimination "could be speeded up by the granting of independence to all dependant countries."⁴⁴ Not only that, but in addition "independence leads to spiritual emancipation. It is a restoration of human dignity and a rehabilitation of human personality."⁴⁵

The end of colonialism was necessary, in his view, not only for the well-being of the colonial peoples, but for humanity as a whole. For this reason "the problem of colonialism ranks uppermost in the history of human relations. . . . It involves political captivity, economic domination, social enslavement and cultural subjugation that affect not only the colonial peoples but human society as a whole."⁴⁶

The Ghanaian and Iranian delegates warned that peace and colonialism could not coexist. Krumah's remark that "as long as a single foot of African soil remains under foreign domination, the world will know no peace,"⁴⁷ was elaborated upon by the delegates from Iran who said:

Peace and freedom are indivisible; any nation which oppresses another violates not only the sovereign rights of the latter but also the freedom, conscience and dignity of mankind as a whole. Yet by so doing, it likewise does violence to world peace and security and it must bear the full responsibility.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 1016.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 1012

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 61.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 994.

Gloomy estimates of and predictions about political and economic conditions in the newly-independent countries do not diminish Afro-Asian attachment to the idea of self-determination. Even when they admit their need for help, they do not concede that such help needs to come in the form of foreign rule. The Iranian delegate put it this way:

Even if their economic, social and political backwardness necessarily imposes a state of relative dependence on some of the underdeveloped countries, there is no reason to think that such dependence should be imposed upon them by the former Administering Power. The international community in the United Nations, among others, can easily give them the necessary aid and assistance without imposing upon them obligations incompatible with their independence.⁴⁹

Even if this disinterested aid were not to be made available, Afro-Asian states make it quite clear that they would still opt for death before dishonor. As Nkrumah expressed it: "We prefer complete independence with danger to servitude in tranquility."⁵⁰ The Saudi Arabian delegate blamed political unrest in the newly-independent nations on foreign intrigues aimed to reassert European domination. Even if this explanation were not true, he added, "difficulties and conflicts among political leaders...should not be a reason for denying independence to the peoples claiming it. Fighting for power among political leaders is not an extraordinary thing. It happens everywhere."⁵¹ He then reaffirmed Nkrumah's choice

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 994.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 1012.

⁵¹ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1021.

for suffering in freedom:

But if, in spite of all, the question would be to choose between freedom with all its attendant economic difficulties and internal conflicts on the one hand, and the maintenance of colonial rule with all its attendant subjugation, exploitation, degradation and humiliation, and so on, on the other, I would right away and unequivocally say that the peoples, all peoples, under colonial rule prefer poverty in freedom to wealth in slavery, and they will definitely prefer fighting in freedom to peace in slavery.⁵²

The preceding discussion of Afro-Asian views on the colonial problem is likely to give the impression that there is very little Afro-Asian solidarity on colonial issues. Vote analysis, presented in Chapter III, shows that this is not so. It was shown then that on 63.6% of the votes on colonial questions, Afro-Asian states attained the index of cohesion of 90 or higher, compared with only 18.8% of the total Assembly's votes in the same cohesion category. The explanation for the apparent contradiction between the votes and the statements of Afro-Asian states resides in the fact that resolutions are invariably much more restrained than the debates. The "demagogy" of the radicals, to which the delegate from Gabon objected in his previously quoted remarks, does not appear in any of the resolutions voted upon. The moderates object to colonialism perhaps as much as the radicals. Lacs, for example, by no stretch of imagination can be classified with the radicals. Yet his delegate left no doubt as to how his country feels about colonialism. The domination of man by man in any form, he said, was repugnant,

⁵²Ibid.

and "humiliation is worse than poverty." In words reminiscent of Nkrumah's he declared that "a man can get used to hunger but never to humiliation."⁵³

Let there be no doubt, then, that all Afro-Asian states harbor nothing but extreme repugnance to colonialism. The relatively conciliatory language of resolutions, therefore, removes a major and important--though not the only--element of difference between the radicals and the moderates. For this reason, it has been possible for Afro-Asian states, relatively speaking, to close their ranks once the debate has ended and the time has come to vote for Afro-Asia's liberation.

Cold War Issues:

Views expressed by Afro-Asian states concerning the cold war and problems directly related to it reveal a basically self-centered outlook which determines not only the choice of role for Afro-Asia in the East-West controversy, but also the role they believe the United Nations should play. They generally consider the cold war to be a big power problem in which the smaller states must minimize their involvement for their own good.

Although Afro-Asian states generally are neither oblivious of nor indifferent to the dangers which the cold war poses to the world as a whole, their primary and immediate concern with it seems to stem from the fact that they see in

⁵³Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1108.

the cold war a threat to their newly-acquired freedom. During the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states, Carlos P. Romulo, the chief delegate of the Philippines, revealed this concern in his remark: "In this world of contending great powers the independence of the small or weak nation is at best a precarious and fragile thing."⁵⁴ The threat to the independence of the small and weak nations is not due only to a possible war between the great powers, but also to rivalry and other forms of peaceful struggle. In a speech made in 1946, Nehru gave Iran as an example of how the threat may come. Referring to the dispute over the continued presence of Soviet troops on Iranian soil after the end of the Second World War, Nehru said:

The British have sent troops there openly to protect their oil interests; on the other hand, Russia says that she will send Russian forces down from the North. Well, between the two, I don't quite know what happens to Iran.⁵⁵

A yet more indirect way in which great power rivalry threatens the independence of the smaller nations was outlined by Nasser, then Prime Minister of Egypt, during the Bandung Conference. The cold war, he said, caused the great powers to induce smaller nations to become camp followers, an act which has the "damaging effect of isolating the small nations and weakening the ties of unity and community interests existing between them, thus causing them to fall under

⁵⁴ Carlos P. Romulo, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1258.

⁵⁵ Nehru, India Quarterly, II (October-December, 1946), 326.

the grip of foreign domination."⁵⁶

These and similar statements made by Afro-Asian leaders and representatives show that the possible danger to their independence latent in great power rivalry is the aspect of the cold war which is central to their thinking about it. As will be shown shortly, with a few exceptions Afro-Asian states are willing to see the great powers find their own solutions to their own quarrels, provided they let Afro-Asians alone.

Analysis of statements of policy made by Afro-Asian representatives concerning the cold war generally shows a surprisingly high degree of agreement. The situation is in contrast with findings related to the colonial problem where it was found that the vote indicated greater agreement than the debates. In the case of cold war questions, the debates lead one to predict a higher degree of cohesion than is actually found in the voting record. This is perhaps best explained by the fact that Afro-Asian states envision for themselves the role of peace-maker and mediator in the cold war. This role inevitably drives most of them to a common middle ground in their views on the East-West dispute.

Now let us see what views the Afro-Asian states hold on various aspects of the cold war. First of all, the Afro-Asian states dread the possibility of premature death, a possibility they believe to be latent in the cold war. As the

⁵⁶Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1258.

statements quoted above indicate, they fear that they will be accorched by the heat of big power controversy. Moreover, they realize that to consolidate and reap the fruits of independence they need a more peaceful world. Cameroun's foreign minister, speaking to the General Assembly, said that his country "requests the Organization to recommend that the great Powers avoid the temptation to confront one another in Africa and to transplant their fruits of a cold or hot war."⁵⁷ One is almost given the impression that the foreign minister did not wish to spoil the game for the big powers as long as they stayed away from Africa. This attitude was also expressed by Nkrumah in remarks he made in the Assembly concerning the problem of disarmament. His primary concern seemed to be that the great powers refrain from establishing or maintaining bases in Africa or introducing nuclear weapons there. "It is essential," he told the Assembly,

that we on the African continent take positive steps to isolate ourselves as far as is possible from the effects of nuclear warfare. One of the first and most practical steps which could be taken in this regard is to prevent any state having nuclear weapons from possessing military bases on the African continent.⁵⁸

It is clear from such statements that the spokesmen's primary interest is to shield their region from the effects of great power clash, not necessarily to liquidate it.

The Afro-Asian states' brief against involvement in the cold war is lengthy and their arguments are numerous.

⁵⁷GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 30.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 66.

First of all, they generally believe that the cold war is not their problem, and for that reason they must not become involved in it. The prime minister of Ceylon told the Bandung Conference that "the entire human race stands on the brink of chaos....The Great Powers who within recent generations have guided the destinies of mankind have brought themselves and us to this calamity."⁵⁹ The representative of Gabon described the cold war as a "struggle of ascendancy" among the great powers.⁶⁰

The Afro-Asian states believe that they can use their time and resources more fruitfully in other endeavors than this struggle for ascendancy. The delegate from Togo said that "Africa, more than any other continent, needs peace, because peace is essential for its own internal growth, for the consolidation of freedoms that have been won and the improvement of the living conditions of its inhabitants."⁶¹ The Cambodian delegate expressed a similar view when he said that "the small, poor, under-developed countries like ours consider it, generally speaking, more urgent to cover the distance which separates them from the modern and prosperous countries, than to participate in quarrels which do not concern them."⁶²

⁵⁹Sir John Kotelawala, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1254.

⁶⁰GACB, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 38.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 31.

⁶²Ibid., p. 221.

The Afro-Asian states seek to minimize their involvement in the cold war not only because it is not their war and because they wish to concentrate on tackling their own problems, but also because they have a feeling that they are not capable of doing much about it. Thus the Cambodian delegate warned his Afro-Asian colleagues not "to take part in conflicts which in any case are beyond their scope, or to nurse the vain and reckless delusion that they can play a historic role in world development. For our part, we leave it to the great Powers to write the history of the world."⁶³ The Indian delegate concurred by saying: "We are confronted with problems about which we really have inadequate experience."⁶⁴

The logical corollary of this attitude is that it is primarily the responsibility of the great powers to cope with the problem. As the Cambodian delegate put it in the previously quoted statement, let the great powers write the history of the world. This is not to say that Afro-Asian states are indifferent to how the great powers do so. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia felt that "some people will perhaps excuse small countries like ours of showing selfishness, of thinking of nothing but their own situation and of refusing to participate in the ideological trends which divide the world."⁶⁵ He then explained that although the small countries

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴GAOR, Session XIV, 1959, p. 413.

⁶⁵GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 221.

consider it more urgent to cope with the problems of underdevelopment, they were interested "to contribute, in all sincerity and as far as our small means allow, to a better understanding between the peoples and to the maintenance of peace."⁶⁶

Since the actions of the great powers will most certainly effect the fate of other nations, these nations are entitled to pass judgment on the solutions which the great powers propose. The attitude that resolving East-West conflicts is the primary responsibility of the great powers but subject to the approval of all nations is best manifested in Afro-Asian views on the question of disarmament. "Given the complexity of this problem and the way in which an agreement would be applied," the Cambodian representative said,

We think it would be desirable to leave to the great Powers responsible for war and peace, for overarmament and disarmament, the task of discussing it and getting to the root of it. Once the long-desired agreement had been arrived at, it would then, and only then, be logical for the procedure adopted to be submitted to all the medium-sized and small nations.⁶⁷

President Nasser, speaking to the General Assembly in 1960, said that although the smaller nations are entitled to urge the great powers to take steps necessary to lessen world tension, an actual agreement is the responsibility of the major powers.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 218.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 150.

It is obvious that Afro-Asian states generally are not anxious to enlarge the Assembly's functions in matters which they do not believe to be of their primary concern. This conclusion agrees with the finding made in Chapter III, where it was shown that Afro-Asian states are not anxious to have cold war issues placed on the Assembly's agenda.

In spite of the fact that the Afro-Asian states are reluctant to become involved in East-West disputes, they do believe that they have a role to play in the cold war as members of the United Nations. It is clear from statements made by their leaders and representatives that they envision for themselves the role of mediators in the conflict. They think that they are properly equipped for the role due to their military weakness and especially due to their lack of commitment to either camp. The Cambodian delegate expressed the view that "in the present circumstances the neutral countries, with their lack of military strength, their absence of any spirit of conquest and in general their disinterested attitude, appear to be the best fitted to make a clear and dispassionate estimate of the international crisis."⁶⁹ They are able to see things more clearly and presumably judge issues on their own merits, not on the basis of preconceived and hardened attitudes born out of prior commitments to the disputing camps. For this reason, they believe that they are suited to "bridge the gap," as President Nasser put it,

⁶⁹GAO, Session XIV, 1959, p. 29.

"separating the distant parts with a view to achieving peaceful coexistence among the nations of different social beliefs, and we can contribute to the creation of the atmosphere that helps ease the tension and brings tranquility to the peoples of the world."⁷⁰

The belief that the small nations of Asia and Africa can and should play this mediatory role is evidently so strong that even some of the aligned Asian states subscribe to it. The Thai delegate said that the small nations, working within as well as outside the United Nations, can be a "bridge which may be thrown across the chasm separating the two camps."⁷¹ The view of the representatives of one of the few Afro-Asian countries which are committed to one of the two camps that Afro-Asian states can meet their obligations without a need to enter into alliances⁷² is testimony to the fact that the Cambodian prime minister's assertion that "the concepts of neutrality and non-attachment have great attraction for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America"⁷³ is not without truth.

Although concern for international harmony and reconciliation is a factor in conditioning Afro-Asian views on cold war questions, it remains true that concern for their

⁷⁰GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 150.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 157.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 221.

own safety is perhaps the most important factor. They wholeheartedly agree with President Washington's belief that an alliance between a small and weak nation and a great power "dooms the former to be a satellite of the other." Their experience with colonialism makes them, as the Cambodian prime minister put it, "rightly suspicious of so-called defensive organizations and of political organizations serving as a mask for resurgent imperialism."⁷⁴ Afro-Asian states have not forgotten that many of them began their careers as colonies by becoming protectorates of stronger states. It was evidently this fact which caused an experienced Asian diplomat to remark that "for most of them an immediate problem is the danger which they see of a return to the principle of Great Power protection, which appears to them to be nothing less than colonial rule under a new guise."⁷⁵

Economic Questions:

During the 1952-1960 period, only a few roll-call votes were taken in the General Assembly on economic questions. For this reason, it was not deemed useful to infer an Afro-Asian voting behavior from these votes. The records of the Assembly, however, contain sufficient information on Afro-Asian views on economic matters to justify a discussion of such views. Most of the statements on economic affairs were made in connection with debates on the colonial problem.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Panikkar, The Nation, April 2, 1955, p. 287.

This is not surprising in view of the fact that, as was shown earlier in this chapter, economic underdevelopment in the newly independent states of Asia and Africa is generally considered by them to be one of the legacies of colonialism.

In considering Afro-Asian views on economic matters, it is of vital importance that one should keep in mind the fact that colonialism is blamed for the present backwardness of Afro-Asia. This attitude makes them less apologetic and more aggressive in their views. It is the explanation of why, as will be shown presently, Afro-Asian states tend to feel almost self-righteous about their poverty, and to believe that the developed nations owe them a helping hand in their drive toward economic viability. It goes far to explain what the Western man in the street assumes to be ingratitude on the part of poor nations.

In the discussion of Afro-Asian views on colonialism, various statements made by Afro-Asian spokesmen were quoted which show their belief that their underdevelopment was largely due to exploitation by stronger nations. This attitude was perhaps best stated by the Saudi Arabian delegate who, speaking of the disparity in the standards of living of the advanced and the underdeveloped nations, said:

This is no credit to the rich, and no shame for the poor. It is not any particular genius which makes the Western countries richer; neither is it because of a natural disability that the other countries are poor. Colonialism is the explanation of the whole phenomenon of disparity. The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, because of ages of colonialism, have been robbed of their gold, their diamonds, their cotton, their silk, their ivory, their spices, their drugs, their rubber, their oil, their

animal wealth, and many times even robbed of their fabulous museums, including their dead kings and queens.⁷⁶

The advanced nations contributed to the poverty of the underdeveloped states not only by robbing their wealth in the past, but also by denying them a just return on their present efforts. Since the colonial powers obstructed progress in their colonies except to the extent that such progress was necessary for imperial interests, the colonies were designed to be raw material producing units. As the Ghanaian delegate put it:

It has never been the policy of the colonial powers to develop the territories under them to an economically high level, because to them colonies must remain sources of raw materials and minerals. Thus it is that I do not know of any colonial territory in Africa which on the attainment of independence can be described as an economically advanced territory.⁷⁷

Having assured the Afro-Asian states' dependence on raw materials exports to them, the advanced nations continued to exploit this Afro-Asian weakness after independence. This new form of exploitation, as President Nasser expressed it, took the form of "arbitrary controls over the prices of raw materials, which aim at hampering the development of the countries producing those materials and keeping them as mere storage areas."⁷⁸ As a result of this new form of exploitation, all that the underdeveloped states can do--in the words of the Pakistani representative--"is to reduce the pace of

⁷⁶GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. II, 1960-61, p. 1016.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 1011.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 150.

retrogression."⁷⁹ All of which leads to the conclusion that "the improvement in the standards of living of the manufacturing countries has in a large measure taken place at the cost of the starving people of the backward nations."⁸⁰ There is obviously a dispute between the advanced and the underdeveloped countries on the question of who is supporting whom.

The Afro-Asian view that Afro-Asia's backwardness is primarily due to long-standing exploitation by the developed countries logically leads to the belief that these countries owe them the assistance they need to cope with their poverty. "Would it not be an act of historic justice," the Pakistani delegate asked, "if some restitution were made in the present for the wealth which has flowed in the past from these countries to enrich the economies of those now so industrially advanced?"⁸¹

The underdeveloped states are, of course, being helped by the industrially advanced nations in many ways. But such help is often seen as a weapon which these powers wield and not as the gesture of repentance it ought to be. As Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia put it:

Up to now, the volume of the assistance given to the underdeveloped countries has been in proportion neither to their population, nor to their poverty and their need, nor yet to their determination, their efforts to build for the future, or their deserts. In most cases such assistance was measured by the value of these countries

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 236.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 235-36.

⁸¹Ibid.

as pawns in the blocs' struggle for influence, the extent of their docility or willingness to join one of the blocs, or their potentialities as threats or sources of trouble to them.⁸²

Afro-Asian dissatisfaction with the use of economic aid as a political weapon is intensified by the fact that it is precisely the opposite end for which they seek development. To them, economic underdevelopment represents the Achilles' heel of their national freedoms. Without sound economies, secure political independence is not deemed possible. This is the major reason why, as it was said before, questions of economic development are very often brought up with problems of colonialism. Speaking to the General Assembly in 1960, President Nasser said that

those peoples who have obtained their political freedom or who expect to gain it in the near future look forward to economic independence and are prepared to fight for it. These newly independent nations are firmly convinced that, if they do not obtain their economic independence, they will not find the sound basis upon which they can preserve their political freedom.⁸³

As in the case of colonial problems, countries with more intimate relations with the Western powers often seek to include communism in whatever attacks the so-called radicals are leveling against their ex-rulers. An example of this attitude is seen in the Pakistani delegate's remark on the economic needs of newly independent states. "Rapid economic development of underdeveloped countries," he said, "is, however, demanded even more insistently by considerations

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

of a more primary character. It is the only answer to infiltration, confusion and subversion."⁸⁴ Agreement among the Afro-Asian states on the importance of economic development for security purposes is marred by disagreement on the source of the threat.

The view that economic development is essential for the preservation of Afro-Asia's newly-won political independence is augmented by the belief that it must be accomplished in the near future. Afro-Asian peoples, it is argued, "cannot afford to waste any time after the long period during which they lagged behind."⁸⁵ President Nasser--who made the previous statement--argued that people who counsel Afro-Asian states to be patient about their economic needs forget that they are dealing with peoples living under circumstances which Europe did not face during a comparable period in its history. For one thing, Afro-Asian peoples are more aware of the gap which separates them from the peoples of the advanced countries. These peoples who "had missed the era of steam and the era of electricity" will not be patient when "they are almost missing the era of atomic energy with all its unlimited potentialities."⁸⁶ Due to the scientific revolution, people are said to have changed. "Those who had the patience to endure crossing the sea in small boats

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 107.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 150.

⁸⁶Ibid.

directed by the winds," President Nasser said, "differ completely from those who are able to cross it now in a few hours' time by jet aircraft."⁸⁷

To narrow and possibly eliminate the economic gap which separates them from the advanced countries speedily and without compromising their independence, then, is the paramount economic objective of Afro-Asian states. To achieve this goal, "they will accept every assistance given to them through the United Nations, and they will not hesitate to accept any unconditional aid offered to them outside the United Nations."⁸⁸

Conclusion:

From the preceding presentation of Afro-Asian views on important substantive issues, one generalization can be made which seems to account for their attitudes. Their colonial experience is the basic determinant of their outlook on world problems as they appeared in the deliberations of the General Assembly. This generalization is even confirmed by dissenting views, for dissent is apparently a function of the dissenters' less severe experiences with colonialism.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

COHESIVE AND DIVISIVE FORCES

Although this study is concerned with Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations General Assembly, it is well to keep in mind the fact that the ability of the Afro-Asian coalition to function in the Assembly is directly affected by the ability of its members to co-operate outside the framework of the United Nations. This ability is determined, to a large extent, by the interplay of the forces of unity and the forces of disunity which exist among them. The identification of these cohesive and divisive forces will, therefore, add to our understanding of the coalition.

The discussion of cohesive forces will deal with factors which tend to generate general Afro-Asian solidarity. No attempt will be made to compile a list of all actual and possible conditions which favor solidarity between pairs of states, for example. Similarly, the discussion of the divisive forces will not be an attempt to catalogue clashes and skirmishes among Afro-Asian states. It will concentrate on the identification of factors which tend to intensify factionalism within the coalition.

Since the discussion thus far has contained scattered references to sources of agreement and disagreement among Afro-Asian states, some factors discussed below will be

emphasized more than others. Whenever possible, an attempt will be made to relate the sources of unity and disunity identified to the findings already made in previous chapters.

Let us begin by considering factors which work for Afro-Asian solidarity. The first and a very compelling drive behind Afro-Asian solidarity is the desire to assert and to gain recognition of the equality of the peoples and the states of the region, and the related grievance against the yet incomplete attainment of it. It is apparent throughout the discussion so far that no other goal approaches this desire as an element of cohesion among the Afro-Asian states. This is shown to be the case by three major indicators. First, the recognition of racial and state equality has been the most persistent theme of Afro-Asian conferences, both on the governmental and the non-governmental levels, and has given rise to greater mutual identification among Afro-Asian states and peoples than any other factor.¹ Second, no other factor has created greater solidarity and mutual support among Afro-Asian states in the United Nations than the drive toward that goal.² Third, no other principle or goal equals it as an all-pervasive influence which permeates all of the other objectives of Afro-Asian states, and to a large extent conditions their outlook on the international situation in general.³

¹See Chapter I.

²See Chapter III.

³See Chapter VI.

This affinity of grievances and desires is augmented by a belief that Afro-Asian nations will either stand or fall together. It is difficult, if indeed it is possible at all, to conceive of a more potent unifying force than the belief in a shared fate. This belief has been expressed by spokesmen of Afro-Asian states both in terms of past experiences and in the form of future expectations. It perhaps goes farther than any other single factor in explaining Afro-Asian search for solidarity. For this reason, it will be discussed at length.

First, let us consider the belief that the destinies of Afro-Asian states have been historically intertwined. As far back as 1926, as was mentioned in the historical introduction to this study, the delegations of Asian territories represented at the International Conference for World Peace submitted a joint document entitled Asia and Peace in which they stated that "the whole problem of Asia centers round Great Britain's position in India."⁴ A quarter of a century later, President Nasser expressed the view that the unity of the Arab world is dictated, among other things, by the unity of fate. Speaking of Egypt's place in the Arab world he said that the Arab states were intertwined by history. "We have suffered together, we have gone through the same crises, and when we fell beneath the hooves of invaders, they were with

⁴Chapter I, footnote 9.

us under the same hooves."⁵

The belief that the destiny of an Afro-Asian state has often been determined by the fate of another is not a figment of the imagination. It is rooted in historical fact. Thirty years after the Asian representatives stated the relationship between India and the Asian problem in general, a Chatham House study group confirmed the assertion in more specific terms. "It is worth remembering," the group's report stated, "that the British colonial dependencies in South East Asia and the Far East were all acquired as an extension of British rule in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent."⁶ This statement definitely underestimates the scope of the relationship between the fates of Afro-Asian states by concentrating on South East Asia and the Far East. British aspirations in the Near East were not unrelated to Britain's empire farther east. Britain's interest in Egypt and the Suez Canal in particular is the best known example of the relationship which existed between the fates of India and the Near East. Nor does the relationship stop with Egypt, for the colonization of the African continent was caused in part by the desire of imperial powers to gain a more secure access to the East.⁷

The belief in the inter-relatedness of the fates of

⁵Wessner, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 60.

⁶Collective Defence in South East Asia, A Report Prepared by a Chatham House Study Group (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 93.

⁷Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), pp. 63-64.

Afro-Asian states as a central fact of Afro-Asian history is sometimes found in cases which are not only less well known than the above mentioned examples, but which at first appear to be irrelevant to the point. The case of Palestine offers a good illustration of this fact.

Although the problem is usually discussed in terms other than colonial, it is beyond doubt that what has been said about the belief in the inter-relatedness of the destinies of Afro-Asian territories is also true for Palestine. Inside as well as outside the United Nations, Arab representatives presented the problem of Palestine as being an essentially colonial problem. The head of the Iraqi delegation, for example, told the Bandung Conference in 1955 that "Zionism is certainly the last chapter in the book of old colonialism"⁸ In 1960, President Nasser spoke of the problem of Palestine to the General Assembly entirely in terms of imperialist interests, and explained how Palestine was used for the purpose of controlling events in the whole Arab world. "Imperialism has its own logic," he said, and

the logic of imperialism, as manifested in its crime against the people of Palestine, has been to break the geographical unity of the Arab world, on the one hand, and, on the other, to create for itself in the very heart of the Arab world a base from which to threaten the Arab peoples. I believe no stronger proof of this could be given than the conspiracy which led to the tripartite aggression against us in 1956.⁹

⁸ Mohammed Fadhi Jamali, "Speech," Vital Speeches, June 1, 1955, p. 1260.

⁹ United Arab Republic, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Text of Statement..., p. 9.

Although it may be tempting to dismiss such views as the angry utterances of an enraged people, it is not as easy to similarly dismiss the historical facts on which they are based.

Palestine's fate was doubtless determined, at least in part, by the fact that it fitted the British imperial position elsewhere in Asia and Africa. The fact that Palestine "is the eastern outpost against any potential threat to the Suez Canal; it is the outlet of the [oil] pipe-line from Kirkuk [Iraq]; it is a halting place on the international air route to India and beyond, and it is a starting point for the desert motor road to Iraq"¹⁰ was an important cause not only in its becoming a part of Britain's plans for empire, but also helped to inspire the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and to determine the events which eventually led to the partition of the country after World War II. Recognizing Palestine's importance to powers interested in surrounding territories, the Zionists persistently appealed to the colonial aspirations of European powers in their efforts to win support for the idea of a Jewish state (or homeland) in Palestine. They, for example, used Germany's well-known efforts before World War I to increase its influence in the Turkish Empire, to promote their own aims in Palestine. "Germany would be well-advised, in her own interests," they

¹⁰Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 1.

argued, "to co-operate with the Zionists... [who] could be relied upon to spread German culture, and promote German economic penetration, throughout the Turkish Empire."¹¹

They also used the argument in their attempts to secure British support. They recognized the importance of Palestine to Britain's empire. No power, they correctly argued, "had the interest in Palestine that England had, seeing that England in Egypt was next-door neighbor to Palestine and that the shortest way to India was through Palestine."¹²

In the wake of Hitler and his concentration camps, the problem of Palestine was increasingly discussed in emotional and humanitarian terms. But the relationship between the struggle over Palestine and the neighboring Afro-Asian territories was not unknown. A British writer commented in 1946 on the fact that the Zionists had offered themselves as a "wooden horse of Troy" to be used by Britain in its imperial plans in the East.¹³ For this reason, the same writer was led to "discount the importance of Jewish immigration as a factor in Arab objection to the Balfour Declaration and to conclude that it was the fact that the Jews were the stool pigeons of British imperialism that damned the whole business in Arab eyes from the beginning."¹⁴

¹¹Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), pp. 212-213.

¹²Ibid., p. 19.

¹³John Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine (London: The Crest Press, 1946), pp. 39-40.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 46.

Unless these examples are kept in mind and duly recognized for their influence upon Afro-Asian thinking, statements concerning the inter-relatedness of the destinies of Afro-Asian territories will not be properly understood. An Afro-Asian leader's belief that as long as all Afro-Asia is not free, his own country will feel threatened, must not be viewed simply as an excuse for intervention in the affairs of other territories. The Afro-Asian states' concern with each other's destinies cannot be fully appreciated without giving due regard to the historical facts which prompted them. The Afro-Asian belief in a shared destiny is and must be regarded as a fundamental ingredient of collective Afro-Asian politics.

It was said earlier that Afro-Asian belief in a shared fate is not based strictly on past experience, but also on future expectations. The idea that a country's independence is not secure as long as other peoples in the region are not free at least partially explains the Afro-Asian states' continuing concern with each others' affairs. It is to be expected, for example, that Guinea and Ghana would view their neighbors' efforts to become and to remain free as their own, and to shape their policies on the assumption that they have a stake in the outcome. Such an attitude is the logical outcome of the belief that "as long as all Africa is not free, Guinea will feel threatened,"¹⁵ and that "Ghana's independence

¹⁵Statement from Sékou Touré, Chapter III, footnote 6.

was meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the African continent."¹⁶

The security of the political independence of one Afro-Asian state, then, not only was linked to that of others in the past, but will also be dependent upon it in the future. Thus an Afro-Asian state must not stop with freeing itself, but also must help in the liberation of others in order to remain free.

The third major factor which makes for unity among the states of Asia and Africa is their realization that though individually they are fairly impotent to cope with the dangers they believe they face, and to achieve the goals they seek, they are better able to do so through mutual support. There is no evidence, except in statements designed for domestic consumption, that Afro-Asian spokesmen believe that their countries can individually exert much influence on the international scene. Yet there is abundant evidence that they see Afro-Asia as a major factor in world politics.¹⁷

These three factors--the desire to assert their equality, the belief in a shared destiny, and the realization that only through mutual support can they hope to be participants in, and not only subjects to, world events--account for virtually all manifestations of general solidarity among Asian and African states. Any other factors to which such solidarity may be attributed will be shown, upon examination, to

¹⁶Statement from Kwame Nkrumah, Chapter III, footnote 7.

¹⁷For example, see Chapter I, p. 31.

stem from the generalizations stated above. It was shown in Chapter VI, for example, that general Afro-Asian aversion to involvement in cold war alignments partially stems from their fear of being subordinated to a dominant partner. Similarly, it was shown that their attitudes on questions of economic underdevelopment were conditioned not only by similar economic conditions and needs, but by shared views about the causes of these conditions and needs as seen in their colonial experience. These two examples illustrate the fact that the three unifying influences identified above constitute the foundations upon which Afro-Asian solidarity rests.

Now let us turn to sources of friction which militate against Afro-Asian solidarity. One of the most important of these sources is the existence of cross loyalties which, in spite of agreement on principles, make agreement on particular issues more difficult. There are three types of affiliations which vie with the commitment to the coalition for the loyalty of some of its members. These are military alliances with non-Afro-Asian powers, the French Community, and the Commonwealth of Nations. The first two affiliations do function as sources of friction, but the third does not seem to be a threat to Afro-Asian solidarity.

In regard to the question of military alliances, membership in SEATO and in CENTO is actually both a cause and effect of disagreement. It is obvious that Afro-Asian members of military alliances disagree with the rest on the nature of the threat to their independence. As it was pointed out in

Chapter VI, they often express the opinion that the so-called radical Afro-Asian states' idea about threats to their independence is one-sided, because it does not take account of the communist threat. But it is clear that membership in military alliances is also a cause of friction among Afro-Asian states. It is a source of friction because of a belief on the part of some members of the coalition that the aligned states are endangering the security of other states by belonging to military alliances. The attitude of the Indian government toward the South East Asia Treaty Organization is representative of non-aligned views on the subject of military alliances. While the Manila Treaty was being negotiated, the Indian government opposed the scheme. A resolution on international affairs adopted on January 17, 1955, by the Steering Committee of the Indian Congress Party explained why. The establishment of SEATO, the resolution stated, "by some great Powers of the West and some States in South East Asia, is regrettable and has added to the insecurity of that region and extended the area of the cold war."¹⁸ When this statement is coupled with the belief that "the Manila Treaty represents a subtle attempt on the part of the Western Powers

¹⁸ India News, January 22, 1955, quoted in the Chatham House Study Group's Report, p. 94. Emphasis added. Five years later, Nkrumah expressed the same idea in virtually identical terms. An African state which enters into a military alliance "with any outside Power," he said, "...not only involves the State concerned in the risk of being drawn into nuclear warfare; it also endangers the security of the neighbouring African States." GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. I, 1960-61, p. 66.

collectively, to force colonialism in a different guise on South East Asia by substituting military protection for political tutelage,"¹⁹ it becomes clear that military alliances clash with two of the three sources of cohesion identified above. They represent, in the view of some Afro-Asian states, a threat to the efforts of Afro-Asian states to maintain their sovereign equality, and they collide with the belief in the inter-relatedness of the destinies of Afro-Asian states.

Another commitment which creates friction among Afro-Asian states is the membership of some African states in the French Community. Whenever French policies conflicted with objectives of Afro-Asian states, the African members of the Community found themselves caught between the double loyalties expected from them as members of the French Community, on one hand, and as Afro-Asian states on the other. This conflict was most apparent in the course of the General Assembly's dealings with the problem of Algeria. The question of how to steer a proper course in regard to this problem was "deeply troubling to the African members of the French Community which are torn between their loyalty to President de Gaulle and their strong anti-colonialism and sympathy with Algerian Arab Nationalism."²⁰ The African members of the French

¹⁹Chatham House Study Group's Report, p. 95. Chapters I, III, and VI contain similar remarks made by leaders and representatives of Afro-Asian states inside and outside the United Nations.

²⁰The New York Times, November 27, 1960. Also see ibid., October 16, 1960.

Community attempted to solve the problem by unsuccessfully trying to please both sides. While the supporters of speedy independence for Algeria were advocating a referendum, the members of the Community sought a re-opening of negotiations. The Senegalese delegation, which was promoting this idea on behalf of the other Community members, caused Mongi Slim of Tunisia to remark that the efforts of these states were "not ...beneficial to a brother-people." He warned the Community members against "treading on dangerous ground in efforts to be a friend of both France and the Algerians."²¹

The members of the French Community could not reconcile the conflicting aims of the two groupings to which they professed allegiance. As was said in the last chapter, they were almost in total opposition to the rest of the Afro-Asian group on roll-calls pertaining to the Algerian problem. The fact that the members of the French Community did generally support France on a question like the problem of Algeria shows how Afro-Asian solidarity suffered due to the cross loyalties to which some Afro-Asian states are subject.

The only other commitment to a non-Afro-Asian influence which some Afro-Asian states have is membership in the Commonwealth of Nations. Unlike the other two commitments, however, membership in the Commonwealth does not seem to be a threat to Afro-Asian solidarity. As was shown in Chapter V, the analysis of Afro-Asian recorded votes did not reveal

²¹Ibid., December 15, 1960.

the existence of a Commonwealth subgroup within the coalition, although it showed the existence of distinct voting alignments centering around the aligned states and the French Community members. The reason for this seems to be that while memberships in the French Community and in military alliances tend to exert attitudes and lead to policies stemming from such commitments, membership in the Commonwealth does not require policies which cause friction with other Afro-Asian states. Commonwealth members have always subordinated their commitments to the Commonwealth to their Afro-Asian obligations. There is no parallel, for example, in the conduct of Commonwealth members to the conduct of the French Community members in regard to Algeria. Conflict between the interests of the Commonwealth and the interests of Afro-Asia never seemed to pose a problem to the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth. In such cases, the choice was always clear and simple: Afro-Asian interests came first. This attitude was reflected in Nkrumah's remark that "it is natural that we in Africa should judge the effectiveness of the Commonwealth in terms of its significance to the African situation at the present and in the future."²² This tendency on the part of the non-English-speaking members of the Commonwealth to view their commitments to the Commonwealth as being subordinate to the "situation" in their region when the two obligations come into conflict is the reason why membership in the

²² Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 224.

Commonwealth has not been detrimental to Afro-Asian solidarity. Instead of dividing Afro-Asian states between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth members, Afro-Asian states' membership in the Commonwealth has tended to divide the Commonwealth between English-speaking and non-English-speaking members.²³

In addition to the factor of cross loyalties, the question of unity is paradoxically a source of friction among Afro-Asian states. Friction arising from conflict over unity affects solidarity within two numerically important segments of the coalition: the Arab and the sub-Saharan African states. In both cases, the conflict centers more around the extent and method of union than it does on its necessity or desirability. Although it is impossible to know with certainty whether or not unity is genuinely sought by those concerned, it is true that in both cases there is an apparent general agreement on the principle. In both cases, limited experiments have been tried and failed.

In the case of the Arab states, suffice it to say that friction tends to arise from attempts to go beyond the level of collaboration agreed upon in the Charter of the League of Arab States. The first actual attempt to go beyond this level of unity--the merger of Syria and Egypt in 1958--resulted in a rival effort by Jordan and Iraq.

²³Taylor Cole et al., "The British Commonwealth," European Political Systems, Taylor Cole, ed. (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 153.

In the case of sub-Saharan African states, the desirability of some form of union is generally accepted. Whenever dissention is expressed, it is based on the ground that union is not feasible. The Nigerian premier, Obafemi Awolowo, said that even economic integration was not practicable. "I am firmly of the opinion," he said, "that it is visionary now, and for many years to come, to labor for the emergence of a United States of Africa, or even economic cooperation (such as exists in Western Europe) among all the countries of Africa."²⁴ This view, however, is not shared by most African leaders who rather concur with the view expressed by President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika to the effect that African "unity is...necessary to consolidate and maintain the independence which we are now achieving in different parts of Africa."²⁵

The question of African unity, however, becomes a controversy when the discussion shifts from principle to specifics. The division on how far and how fast to pursue an African union follows the division shown to exist in Chapter V. African states most closely related to the non-aligned voting subgroup of the Afro-Asian coalition stand in opposition to those states generally identified with the Brazzaville voting subgroup. Ghana, Guinea, and Mali--the African states

²⁴ Sigmund, p. 230.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 205.

most closely associated with the "radical" Afro-Asian states--represent the more radical position on African unity. They seek to go faster and farther than most African states are willing to do. While most African states advocate a gradual, functional approach to unity, the "radicals" see a danger in delay. The two positions may be illustrated by the following statements expressing the views of the Ivory Coast and Ghana. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast saw in the failure of union between Senegal and the French Sudan a proof that political unions need careful economic and administrative planning, and for that reason favored the establishment of an African common market as a first step toward federation.²⁶

The Ghanaian position, representing the more radical approach, sees a danger in gradualism. The deferment of political union, in Nkrumah's view, contained a "very great danger of African leaders in newly independent countries resting content with the idea of being 'little tin gods' in their own territories, when in reality Africa's future demanded that its countries should create the greatest unity."²⁷ What makes the difference over approaches to unity "one of the principal divisions between African states"²⁸ is not only disagreement on how to bring about a union, but suspicion

²⁶The New York Times, December 12, 1960.

²⁷Nkrumah, p. 204.

²⁸Eresene Klean, "African Unification Movements," International Organization, XVI (Spring, 1962), 387.

concerning the motives of each other. While the moderate African states, centered in the Brazzaville group, suspect the radicals of using the desire for unity as a pretext for "inciting subversion in other African states,"²⁹ the counter-charge is advanced that the gradualists are advocating methods which are "deceptively time-delaying."³⁰ It is even suggested that the gradualists are not sincere in their adherence to the principle of African unity. During one of their meetings, the leaders of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali actually suggested that the Brazzaville states' idea of unity was nothing but "regroupment based on language of the colonial powers" and appealed to "these heads of States to follow a higher and more healthy conception of African Unity."³¹

The third factor which militates against co-operation among Asian and African states is the existence of disputes in which some of them are deeply and directly involved. There have been two types of such disputes. The first type, represented by the Indian and Pakistani struggle over Kashmir, is a dispute where both antagonists are members of the Afro-Asian coalition. In such cases, Afro-Asian solidarity suffers not only because two or more of the coalition members stand in direct opposition to each other, but also because other members are put in a position where they have to choose sides.

²⁹"Narrower Middle Through," Economist, February 3, 1962, p. 432.

³⁰Mkumah, p. 253.

³¹"Co-operation by African States," African Affairs, LX (April, 1961), 129.

Another way in which the struggle over Kashmir has weakened Afro-Asian solidarity stems from the relationship which undoubtedly exists between it and military alliances which have already been identified as a source of friction.

Pakistan's membership in SEATO was not entirely due to that country's fear of communist aggression. Zafulla Khan, the Pakistani representative during the Manila Conference which negotiated the alliance, made it clear that his country was not as concerned with the communist threat as the other participants were.³² In December, 1960, the President of Pakistan explained his country's policy of alignment to an Indonesian audience at Bandung by saying: "It is an Asian country which has been oppressing us and continues to oppress us."³³ The reference to India is obvious.

The other type of disputes which result in an adverse effect on Afro-Asian co-operation were disputes in which, although the directly involved Afro-Asian states stood on the same side of the controversy, they felt so strongly about it that they were not willing to pay for support by significant changes in their position. The question of Palestine and the Moroccan claim to Mauritania are examples of such cases. Such problems threatened Afro-Asian solidarity in two ways. First, some Afro-Asian states which were not directly involved

³²Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 28.

³³Sisir K. Gupta, "Islam as A Factor in Pakistani Foreign Relations," India Quarterly, XVIII (July-September, 1962), 235.

tended to withhold their support from positions they considered to be extreme. Second, withholding of that support resulted in a general worsening of relations between both groups. This fact was evident, for example, in the reaction of the Moroccan delegate to the opposition of the French-speaking African states to Morocco's position on the question of Mauritania. His statement implying that these states were instruments of French policy³⁴ indicated a belief in the unreliability of these coalition partners, a belief which was obviously incompatible with meaningful co-operation.

The fourth source of friction among Afro-Asian states has so far been more potential than actual. Black African nationalism poses a potential threat to Afro-Asian solidarity in the form of a resentment against Indian and Arab involvement south of the Sahara. While "Indian-African relations may be strained in the future by the position of the Indian traders in East Africa,"³⁵ clash with Arab involvement in sub-Saharan African affairs has already been manifested. The belief on the part of some African states that the Arab states of North Africa are intruders on black African concerns³⁶ clashes with the belief, expressed by President Nasser, that Egypt is an integral part of Africa and not only in the geographic sense of the word. "Can we possibly ignore the fact,"

³⁴See Chapter IV, footnote 24.

³⁵Sigmund, p. 153. Also see L. W. Hollingsworth, The Asians of East Africa (London: Macmillan Co., 1960), especially pp. 168-172.

³⁶Chapter I, footnotes 67 and 68.

he said, "that there is an African continent which we have been made part of by fate, and that the terrible contention now going on about its future will have its influence on us whether we will or no?"³⁷

The solidarity of Asian and African states is, therefore, troubled by many conflicts. Some of these conflicts have found their way to the United Nations and for this reason affected Afro-Asian solidarity in the Assembly in a direct manner. Other conflicts were never subject to consideration by the international organization, and their effect upon Afro-Asian solidarity took the general form of divergent views and incompatible outlooks. But the existence of conflict does not, by itself, determine the fate and the functioning of a political coalition. Conflict will naturally diminish its effectiveness, but will not necessarily render it ineffective. In the case of the Afro-Asian coalition, the factors making for solidarity have managed to keep and to sustain the coalition. But how powerful is the coalition they have sustained? This question will be dealt with in the following chapter.

³⁷Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 58.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COALITION'S SUCCESS

Now that the Afro-Asian coalition has been discussed in terms of its historical setting, cohesion, subdivisions, goals, and outlook on the various types of issues which were dealt with by the General Assembly, it is time to attempt an evaluation of the results of its efforts. How successful has the coalition been in its endeavor to promote Afro-Asian objectives in the General Assembly? This chapter is essentially an attempt to answer this question.

Before the attempt is made, however, it must be stated that it has inherent limitations which, of necessity, tend to lessen its significance. Any assessment of this type is subject to similar limitations. In the case of the Afro-Asian coalition's success in the Assembly, several difficulties stand in the way of a more substantial effort than this chapter will represent. First, states which supported the coalition on a certain position or a vote did not necessarily do so because of the coalition's influence upon them. For example, Soviet support of resolutions favoring the independence of an Afro-Asian territory may well be motivated by Soviet desire to undermine the position of the Western powers in Afro-Asia. In such a case, Soviet support would

most likely be given, regardless of the Afro-Asian states' position on the issue.

Second, when a state changes its position to one more in line with Afro-Asian expectations, the change may be due to influence by a non-Afro-Asian power or by that state's own people, or even changes in the government of that state. Although Britain objected to and vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for its withdrawal from Egypt in 1956, United States' pressure and the pressure of British public opinion undoubtedly had a great deal to do with its subsequent agreement to comply with resolutions urged by Afro-Asian states. But how much of the influence causing the change was Afro-Asian influence? It is impossible to know. A similar statement may be made in connection with France's position on the Algerian problem.

The third difficulty in determining influence in the United Nations derives from the problem of determining the role of debates in the General Assembly. John Foster Dulles, who served on the United States delegation to the United Nations before becoming Secretary of State, said that "every major debate in the United Nations General Assembly has brought about changes of opinion so that there was a larger measure of agreement."¹ But how important were these changes of opinion, and did they result in states voting differently

¹John G. Hadwen and John Kaufman, How United Nations Decisions Are Made (2nd ed.; Leyden, Netherlands; A. W. Sythoff, 1961), p. 39.

than they intended before the debates? These questions are not only difficult to answer, but the validity of the assertion which prompted them is rather open to question. If by "major debates" Mr. Dulles meant a debate on an important controversial issue--for it is only from such issues that major debates seem to arise--then it is certainly unfair that he should ask us to believe that "the United States delegation has almost always modified its initial position after hearing the point of view of other delegations" and that "the same can be said of most delegations."² It is closer to reality to say that, on important controversial issues, initial and final positions are almost always determined before the debate starts and by the home governments who do not even hear the debates.³

These are only some of the difficulties involved, but they are sufficient to make a measurement of influence impossible. The following analysis, then, must be viewed as an assessment of the coalition's achievement and not as a measurement of its influence. This assessment of the coalition's endeavors to promote Afro-Asian aims in the United Nations will be made by analyzing these aims, by studying the fate of resolutions pertaining to them, and by relating the

²Ibid.

³For this reason, pressure designed to change the position of states is often exerted on the home governments. For example, see Robert E. Riggs, Politics in the United Nations (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), particularly the chapter on Palestine.

outcome of the votes to the coalition's position on them. How successful was the coalition in terms of passage of resolutions it supported, and in terms of failure of measures it opposed? And how fully had the coalition used its voting strength in supporting measures it desired and opposing policies it sought to thwart? These and similar indicators of the coalition's success will be the basis of the following analysis.

As was done in some of the previous chapters, the discussion will be organized around the various categories of substantive issues on which roll-calls were taken. After an assessment of the coalition's success on each of these areas is made separately, certain generalizations which can be derived from the analysis will be stated.

Racial Issues:

The Afro-Asian coalition's objectives in relation to the problem of racialism may be described as an effort to deepen the United Nations' involvement in and commitment to the fight against racialism. The process may be divided into three stages which, though not separate and distinct, are characterized by rising Afro-Asian expectations. The initial phase centered around the question of competence. In the second phase, the Afro-Asian coalition concentrated on seeking substantive resolutions expressing disapproval of the policy and practice of racialism. The third phase consisted of an effort to secure recommendations for action designed to

discourage racialism.

The initial phase of the Afro-Asian coalition's struggle against racialism was an unqualified success. South African arguments that the Union's policies pertaining to apartheid and to the treatment of people of Indian origin could not be dealt with by the Assembly were consistently rejected by overwhelming majorities in favor of the Afro-Asian view that such matters were the legitimate concern of the international organization. Although placing this item on the agenda continued to be contested and recorded votes on it continued to be taken for several years after it was first considered during the first session in 1946, a typical vote showed only about half a dozen states supporting the Union of South Africa's position that, due to the domestic jurisdiction provision in the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 7), the Assembly "is unable to adopt the proposals" concerning the placement of the racial question on the agenda.⁴ Never since its establishment did the General Assembly reject the placement of the item on its agenda, and votes for its inclusion always indicated overwhelming support for the Afro-Asian position.

As far as substantive measures are concerned, the General Assembly also gave substantial support for policies advocated and supported by the Afro-Asian coalition. This support resulted in the passage of resolutions, in every

⁴ GAOR, Session VII, 1951, p. 333.

session, ranging from those expressing faith that the states most directly concerned will find a mutually acceptable solution, to the adoption of recommendations for sanctions against the Union of South Africa. But what does this support mean in terms of Afro-Asian success in realizing their aims through the Assembly?

There are two aspects to this question. First, how successful was the coalition in having adopted resolutions which it supported and in having rejected resolutions which it opposed? Second, what type of resolutions was it able to pass? The following analysis of votes and of resolutions indicates that the coalition's success in promoting their objectives regarding the racial problem was more apparent than real.

As far as the votes are concerned, the Assembly rejected two⁵ provisions strongly supported by the coalition. On the other hand, the Assembly passed three Afro-Asian-supported provisions which were opposed by the rest of the Assembly.⁶ In all other cases, resolutions were accepted or rejected because they were supported or opposed by both the

⁵Total votes on racial questions were 33.

⁶The acceptance or the non-acceptance of a measure voted upon is determined on the basis of whether or not it would have passed or failed if one group alone had been voting. For example, if the Afro-Asian coalition's vote on a certain resolution was 20 for and 15 against, the resolution is said to have the coalition's support if it is a procedural vote, and it is said to be opposed by the coalition if it is a substantive vote. The same method is used for determining whether or not a resolution is accepted by the rest of the Assembly members.

Afro-Asian and other states. The fate of 30, out of a total of 33, votes would have been the same even if the Afro-Asian states had not voted at all. With the exception of three votes, approval was not dependent on Afro-Asian support. Even the three votes whose outcome did depend on the coalition's position, were votes on which a simple majority of the non-Afro-Asian states did support the coalition.⁷ There is no evidence, then, that Afro-Asian voting power materially affected the fate of votes on racial issues.

The success of the coalition, evaluated on the basis of the content of resolutions passed by the Assembly, does not lead to the belief that it was very effective in promoting its objectives. As will become clear shortly, the success of the coalition in having adopted measures which it advocated may be to a great extent attributed to the fact that Afro-Asian states tended to sponsor measures which, in light of their expressed feelings on the racial question, may be described as remarkably moderate.

By the time this study begins, in 1952, the General Assembly had passed several resolutions pertaining to the policy of apartheid and to the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa. Resolution 103 (I) of November 19, 1946; resolution 395 (V) of December 2, 1950;

⁷Voting was as follows:

	Afro-Asian			Other	
	yes	no		yes	no
First vote	15	0	20	17
Second vote	16	0	22	15
Third vote	15	0	20	16

and resolution 511 (VI) of January 12, 1952 had already put the Assembly on record in support of Afro-Asian contentions that the racial policies of the Union of South Africa represented not separation but discrimination on racial grounds and were, for that reason, in violation of the Charter. The last resolution passed before this study begins, resolution 511 (VI), recommended negotiations between the Union's government on the one hand the governments of India and Pakistan on the other.

So, when the seventh session began, the Assembly had already adopted the Afro-Asian position that the racial policies of South Africa were the concern of the Assembly and that they were in violation of the Charter. But the Assembly was content in leaving the task of finding a solution to the problem in the hands of the three states which were or were considered to be most directly concerned: the Union of South Africa, India, and Pakistan. and there ended the Assembly's involvement.

When the seventh session (1952) convened, however, it became apparent that direct negotiations without further involvement by the Assembly would not succeed. For on September 25, 1952, the permanent representative of South Africa delivered to the Secretary General a letter stating his government's refusal to negotiate. Due to Article 2, paragraph 7, the letter stated, the Union's government did not recognize the Assembly's authority to deal with its racial policies and, consequently, was unable to carry out

resolution 511 (VI) recommending negotiations with India and Pakistan.⁸

The subsequent reaction of the Afro-Asian states indicates their willingness to pay for the Assembly support by lowering their aims. The demands they made upon the Assembly, represented by draft resolutions they sponsored and supported, were until 1960 kept well below their expectations expressed during debates. While during debates they spoke against the Union's racial policies in the most condemnatory manner,⁹ the resolutions they sponsored and supported were conciliatory and restrained. Thus, when it became apparent that the Union's government was not prepared to recognize the constitutionality of resolution 511 (VI), they neither sought to condemn or to censure the Union's government, but only to study and to mediate the dispute. The first draft resolutions submitted by the coalition during the 1952-1960 period under study called for the establishment of a three-member commission "to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa in light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,"¹⁰ and the establishment of a three-member good offices commission to assist in bringing about the negotiations recommended in resolution 511 (VI) passed during the sixth session

⁸Text of the letter is found in GAOR, Annexes, Session VII, 1952, agenda item 22, pp. 2-3.

⁹See Chapter VI.

¹⁰Resolution 516 (VII).

(1951-52).¹¹

It is difficult to believe that the Afro-Asian states, in proposing and supporting the measures contained in these two resolutions, had actually expected the Union's government to recognize the validity of resolutions designed to bring about the implementation of recommendations already rejected by it as being unconstitutional. Yet, they not only limited themselves to proposing measures which obviously were destined to fail in bringing the Afro-Asian aim of assuring racial equality closer to realization, but they continued to propose and support the same type of measures for several sessions thereafter. There was no need for the Afro-Asian states to guess about the reaction of the Union's government in regard to the establishment of these commissions. The Union's government lost no time in informing the Secretary-General that it did not recognize the commissions' existence, and it was so reported to the General Assembly at the beginning of the eighth session (1953).¹² But the Afro-Asian effort continued to be limited to urging the Union's government to allow the commissions to study and to mediate, and to deploring its refusal to recognize their existence.¹³

It was not until the thirteenth session (1958) that

¹¹Resolution 615 (VII).

¹²See GAOR, Annexes, Session VIII, 1953, Document A/2473, Appendix III for a text of the letter from the Union's government.

¹³Resolutions 721 (VIII); 820 (IX); 917 (X); 1015 (XI); 1178 (XII); 1248 (XIII).

the Afro-Asian states abandoned their attempts to have the government of South Africa recognize and co-operate with the commissions. The abandonment of the commissions, however, did not represent a significant departure in policy. Resolutions supported by the Afro-Asian coalition in the thirteenth session (1958) still showed its reluctance to depart radically from the fairly conciliatory attitude it had followed until that time. Resolution 1248 (XIII) even gives the impression that it was the interest of the Union of South Africa with which the Assembly was concerned. In a multi-racial society, the resolution stated, harmony (and other virtues) are best assured when patterns of legislation and practice are directed toward insuring equality before the law. During the fourteenth session (1959), the coalition was still sponsoring and supporting resolutions which simply reiterated previous policy, albeit in slightly stronger terms. After expressing the belief that racial discrimination was opposed to human rights and fundamental freedoms and after declaring it to be prejudicial to international harmony, the resolution expressed, in its operative paragraphs, the Assembly's opposition to it in any part of the world, and called upon all member states to bring their policies in conformity with their obligations under the Charter.¹⁴

The preceding brief account of resolutions sponsored and supported by the Afro-Asian coalition and approved by the

¹⁴Resolution 1375 (XIV).

General Assembly shows that Afro-Asian efforts in using the Assembly in their struggle against racialism were successful only in the sense that they gained support for them. This success, however, was more apparent than real, since these efforts essentially did nothing more than have the Assembly reaffirm principles already embodied in the United Nations Charter. Until the end of the fourteenth session (1959), the Afro-Asian states neither sought nor received support on measures going beyond the restatement of these principles. The only new element in the coalition's struggle against racialism during the 1952-1959 period was the attempt to broaden the Assembly's involvement through the use of good offices and study commissions--a device which proved to be useless.

During the fifteenth session, the Afro-Asian states apparently abandoned their policy of patient compromise and, for the first time, sought action designed to pressure the Union's government into implementing the recommendations contained in previous resolutions. The result of their effort was the adoption of a resolution¹⁵ requesting all states to consider taking such separate and collective action as was open to them, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of racial policies.

The General Assembly's action on resolution 1598 (XV) may be a good illustration of the point made above, to the

¹⁵Resolution 1598 (XV).

effect that Afro-Asian success in having their resolutions adopted is largely due to their willingness to restrain themselves. As it came to the Assembly from the Special Political Committee, the Afro-Asian supported draft resolution¹⁶ contained an operative paragraph (5) which spelled out the measures which the coalition wished the Assembly to approve. The paragraph recommended that member states (a) break off diplomatic relations or refrain from establishing them with the Union's government, (b) close their ports to vessels flying the Union's flag, (c) enact legislation prohibiting ships from entering South African ports, (d) boycott all South African goods and prohibit exports to South Africa, and (e) refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the government and companies registered under South African laws.

This provision, which a large majority of Afro-Asian states favored, was rejected by the Assembly. It invoked the largest opposition by non-Afro-Asian states. Haiti and the Communist members were the only non-Afro-Asian states which supported it.¹⁷ As adopted, the resolution did not state what measures states should adopt. It simply recommended that they "consider measures, in conformity with the Charter."¹⁸ The

¹⁶Document A/4728.

¹⁷The vote was as follows: Afro-Asian states: 30 for, 1 against, 12 abstain, 1 absent. Non-Afro-Asian states: 12 for, 33 against, 9 abstain, 1 absent.

¹⁸Resolution 1598 (XV), operative paragraph 3.

failure of the provision cannot be attributed to lower cohesion on the part of the Afro-Asian coalition, because it would still have failed to pass even if all 44 of them had voted for it. The vote in that case would have been 56 for and 33 against, the supporters falling short of the required two-thirds majority needed for its passage. The point being made is that neither higher cohesion nor the increase in the number of Afro-Asian states could account for whatever success the group achieved. Its ability to have passed resolutions for which it voted is, to a great extent, due to the group's willingness to accept milder resolutions.

Does this mean that the coalition's efforts to gain the Assembly's support for its aims on racial questions have been an utter failure? Obviously the answer is "no." For one thing, the coalition succeeded in establishing once and for all the Assembly's competence to deal with the problem, thus giving the Afro-Asian states the opportunity to expose the policy and practice of racial discrimination and to establish it as an international problem which, with the Assembly's approval, they could talk about without exposing themselves to the charge of meddling in other countries' internal affairs. Second, the coalition succeeded in establishing the applicability of the general principles of the Charter, pertaining to racial discrimination, to a particular grievance they had against the Union of South Africa. Third, they succeeded in having accepted their contention that the Union's policy of racial discrimination is a serious international

probism, because it not only was in violation of the Charter but also was prejudicial to international harmony. Finally, they succeeded in securing the Assembly's approval for using sanctions without exposing themselves and their supporters to the charge that they were creating international tension and antagonism by imposing material sanctions against a member state. So their success was not all illusory. But it was limited success, because it largely depended on watering-down of resolutions they sought.

In spite of the fact that the coalition's willingness to moderate its aims was an important contributor to its success in having its policies approved by the General Assembly, there is evidence to indicate that the coalition might have been able to secure the adoption of stronger measures during the period before 1960, during which it was content with securing resolutions which simply affirmed certain principles. The ability of the coalition to secure a dozen votes in 1960 in support of very strong measures against South Africa indicates that it would have been possible for it to secure that support prior to 1960. This fact, coupled with the fact that the Afro-Asian coalition had succeeded in securing the adoption of resolutions opposed by many non-Afro-Asian states, indicates that they perhaps unnecessarily lowered their sights, and that they could have secured the adoption of somewhat stronger measures.

Colonial Questions:

The rapid increase in the number of independent states which took place during the 1952-60 period was without precedent. Moreover, it was not generally anticipated. Writing in 1957, an author spoke of the General Assembly as a large parliamentary body, with its eighty-one members, and "facing the prospect of five or six additions within the next ten years."¹⁹ Three years later, the Assembly's membership had already reached 99. With the exception of Cyprus, all the additions in these three years were Afro-Asian states. This phenomenal growth in the number of independent Afro-Asian states, coupled with the great interest that Afro-Asian states have persistently shown in the colonial problem, tend to give the impression that they have had a great deal to do with this development, and that they were somehow responsible for its coming about. A study of Afro-Asian anti-colonial politics in the Assembly leads to the conclusion that if the Afro-Asian states deserve credit for the success of independence movements, then the credit must belong largely to their efforts outside the United Nations. There is little evidence to show that Afro-Asian efforts in the United Nations had much to do with the demise of colonialism in Afro-Asia. On the basis of its ability to secure support for its positions on colonial issues, and on the basis of the types of resolutions it

¹⁹Elmore Jackson, "The Developing Role of the Secretary-General," International Organization, XII (Spring, 1957), p. 443.

successfully steered through the Assembly, the Afro-Asian coalition's success in colonial matters was severely limited.

Analysis of the votes shows that Afro-Asian-supported measures are far from being assured favorable action by the Assembly. Out of a total of 96 measures on which roll-call votes were taken, 35 were rejected by the Assembly. Twenty-four out of these 35 rejected measures had the support of the Afro-Asian coalition. Out of the remaining 11, 7 were rejected because they did not have the support of either the Afro-Asian states or the rest of the Assembly. Only 4 of the 35 rejected measures were rejected due to Afro-Asian opposition and in spite of sufficient support by the rest of the Assembly. What these 35 votes show is that the ability of the Afro-Asian coalition to exercise a collective veto to defeat measures they opposed is quite small. It worked only about 11.4% of the time during the period studied.

Analysis of the votes on measures which were adopted by the Assembly indicates a greater degree of success on the part of the Afro-Asian states. Almost 30% of the adopted measures would have been rejected if non-Afro-Asian votes alone were considered. On the other hand, only about 7% of the adopted measures were approved without sufficient support from the Afro-Asian coalition. This 7% of the adopted measures would have been rejected if Afro-Asian votes alone were considered. The rest of the votes succeeded with sufficient support from both Afro-Asian and other members.

In an organization like the United Nations General

Assembly, it is to be expected that a large minority like the Afro-Asian coalition will be more successful at defeating resolutions it opposes than at passing resolutions it supports. The preceding analysis of the votes shows that, for the Afro-Asian coalition, the opposite was the case. This fact requires an explanation. The explanation will suggest itself as we proceed with the analysis of the type of measure supported by the coalition on colonial problems.

In the discussion of racial issues it was said that the Afro-Asian coalition's success in having adopted resolutions which it favored was largely due to its willingness to moderate its demands upon the United Nations. As will be shown shortly, the same statement can be said about the coalition's efforts in relation to colonial issues. Most resolutions, supported by the coalition and passed by the Assembly, may be characterized as better-than-nothing resolutions (from an anti-colonial point of view). As was said in Chapter VI, the predominant Afro-Asian view on colonialism is that it is evil, harmful to world peace, that independence is the birth-right of all nations, that it is never freely given, and that once it is attained it remains threatened. In light of this attitude, it must be said that Afro-Asian "victories" in the Assembly were rather hollow, because the resolutions the coalition had to be satisfied with, fall even to approach what might be described as a reasonable fulfillment of such ideas.

The unsubstantial nature of the Afro-Asian coalition's

success--when such success is ascertained on the basis of the types of resolutions passed--is shown in two ways. First, as in the case of racial issues, Afro-Asian success partially consisted of having adopted resolutions reaffirming principles already written in the Charter. Such resolutions could hardly be said to have added to the commitments and the obligations to which the administering powers had agreed when they signed the Charter. On December 16, 1952, for example, 3 roll-call votes were taken on a resolution²⁰ calling for respect for the self-determination of peoples. The resolution was adopted, and 2 of the 3 roll-call votes taken on it were passed in spite of the fact that they did not receive the necessary support from non-Afro-Asian states.²¹ But what did this apparent demonstration of Afro-Asian voting strength accomplish? It resulted in an expression of belief that self-determination is prerequisite for a full enjoyment of fundamental human rights, and in recommendations that administering powers take practical steps to prepare non-self-governing territories for self-government or independence. Since the Charter recognizes the right to self-determination, since the resolution did not seek to apply this right in reference to any specific territory or people, and since no limits were set on the time within which preparation for self-government was to take place, it is not clear that the

²⁰Resolution 637 A (VII).

²¹Roll-call votes in GAOR, Session VII, 1952, pp. 374-75.

resolution actually did anything to advance the struggle against colonialism beyond what the Charter had done. Moreover, the "self-government or independence" phraseology of the resolution²² suggested that "self-government" does not necessarily mean "independence," and that the administering powers were not necessarily committed to the goal of preparing territories they administered for ultimate independence.

This is not to say, however, that all resolutions adopted by the Assembly simply reaffirmed anti-colonial provisions already embodied in the Charter. Among resolutions on colonial issues which dealt with the problem as a whole and which were approved by the Assembly, resolution 1514 (XV), approved on December 14, 1960, represents the greatest Afro-Asian achievement in the struggle against colonialism. The resolution, which was sponsored by 43 countries and voted for by all Afro-Asian states, endorsed some very significant anti-colonial ideas which were expounded by the radical Afro-Asian states during debates.²³ After enumerating the evils attributed to colonialism, the resolution stated that (a) all peoples have the right to self-determination, (b) inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness "should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence," and (c) all armed action or repressive measures against

²²Operative paragraph 3.

²³See Chapter VI.

dependent peoples should be terminated. The interesting thing about the passage of this resolution was that it was not opposed by any state. Nine non-Afro-Asian states, including the administering powers and their habitual supporters, were willing to let the Afro-Asian coalition score a point as long as the point did not pertain to any particular dependent territory. As will be shown shortly, the Afro-Asian coalition met greater opposition and generally scored lesser successes whenever it attempted to pursue its anti-colonial objectives in relation to particular dependencies.

Resolutions pertaining to the most important colonial problems with which the Assembly dealt in the 1952-1960 period (the problems of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and West Irian) show that the Afro-Asian coalition had to settle for very little or suffer defeat. The success of the coalition, in addition to having items placed on the Assembly's agenda, was largely limited to making appeals to the administering powers concerned to seek solutions. In most of these resolutions, no mention was made of self-determination being the desired object of negotiations.

In the case of Morocco, a draft resolution by 13 Afro-Asian states (the then 16-member coalition except Thailand, Ethiopia, and Liberia) failed to secure the necessary majority to pass. The General Assembly, the resolution stated, "requests the Government of France and His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of

Morocco, the aspirations of its people and the Charter of the United Nations."²⁴ After rejecting the Afro-Asian sponsored and supported draft resolution, the Assembly adopted an alternate draft resolution sponsored by eleven Latin American members. This draft resolution, slightly amended, became resolution 612 (VII). Resolution 612 (VII) illustrates the price Afro-Asian states often had to pay and did pay for securing Assembly approval of anti-colonial positions. The Latin American draft resolution stated that the Assembly "expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco." By contrasting the wording of the rejected Afro-Asian draft resolution with that of the approved measure, one gets an idea of what type of measure the anti-colonials could safely navigate through the Assembly. First, naming the party with which the administering power should deal seems to work against approval. Second, making a statement to the effect that self-determination of a particular territory is the expected solution also seems to be hazardous. Third, mention of a speedy settlement seems to reduce the chances of success.

When such measures are deleted from an anti-colonial resolution, what is left of it? France did not vote on resolution 612 (VII), because it did not recognize the Assembly's

²⁴Text of the draft resolution is in GACR, Annexes, Session VII, 1952, agenda item 65, pp. 11-12.

authority to deal with what it considered to be a domestic problem.²⁵ But France could have supported resolution 612 (VII) without diminishing its colonial authority in Morocco to any extent. Giving a larger measure of free speech or instituting legal reforms could be interpreted to mean that France was complying with the resolution. Nevertheless, resolution 612 (VII) was the type of resolution of which Afro-Asian anti-colonial success in the Assembly was largely made.

The inability of the Afro-Asian coalition to secure sufficient support for its anti-colonial measures was again shown during the eighth session (1953) when the problem of Morocco returned to the Assembly. A First Committee draft resolution²⁶ enjoying the unanimous support of the Afro-Asian coalition was rejected by the Assembly. Separate roll-call votes taken on each paragraph of the draft resolution revealed the extent of the coalition's weakness. The Assembly failed to support even the most feeble anti-colonial measures conceivable. One of the paragraphs of the ill-fated draft resolution stated the truism that the return of the Morocco item to the Assembly in 1953 meant that the objectives of resolution 612 (VII) had not been fulfilled. Despite unanimous Afro-Asian support, this statement was rejected by the Assembly. Three years later, Morocco became independent

²⁵Document A/C.1/L.58.

²⁶Document A/2526.

before the Afro-Asian coalition could get the Assembly to agree that resolution 612 (VII) had not been carried out.

In light of the Afro-Asian view that all peoples are entitled to self-determination, the least that the coalition should do before it is said to have succeeded in furthering its anti-colonial policies is to secure the passage of resolutions simply affirming the right of a particular territory to self-determination. But it repeatedly failed to do so. Its experience with the Tunisian question was not more successful than in the case of Morocco. A draft resolution which recommended that "negotiations between France and Tunisia be undertaken to ensure the realization by the people of Tunisia of the right to self-determination"²⁷ was rejected by the Assembly, in spite of unanimous Afro-Asian support. Again, as in the case of Morocco, Tunisia became an independent state before the Assembly recognized that it was entitled to self-determination.

During the ninth session (1955), the Afro-Asian coalition came within a hair's breadth of overruling a General Committee recommendation²⁸ that the question of Algeria should not be included in the Assembly's agenda. The committee's recommendation was rejected by a vote of 27 for, 28 against, and 5 abstaining. In addition to the six communist members of the Assembly, the Afro-Asian states received

²⁷First Committee report A/2530.

²⁸Contained in the Committee's report A/2980, paragraph 5.

support from Greece and six Latin American states.²⁹

The Afro-Asian coalition's powerlessness to overcome the opposition which an irate major colonial power could create in the Assembly became evident later in the same session. When the Assembly decided on the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda, France walked out of the Assembly.³⁰ This angry French response generated sufficient pressure on the Afro-Asian states that they had to follow a course which turned their victory into defeat. Before the end of November they agreed to withdraw the Algerian item from the agenda. India sponsored a draft resolution to that effect, and the resolution was passed in committee within seven minutes. The General Assembly approved it without debate, roll-call, or dissent.³¹

During the eleventh session (1956), a draft resolution, sponsored by 18 Afro-Asian states, recognizing the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination and recommending negotiations as a way of solving the problem, was rejected in committee and was not even voted upon in the Assembly.³² In its place, the Assembly adopted on February 15, 1957, resolution 1012 (XI) which was a combination of two

²⁹Roll-call vote in GAOR, Session IX, 1955, p. 196. Ethiopia was the only Afro-Asian state not voting for it. It abstained.

³⁰The New York Times, October 2, 1955.

³¹Ibid., November 26, 1955.

³²Document A/C.1/L.165.

drafts, originally proposed separately, one by Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand,³³ and the other by Italy and five Latin American states.³⁴ As might be anticipated, the adopted resolution was considerably milder than the Afro-Asian draft resolution which was rejected. It deleted the apparently objectionable mention of self-determination and refrained from suggesting a method which might lead to a solution. Resolution 1012 (XI) read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having heard the statements made by various delegates and discussed the problem of Algeria,

Having regard to the situation of Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human lives,

Expresses the hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The passage of this innocuous resolution may be considered a victory only when it is contrasted with the coalition's inability to keep the Algerian question on the agenda during the earlier session. But in view of the Afro-Asian stated commitment to the goal of self-determination of all Afro-Asian peoples, it is difficult to find a semblance of Afro-Asian success in resolution 1012 (XI).

During the twelfth session (1957), the Assembly was given, and was quick to seize, the opportunity to pass the buck. The opportunity came in the form of an offer of good offices which the governments of Morocco and Tunisia had made.

³³Document A/C.1/L.166.

³⁴Document A/C.1/L.167.

The General Assembly passed a unanimous resolution expressing the hope that, in light of the offer, means would be found to solve the Algerian problem.³⁵

By the time the thirteenth session convened in 1958, it was clear that the Moroccan and Tunisian good offices offer had failed to evoke favorable response from the French government, which still insisted that the Algerian problem was a French domestic problem. The Afro-Asian states' response in the Assembly was to sponsor a draft resolution³⁶ which, after recalling previous resolutions and noting the gravity of the situation, recommended negotiations. The draft resolution failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority when it was put to a vote during the 792nd plenary meeting on December 13, 1958. An indication of the coalition's failure to secure support for its anti-colonial measures, moderate as they were, is found not only in the fact that the above mentioned draft resolution failed, but also in the fact that, in addition to the ten communist members of the Assembly, only Greece and Ireland voted in support of the Afro-Asian draft resolution.³⁷

The fourteenth session (1959) found the coalition still attempting to secure recognition for the applicability of self-determination to Algeria. But as in previous attempts,

³⁵Resolution 1184 (XII).

³⁶Document A/C.1/L.232.

³⁷Roll-call vote in GAOR, Session XIII, 1958, p. 627.

the Assembly rejected a draft resolution³⁸ according to which the Assembly was to recognize Algeria's right to self-determination and which urged the holding of pourparlers with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution on the basis of self-determination.

During the fifteenth session (1960-61) the Afro-Asian coalition sponsored and supported, and the Assembly approved, the most meaningful anti-colonial resolution passed during the period under study. The resolution, as proposed, not only recognized Algeria's right to self-determination, but it also provided for a United Nations-sponsored referendum as a method of solving the problem.³⁹ A separate roll-call vote on operative paragraph 4 deleted the provision for United Nations responsibility, but otherwise the resolution was approved by a 63-8-27 roll-call vote.⁴⁰

In view of what has already been said about the ineffectiveness of the Afro-Asian states in passing resolutions recognizing the right to self-determination in reference to particular colonial territories, this important resolution must be explained. The Afro-Asian coalition did not suddenly become more effective. The substantial increases in the coalition's membership obviously did not contribute to this success, because the new members overwhelmingly opposed the resolution."

³⁸Document A/L. 276.

³⁹First Committee report A/4660.

⁴⁰Roll-call in GAOR, Session XV, Part I, Vol. II, 1960-61, pp. 1428-30.

Six of the eight states which opposed the resolution were newly admitted French-speaking African states. Three of these states also abstained. The fact that a two-thirds majority was required for the passage of the resolution meant that 12 affirmative votes were needed to counterbalance the 6 negative votes cast by the new Afro-Asian members. Since the total new addition to the membership of the Afro-Asian coalition was less than 18, it is obvious that the new states, voting for the first time in 1960, were on the whole a liability in this instance. The Afro-Asian success cannot be explained in terms of increased membership.

Furthermore, the passage of the resolution cannot be explained in terms of higher cohesion on the part of the Afro-Asian coalition or lower cohesion on the part of the other members of the Assembly. On the contrary, Afro-Asian cohesion was lower, and non-Afro-Asian cohesion was higher on this vote than on most votes taken on defeated measures pertaining to Algeria.

A third possible explanation for the surprising success of the coalition which might be advanced is that the coalition somehow succeeded in influencing the votes of the other members of the Assembly as it had never done before. But there is no evidence to show that this was the case. It is true that the passage of the resolution was greatly helped by the fact that some of France's habitual supporters reversed their usual voting behavior by supporting the resolution, and that many of them abstained and by so doing made it easier

for the resolution to pass. Of the 22 opponents of the 1959 Afro-Asian resolution on Algeria, only two opposed the 1960 resolution. Three of them reversed their votes from opposition to support, and 17 facilitated passage of the resolution by abstaining instead of opposing.⁴¹ This new support, however, can in no way be attributed to the coalition itself. To account for it, we must look outside the United Nations. The only feasible explanation for it seems to be President de Gaulle's change of policy in regard to Algeria. On September 5, 1960, President de Gaulle began a series of policy statements which eventually led him to concede Algeria's right to self-determination. In a press conference on that day, he answered a question on Algeria by saying:

There is an Algerian entity....The only question that arises, that will arise in my view, will be to know whether this Algeria will be Algerian against France, by secession, by rupture with France, or in association, in friendly union with her.⁴²

On November 4, 1960, President de Gaulle's change of policy became more definite, and his concession of Algeria's right to self-determination--if it wished it--became more pronounced. In a speech he made on that date he continued

⁴¹Changes in the votes of the 1959 opponents of Afro-Asian position on Algeria are as follows: Opposed in 1959 and 1960: Portugal and South Africa. Opposed in 1959 and abstained in 1960: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Spain, and United Kingdom. Opposed in 1959 but supported in 1960: Canada, Honduras, and Peru.

⁴²For a text of the statement see The New York Times, September 6, 1960.

to prepare France for the day when Algeria was to become independent by practically admitting its inevitability. "Yes, of course, we are, as they say, living 'in our times,'" he began his address. Then he continued to say that

the same conditions which urge us to renovate ourselves have unleashed a tremendous evolution throughout the world....

Faced with the passion of independence and progress that has laid hold of the peoples which until now had lagged behind modern civilization, the liberating genius of France has led her to emancipate populations which, previously were dependent on her....

Having taken the leadership of France again, I have, as you know, decided in her name, to follow a new course. This course leads not to an Algeria governed by Metropolitan France, but to an Algerian Algeria.⁴³

France, by adopting this new course, had in effect released its supporters and absolved them of the task of defending its cause. This fact, and no other, seems to account for the passage of the resolution. Obviously, the Assembly could not and did not continue to uphold a French position which France had abandoned. It must be concluded, then, that the passage of the resolution recognizing Algeria's right to self-determination hardly testifies to the effectiveness of the Afro-Asian coalition in the General Assembly.

The Afro-Asian coalition's extremely modest achievement as an anti-colonial force in the General Assembly can also be seen in its experience with the problem of West Irian (West New Guinea). The Indonesia-Netherlands dispute over the future of the territory first came to the Assembly in 1954.

⁴³Text of the statement is in ibid., November 5, 1960.

During the ninth session (1954), a draft resolution supported unanimously by the Afro-Asian states failed to secure necessary support for adoption in the Assembly. The draft resolution⁴⁴ failed in spite of the fact that it was not only extremely moderate, but also co-sponsored by Yugoslavia and five Latin American states to give it wider support. The rejected draft had done no more than to express the Assembly's hope that the governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands

will pursue their endeavours in respect to the dispute that now exists between them to find a solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Three sessions later, in 1957, the Afro-Asian coalition was still attempting to have the Assembly endorse a similarly mild statement. On November 29, 1957, the Assembly again rejected a draft resolution, sponsored by Bolivia and eighteen Afro-Asian states, which simply invited the parties concerned to continue efforts to find a speedy solution.⁴⁵

This survey of Afro-Asian efforts in relation to colonialism leads to the inescapable conclusion that if the independence of Afro-Asian territories and peoples were totally dependent upon the Afro-Asian coalition's success in the United Nations, Afro-Asia today would hardly be in a better position than it was when the Charter was written. It must be repeated, however, that this conclusion does not take into

⁴⁴Document A/2831.

⁴⁵Document A/C.1/L.193.

account the unmeasurable effect of Afro-Asian argumentation in the United Nations. It is possible that such activities had some favorable influence on the governments and the peoples of the world.

This evaluation of Afro-Asian influence is not intended to convey the belief that the Afro-Asian coalition's efforts to advance the ideal of self-determination were absolutely fruitless during the nine regular sessions studied. It succeeded in bringing specific colonial disputes as well as the colonial problem in general to the attention of the world. It also succeeded in securing the Assembly's endorsement of anti-colonial pronouncements embodying some of the Afro-Asian concepts on this problem. But beyond that, it is difficult to discern any appreciable success in establishing the right of particular colonial territories against the opposition of metropolitan powers.

It was said earlier that the coalition's voting record on colonial issues needed to be explained since its ability to block resolutions it opposed was less than its ability to pass resolutions it supported. It was also said that the explanation would suggest itself once the type of resolutions passed was examined. It can be seen now that the frequency of the coalition's being on the winning side of the vote was not the same thing as being on the winning side of the argument. Afro-Asian voting on the winning side was hardly more than an if-you-can't-beat-them-join-them type of victory. It was not an indication of Afro-Asian triumph, but rather of

Afro-Asian concession.

Cold War Issues:

Analysis of votes on cold war issues shows that the fate of 92 out of a total of 94 votes was not determined by the way the Afro-Asian states voted. The outcome of only two votes was actually different from what it would have been if only non-Afro-Asian votes were considered. In all other cases, the Afro-Asian vote merely affected the margin with which votes passed or failed. In almost 97.7% of the cases, then, the will of the non-Afro-Asian states was the will of the General Assembly.

The Afro-Asian coalition, on the other hand, was on the losing side of the voting alignment in 18 of the 94 votes on cold war questions. In 11 cases, the Assembly adopted measures which would have been rejected if the Afro-Asian vote alone were considered. The Assembly rejected 7 measures which the coalition, but not the rest of the Assembly members, supported. In the remaining 74 cases, the Afro-Asian coalition's voting behavior reflected that of the rest of the Assembly.⁴⁶ On the basis of the votes alone, then, it can be said that there is no evidence that necessarily indicates that the Afro-Asian coalition influenced the

⁴⁶This must not be taken to mean that the division of Afro-Asian votes between "yes," "no," and "abstain" was in the same proportion as the votes of the rest of the Assembly members, for this was not the case. It simply means that on 74 votes the coalition supported measures which the rest of the Assembly supported, and rejected measures which it opposed.

fate of measures placed before the Assembly. If the vote shows anything at all in connection with this matter, it shows Afro-Asian impotence. The will of the Afro-Asian coalition--if the way in which it voted may be so called--clashed with the will of the rest of the Assembly members on cold war votes 21.3% of the time. In only 10.0% of these cases did the Afro-Asians have their way. In the other 90.0% of these cases, the contrary view of the rest of the Assembly prevailed.

The Afro-Asian states' low level of cohesion, their excessive resort to abstention on cold war issues, and the great disparity between the number of non-Afro-Asian states on the opposite sides of the cold war votes largely explain this lack of Afro-Asian influence. The great majority of cold war measures were approved or rejected by non-Afro-Asian states by a 4 to 1 margin. In order to reverse the outcome of such votes, the Afro-Asian states needed to oppose the prevailing (non-Afro-Asian) view by large margins. The large number of Afro-Asian abstainers on most cold war votes⁴⁷ necessarily meant that not very many of them were left to support or to oppose. The low index of cohesion of the Afro-Asian group further indicated that Afro-Asian states which did take an affirmative or a negative position were not usually overwhelmingly on the same side. The result of

⁴⁷It was shown in Chapter III that Afro-Asian states abstained on 39.2% of their votes on cold war questions, more than twice the abstention rate of the whole Assembly.

this state of affairs was that the Afro-Asian coalition was not likely to furnish sufficient affirmative or negative votes to overrule the non-Afro-Asian portion of the Assembly. In the case of cold war votes, then, it may be concluded that, in view of the fact that the Assembly's rules of procedure do not consider abstaining states as present and voting, the excessive resort to abstention by the Afro-Asian states helped diminish their influence over the outcome of cold war votes.

Analysis of cold war votes further indicated that the Afro-Asian coalition found itself on the losing side of the voting alignment more frequently as its membership increased and as it came to make up a larger portion of the total Assembly. Seven of the 18 cases in which the Afro-Asian states were overruled by the Assembly happened during the fifteenth (1960-61) session, when the coalition's membership was larger than at any previous time.

The assessment of Afro-Asian influence and the evaluation of the coalition's success in the area of cold war questions based on the content of resolutions proposed presents a greater difficulty than similar attempts in the case of racial and colonial issues. In the last two types of issues, most proposed resolutions were sponsored by the Afro-Asian states. This made it possible to compare the type of measures the coalition sought and the type of measures that were actually passed. In the case of cold war issues, however, the Afro-Asian states were basically passive

participants. They mostly voted on measures which other states initiated and which the Afro-Asian states were simply expected to accept or reject. Such proposed resolutions, in themselves, tell us very little if anything at all about what type of measures the Afro-Asian states would have preferred to have adopted. The evaluation of the coalition's success, then, must be made on the basis of whether or not the Assembly adopted measures known to be desired by the Afro-Asian states.⁴⁸ The evaluation will also be based on the success of the few measures which were initiated by Afro-Asian members.

One of the most important aspects of the Afro-Asian states' attitude toward the cold war is their belief that it is the problem of the great powers, who should have the main responsibility for finding a way out of it. It was said in Chapter VI that Afro-Asian states generally preferred to see the great powers negotiate settlements to cold war disputes, and that the smaller states' role was to consider solutions proposed by the great powers. In pursuance of this objective, they generally favored contacts among the major powers for the purpose of alleviating cold war tension. Their fear that they would lose control over their affairs due to the East-West struggle made them become "among the strongest advocates of East-West rapprochement, a sentiment always latent among the smaller and less powerful members of the United

⁴⁸ These are measures compatible with Afro-Asian views on cold war problems, outlined in Chapter VI.

Nations."⁴⁹ In one important instance during the 1952-60 period, the Afro-Asian states found occasion to use their influence in the Assembly to accomplish that purpose and failed. The occasion arose after the failure of the 1959 Paris Summit Conference due to the Eisenhower-Khrushchev duel over the U-2 incident. When the Assembly convened in 1960, the Afro-Asian states sought to cause a resumption of contacts between the American and Soviet heads of governments. Five leading non-aligned states (Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) proposed a draft resolution which was to express the Assembly's desire that the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. "renew their contacts interrupted recently."⁵⁰ The draft resolution was approved by the Assembly, but only after it was amended in such a way that it did not reflect the intention of its sponsors and supporters. As it was passed in the Assembly, on October 5, 1960, the resolution simply recommended co-operation among member states. What makes Afro-Asian defeat on this matter particularly significant is that many of the Afro-Asian delegations at that time operated under the leadership of heads of states and governments. The five sponsors of the emasculated draft resolution were Nkrumah, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Tito--the

⁴⁹H. N. Howard, "The Arab-Asian States in the United Nations," Middle East Journal, VII (Summer, 1953), 284.

⁵⁰Document A/L.317.

foremost champions of non-alignment.

Another favorite target of the Afro-Asian states in relation to the cold war is the arms race. Although they generally tend to believe that, due to the complexity of the problem, a smaller body than the General Assembly has a better chance of arriving at a solution to this problem, they have attempted to put the Assembly on record as favoring the idea of disarmament and the use of savings for economic development of the underdeveloped world. A draft resolution sponsored by Yugoslavia and 13 Afro-Asian states was submitted to the Assembly during the 779th plenary meeting on November 4, 1958, which sought a recommendation that France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union discontinue nuclear weapons testing, reduce their military budgets, and use some of the savings so effected for assistance to the underdeveloped countries.⁵¹ The draft resolution was rejected by an overwhelming margin.⁵²

It was said in Chapter VI that the Afro-Asian states, especially the non-aligned, tend to think of themselves as moderators of the East-West conflict. This is the only goal on which the coalition might have scored any appreciable success in the United Nations in relation to cold war issues. There is no sufficient evidence in the coalition's voting record to indicate that it succeeded in a direct exercise

⁵¹Document A/L.250.

⁵²The vote was 27 for, 41 against, and 13 abstained. GAOR, Session XIII, 1958, p. 430.

of this influence. There is no sufficient evidence, for example, that Afro-Asian proposals designed to alleviate tension were successful. On the other hand, it is possible to expect that the desire of the cold war antagonists to gain Assembly approval of their proposals resulted in their proposing resolutions more moderate than they would have if they did not need the votes of the non-aligned states. It was said earlier that anti-racial and anti-colonial measures passed in the Assembly were largely approved due to the fact that the Afro-Asian states were willing to settle for moderate resolutions. The same thing may be reasonably said of the proposals made by the antagonists in the cold war. It is this possible influence which prompted a writer to remark that "it is obvious that the presence of nonaligned countries in the Assembly has a certain prenatal effect upon the whole UN program."⁵³ Although it is doubtful that this prenatal influence is obvious, it can be reasonably assumed that the non-aligned vote "has occasionally deterred the great powers from submitting proposals which, they anticipated, would incur the negative votes of the nonaligned nations."⁵⁴ It is this type of possible influence which, to use a particular case, prompted the New York Times to comment on the Soviet attack upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations in

⁵³Wilcox, Headline Series, No. 155 (September-October, 1962), p. 20. It must be noted that since not all of the non-aligned states are Afro-Asian states, this prenatal influence is not all Afro-Asian influence.

⁵⁴Ibid.

1960 by saying that "the attitude of the African states... will help determine how hard Mr. Khrushchev presses his attack on the Secretary General."⁵⁵

The Afro-Asian states are not unaware of the fact that the most important source of influence they might have in the General Assembly is in the form of prenatal influence. Speaking to a meeting of the Afro-Asian group in 1958, Kwame Nkrumah said:

Today force is not decisive. Recent experiences would indicate that all powers--great and small--are sensitive to world public opinion and take it into account in deciding their policies. We here represent a large segment of world opinion, and herein lies our strength.⁵⁶

So, whatever influence the Afro-Asian coalition might have had in promoting prevailing Afro-Asian views on the cold war must be sought in the prenatal moderating effect caused by the desire to secure sufficient votes. Unfortunately, as it is the case in all forms of deterrent power, it is not possible to determine the success of such power as it is possible to determine its failure. It is to be expected that states which follow a moderate course on a certain issue will make a virtue out of necessity by not admitting that their moderation stems from necessity--i.e., the need for votes--and not from reasonableness and a desire for conciliation. It was the "liberating genius of France," de Gaulle had said, which made it abandon colonialism.

⁵⁵The New York Times, September 24, 1960.

⁵⁶Ghana Information Service, p. 24.

Other Questions:

Other than racial, colonial, and cold war issues, the work of the General Assembly dealt with questions among which economic assistance and general political disputes are the most relevant to the subject of this analysis. Even these two types of issues, however, do not particularly lend themselves as very useful aids in this attempt to evaluate Afro-Asian achievement in the General Assembly. In the case of general political questions, because such questions were invariably of direct interest to one or a few Afro-Asian states,⁵⁷ and because there is no known and predetermined Afro-Asian goal in relation to them, it is difficult to assess the coalition's success. In the case of questions pertaining to economic development, two reasons diminish the usefulness of their analysis as a method of ascertaining Afro-Asian achievement. First, the resources of the United Nations allocated for this purpose have never been great enough to be considered important when measured against the economic and technical needs of the underdeveloped countries. Second, such resources are intended for the use of the underdeveloped countries in any case, and their use in that manner does not explain much about the success or the lack of success of the coalition. For these reasons, the following part of this evaluation must be considered as of minor significance in the analysis of Afro-Asian success in the Assembly.

⁵⁷For example, the problems of Palestine, Kashmir, the Congo, and the Suez crisis.

The two most important general political disputes which were dealt with by the Assembly and which can be used to illustrate the conditions of Afro-Asian success are the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, and the post-independence crisis in the Congo. The handling of these two problems in the Assembly indicates that--in the case of disputes which are neither racial, colonial, or cold war problems--the effectiveness of the Afro-Asian coalition is largely determined by whether or not they could identify themselves with the problem in question. The direct involvement of France and Britain in the attack against Egypt could not help but fan Afro-Asian ever-present suspicion that former colonial powers have never really accepted the independence of their erstwhile colonies. This fear, which has been likened to "the ingrained French fear of Germany,"⁵⁸ helps to rally Afro-Asian sentiment and opinion whenever there seems to be a clear-cut case of direct threat to the independence of an Afro-Asian state by a colonial power. The attack on Egypt was such a case, and consequently the solidarity of Afro-Asian states and the vehemence of their support were the most remarkable ever manifested by the coalition on a general political problem.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Chatham House Study Group's Report, p. 92.

⁵⁹For the text of speeches made on that occasion see GAOR, Special Emergency Session I, 1956. For roll-call votes see ibid., pp. 34, 71, 89, and 126-27, and GAOR, Session XI, 1956, p. 306.

The crisis in the Congo, on the other hand, did not seem to present as clear-cut a case of an ex-colonial power threatening the sovereignty of an Afro-Asian state. Although Belgian troops were sent to the Congo, the civil war characteristics of the problem over-shadowed the Belgian-Congolese aspect of the dispute, and for this reason it was more difficult than it was in the Egyptian case for the Afro-Asian states to identify the dispute with resurgent colonialism. Unlike the Egyptian case, the Congolese crisis divided the Afro-Asian coalition not only over its solution, but also over the question of what the crisis was really about. Lamenting this situation, the Liberian delegate to the Assembly said that not only has there been "no common and agreed policy coming from the Asian and African States," but their whole approach to the question was a study in confusion.

Our voice, indeed, has been truly loud [he said], but it has not been concerted nor concise, and the constant bickerings among African States have sown the seeds of confusion and bewilderment in the minds of the Congolese.⁶⁰

The Liberian representative continued to say that the Afro-Asian confusion had hampered the Assembly's efforts to deal with the problem.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the coalition's effectiveness in relation to general political questions is largely dependent on whether or not it sees in a particular dispute a threat to its most basic stated goal--the attainment

⁶⁰GAOR, Session XV, Part II, 1960-61, p. 143.

and the preservation of Afro-Asian freedom from foreign rule.

As far as the Afro-Asian goal of economic betterment is concerned, there has been little occasion during the period studied to test the coalition's effectiveness in using the General Assembly for the fulfillment of that goal. The Assembly did, however, pass a few resolutions which incorporated economic objectives pursued by the Afro-Asian states. During the seventh session (1952), for example, it adopted an Afro-Asian supported resolution recommending that countries importing primary commodities should consider the effect of measures which they might adopt and which would affect prices and, consequently, the economies of the exporting underdeveloped countries.⁶¹ This resolution, which in effect suggested that the industrialized countries have some responsibility toward the underdeveloped world, at least vaguely reflects Afro-Asian contentions that Europe was partially responsible for the Afro-Asian countries' poverty and backwardness by burdening them with raw material economies. But the resemblance between the Afro-Asian charge and the resolution is so slight, and undoubtedly unintended as a confession, that the resolution cannot be reasonably interpreted as the prevalence of Afro-Asian economic views.

In conclusion, it may be said that the coalition's success in having the General Assembly adopt resolutions endorsing Afro-Asian goals in regard to matters with which

⁶¹Resolution 623 (VII).

its members are concerned is quite small. Moreover, it may be concluded that whatever success the coalition did have was mostly due to their willingness to moderate their views, and to the development outside the United Nations of an international atmosphere which favored the fulfillment of Afro-Asian aspirations.

CONCLUSIONS

This study of Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations shows that the solidarity of the Afro-Asian states is directly related to their ability to relate themselves to the type of problem with which the Assembly is concerned. In cases which are directly relevant to Afro-Asian territories and peoples, the group is not only more cohesive, but its members are less likely to abstain, more likely to support United Nations involvement, and more likely to take an active role in sponsoring resolutions and in debating the issues. In cases where the relevance of the problem to Afro-Asia's concerns is less direct, the Afro-Asian states' cohesion is lower, their non-voting is higher, their support for United Nations involvement is more reluctant, and their role in initiating and advocating measures is more passive.

Furthermore, this study shows that although racialism and colonialism are the two types of problems with which the Afro-Asian group relates itself most closely, it tends to detect these problems in practically all the issues dealt with by the Assembly. For this reason, it may be said that Afro-Asian solidarity on other than racial and colonial problems is partially induced solidarity, generated by the supposed racial and colonial overtones which the Afro-Asian states

believe to occupy most international problems.

Analysis of the voting behavior and the views of Afro-Asian states on various types of problems shows that although the Afro-Asian states constitute a distinct alignment in the General Assembly, the alignment is more of a coalition than a unified bloc. Only on racial questions does the alignment operate as a solid bloc. On all other questions, it not only fractures into three subdivisions representing distinct political attitudes, but the subdivisions are generally the same regardless of the type of issue involved. This indicates that the division among Afro-Asian ranks represents a severe limitation on interaction among the members of the alignment. The fact that one Afro-Asian state is not likely to find itself aligned with different Afro-Asian states under different circumstances, may lead to the hardening of these divisions and the eventual break-up of the coalition.

Finally, this study shows that the Afro-Asian coalition's ability to gain acceptance for its policies was severely limited during the period studied. The major part of its achievement consisted of its ability to have the Assembly deal with the grievances of its members. But, with the exception of racialism, failure to have the Assembly adopt favorable substantive measures pertaining to such grievances generally characterized Afro-Asian performance in the General Assembly.

NOTE ON METHOD

Although the text of this dissertation gives some information about the method of the study, a few points about methodology need to be elaborated upon here. These points pertain to the collection and classification of data, and to the statistical methods employed.

The bulk of the data used in this dissertation was taken from the Official Records of the General Assembly. All roll-call votes were recorded on data sheets showing "yes," "no," and "abstain" votes, as well as absenteeism. There were 428 roll-call votes taken during the 1952-1960 period studied, out of which 76 votes were unanimous. The unanimous votes were not used on the ground that they could hardly be useful in showing group affiliations, cohesion, or attitudes.

The remaining 352 votes were then classified by type of issue. The classification was based on the subject matter of the resolutions voted upon. A vote on amendments to resolutions was given the same classification as the provision being amended. This classification system yielded the following categories of issues: racial, colonial, cold war, general political, procedural, and agenda. Other types of questions, like economic matters and matters pertaining to

the internal organization and financing of the United Nations, were not represented by enough roll-call votes to justify statistical analysis. In spite of this fact, economic questions were dealt with in Part II because, although they accounted for very few roll-calls, there was enough discussion of them in the records to show Afro-Asian views on the subject.

It was said earlier that roll-call votes were classified on the basis of the subject matter of the resolutions on which they were taken. Some votes, however, were taken on resolutions containing reference to more than one of the categories of questions listed above. A study of statements made during debates or in explanation of votes clearly indicates that very frequently states are not in agreement on what the vote or the debate is really about. In such cases, a judgment had to be made on whether or not more than one type of question was at issue, and what type of questions were actually involved. It was decided that some of these votes did actually involve more than one type of issue. An example of these "dual votes" is the series of roll-calls on the inclusion in the agenda of the item pertaining to Chinese representation in the United Nations. Such votes obviously included more than an expression of attitudes concerning the inscription of the item on the agenda; they were also votes on a matter which figures prominently in the East-West controversy. For this reason, it was classified both as an agenda and as a cold war question.

In other cases, votes were classified under only one

type of issue although debates concerning them gave the impression that more than one type of problem was involved. An example of such votes was the series of votes pertaining to the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. To many Afro-Asian states, the invasion had the infelicitous marks of resurgent colonialism. The Soviet bloc members injected the East-West controversy into the debates. In spite of this fact, the problem was classified as a general political issue. The decision was made on the ground that Afro-Asian states tend to smell the colonial rat in practically every controversy between one of their members and a Western power's attempts to assert or reassert their position around the world. For this reason, the dispute was viewed as a political dispute in which racial, colonial, and cold war considerations were either absent or just superimposed, and it was categorized as a general political issue.

For purposes of measuring voting solidarity and identifying voting clusters, two statistical methods were used. The first method was Stuart A. Rice's index of cohesion,¹ used in Chapters II and III. Briefly, the index of cohesion method is a statistical tool for the quantitative determination of voting agreement among a group of voters. It is a simple method which works as follows:

A calculation is made of affirmative and of negative votes cast by the group's members on every vote. The index

¹Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925).

of cohesion of the group on a particular vote is then found from the formula

$$I = \frac{V_m}{V_t} \times 100$$

"I" being the index of cohesion, "V_m" the number of states voting with the majority (abstainers excluded), and "V_t" the total number of states voting "yes" and "no."

The above equation yields an index of cohesion between 50 (for an even split in the group's vote) and 100 (for a perfect, i.e. no opposition, record). In order to facilitate the presentation and the understanding of results, the index of cohesion may be converted--as it was in this study--from the 50-scale which the equation gives to a scale of 100. This conversion expands the scale from 0 for an evenly-divided vote to 100.

The index of cohesion method has one limitation as far as its applicability to this study is concerned. It takes no account of abstentions or non-voting. It is based on affirmative and negative (opposing) positions, and does not consider differing votes. For this reason, except in cases where all states vote either "yes" or "no" the index of cohesion will be an accurate measure of disagreement but will tend to exaggerate the extent of agreement. In other words, the index of cohesion represents solidarity defined as the absence of disagreement, but it does not necessarily represent an accurate measure of solidarity defined as the presence of agreement. In order to correct for this method's neglect of abstentions and non-voting, a separate calculation of these "votes" was

made in Chapter III.

The second statistical method, used for identifying blocs in Chapter V, was developed by Arend Lijphart.² The basic functional difference between Rice's index of cohesion and this method is that while the index of cohesion is designed to measure cohesiveness among the members of an already identified or chosen group, this method is designed to identify groups not previously known, strictly on the basis of their voting record.

This method works as follows: a calculation is made of the frequency of agreement and disagreement between every pair of states studied. These frequencies are then expressed in percent of total votes considered. A decision is then made on the level of agreement which must exist among a number of states for them to qualify as a voting bloc or cluster. This level of agreement may be expressed in terms of net agreement, meaning the percent of votes on which states voted alike minus the percent of votes on which they opposed each other.

Once this is done, voting blocs are identified as is shown by the following simple example: states A, B, C, D, E, and F constitute the total group. Net agreement between all pairs of members is given in the following table:

	A	B	C	D	E	F
A						
B	95					
C	60	68				
D	52	59	91			
E	39	40	87	88		
F	85	90	65	60	55	

²Lijphart, The American Political Science Review, LVII (December, 1963), 902-917.

Suppose we designate 80% net agreement as the level of agreement necessary for membership in a voting bloc. The problem is to find subgroups within the total group. The six states belonging to the total group are arranged according to a decreasing level of agreement with state A. This process yields the following arrangement: A, B, F, C, D, E. The net agreement table is then re-arranged according to this new order as follows:

	B	F	C	D	E
A	95	85	60	52	39
B		90	68	59	40
F			65	60	55
C				91	87
D					88

Visual inspection of the table shows that large numbers cluster together, indicating voting blocs. In this example, it is obvious that countries A, B, and F represent one voting bloc, and countries C, D, and E represent another.

APPENDIXES

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Appendices B, C, D, E, and F give the percentage of agreement and disagreement between all pairs of Afro-Asian states. For the purpose of conserving space, some information appears in a coded form. The numbers which appear in the extreme left column and the top row on every page in these appendices are code numbers for the members of the Afro-Asian group. The following is a list of these countries and the numbers used in the appendices to identify them:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Country</u>
1	Afghanistan	24	Laos
2	Burma	25	Lebanon
3	Cambodia	26	Liberia
4	Cameroon	27	Libya
5	Central African Rep.	28	Madagascar
6	Ceylon	29	Mali
7	Chad	30	Morocco
8	Congo (Brazzaville)	31	Nepal
9	Congo (Leopoldville)	32	Niger
10	Dahomey	33	Nigeria
11	Egypt	34	Pakistan
12	Ethiopia	35	Philippines
13	Fed. of Malaya	36	Saudi Arabia
14	Gabon	37	Senegal
15	Ghana	38	Somalia
16	Guinea	39	Sudan
17	India	40	Syria
18	Indonesia	41	Thailand
19	Iran	42	Togo
20	Iraq	43	Tunisia
21	Ivory Coast	44	Upper Volta
22	Japan	45	Yemen
23	Jordan		

The letters "A" and "D" which appear in the vertical headings refer to agreement and disagreement, respectively.

Naturally, the percentages of agreement and disagreement given in the appendixes do not add up to 100% in all cases, because of abstention and non-voting. Agreement and disagreement include identical and opposing votes, respectively. Cases where states neither agreed nor disagreed (e.g., when one voted "yes" and the other voted "abstain") would be equal to $[100 - (A + D)]\%$.

APPENDIX A

AFRO-ASIAN GROUP: DATES OF ADMISSION AND AFFILIATIONS

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>	<u>Affiliations</u>
Afghanistan	November 19, 1946	
Burma	April 19, 1948	
Cambodia	December 14, 1955	
Cameroun	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Central African Rep.	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Ceylon	December 14, 1955	Commonwealth
Chad	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Congo (Brazzaville)	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Congo (Leopoldville)	September 20, 1960	
Dahomey	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Egypt (U. A. R.)	Charter Member	Arab League Casablanca
Ethiopia	Charter Member	
Fed. of Malaya	September 17, 1957	Commonwealth
Gabon	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Ghana	March 8, 1957	Commonwealth Casablanca
Guinea	December 12, 1958	Casablanca
India	Charter Member	Commonwealth
Indonesia	September 28, 1950	
Iran	Charter Member	CENTO
Iraq	Charter Member	Arab League CENTO (to 1959)
Ivory Coast	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Japan	December 18, 1955	Bilateral alliance with the U. S.
Jordan	December 14, 1955	Arab League
Laos	December 14, 1955	

APPENDIX A--Continued

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>	<u>Affiliations</u>
Lebanon	Charter Member	Arab League
Liberia	Charter Member	
Libya	December 14, 1955	Arab League
Madagascar	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Mali	September 20, 1960	Cessablanca
Morocco	November 12, 1956	Arab League Cessablanca
Nepal	December 14, 1955	
Niger	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Nigeria	October 7, 1960	Commonwealth
Pakistan	September 30, 1947	Commonwealth CENTO SEATO
Philippines	Charter Member	SEATO
Saudi Arabia	Charter Member	Arab League
Senegal	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Somalia	September 20, 1960	
Sudan	November 12, 1956	Arab League
Syria	Charter Member ¹	Arab League
Thailand	December 16, 1946	SEATO
Togo	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Tunisia	November 12, 1956	Arab League
Upper Volta	September 20, 1960	Brazzaville
Yemen	September 30, 1947	Arab League

¹Relinquished its seat after merging with Egypt in 1958.

APPENDIX B
PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGREEMENT (A) AND DISAGREEMENT (D) ON
RACIAL ISSUES: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2	94	0												
3	88	0	100	0										
4	100	0	80	0	80	0								
5	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0						
6	88	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0				
7	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0		
8	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
9	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
10	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
11	100	0	97	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
12	100	0	97	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
13	87	0	93	0	93	0	80	0	80	0	93	0	80	0
14	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
15	100	0	93	0	93	0	100	0	100	0	93	0	100	0
16	100	0	83	0	83	0	100	0	100	0	83	0	100	0
17	94	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
18	97	0	97	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
19	91	0	97	0	94	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	80	0
20	97	0	97	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
21	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	80	0	60	0
22	76	6	76	0	76	0	60	6	60	6	76	0	60	6
23	71	0	71	0	71	0	100	0	100	0	71	0	100	0
24	71	0	76	0	76	0	80	0	80	0	76	0	80	0
25	88	0	94	0	94	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	80	0
26	94	0	94	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	88	0	100	0
27	88	0	88	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	88	0	100	0
28	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
29	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
30	82	0	82	0	82	0	100	0	100	0	82	0	100	0
31	94	0	94	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	88	0	100	0
32	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
33	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
34	91	0	97	0	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
35	94	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
36	97	0	97	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
37	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
38	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
39	94	0	94	0	94	0	100	0	80	0	94	0	100	0
40	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
41	91	0	94	0	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
42	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
43	94	0	94	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0
44	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
45	82	0	82	0	94	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

	8		9		10		11		12		13		14	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9	100	0												
10	100	0	100	0										
11	100	0	100	0	100	0								
12	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0						
13	80	0	80	0	80	0	87	0	87	0				
14	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0		
15	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
16	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	83	0	100	0
17	80	0	80	0	80	0	97	0	97	0	93	0	80	0
18	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
19	80	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	94	0	87	0	80	0
20	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	97	0	87	0	100	0
21	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0
22	60	6	60	6	60	6	76	6	76	6	80	0	60	6
23	100	0	100	0	100	0	76	0	76	0	67	0	100	0
24	80	0	80	0	80	0	71	0	71	0	93	0	80	0
25	80	0	80	0	80	0	91	0	91	0	87	0	80	0
26	100	0	100	0	100	0	97	0	97	0	93	0	100	0
27	100	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	94	0	80	0	100	0
28	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
29	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
30	100	0	100	0	100	0	88	0	88	0	73	0	100	0
31	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
32	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
33	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
34	80	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	94	0	93	0	80	0
35	80	0	80	0	80	0	97	0	97	0	93	0	80	0
36	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
37	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
38	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
39	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
40	100	0	100	0	75	0
41	80	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	94	0	93	0	80	0
42	80	0	80	0	80	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0
43	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	87	0	100	0
44	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0
45	100	0	100	0	100	0	85	0	85	0	87	0	100	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

	15		16		17		18		19		20		21	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
16	100	0												
17	93	0	83	0										
18	100	0	100	0	97	0								
19	87	0	67	0	97	0	94	0						
20	100	0	100	0	97	0	100	0	94	0				
21	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0	60	0		
22	87	7	67	17	76	0	76	6	71	0	76	6	60	0
23	73	0	83	0	71	0	76	0	71	0	76	0	60	0
24	80	0	67	0	76	0	71	0	76	0	71	0	60	0
25	87	0	83	0	94	0	91	0	91	0	91	0	60	0
26	93	0	100	0	94	0	97	0	91	0	97	0	60	0
27	93	0	83	0	88	0	94	0	88	0	94	0	60	0
28	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
29	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
30	87	0	83	0	82	0	88	0	82	0	88	0	60	0
31	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0	88	0	100	0	60	0
32	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
33	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
34	93	0	83	0	97	0	94	0	94	0	94	0	60	0
35	93	0	83	0	100	0	97	0	97	0	97	0	60	0
36	100	0	100	0	97	0	100	0	94	0	100	0	60	0
37	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
38	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
39	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0	88	0	100	0	60	0
40	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
41	93	0	83	0	97	0	94	0	94	0	94	0	60	0
42	80	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	60	0
43	100	0	100	0	94	0	100	0	88	0	100	0	60	0
44	100	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	80	0	100	0	60	0
45	100	0	100	0	82	0	85	0	79	0	85	0	60	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

	22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
16														
17														
18														
19														
20														
21														
22														
23	6	6												
24	65	0	59	0										
25	71	0	65	0	71	0								
26	71	6	76	0	76	0	88	0						
27	71	6	76	0	71	0	82	0	88	0				
28	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0		
29	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
30	65	6	71	0	65	0	82	0	82	0	88	0	100	0
31	76	6	76	0	71	0	88	0	94	0	94	0	100	0
32	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
33	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
34	76	0	71	0	76	0	91	0	91	0	88	0	80	0
35	76	0	71	0	76	0	94	0	94	0	88	0	80	0
36	76	6	76	0	71	0	91	0	97	0	94	0	100	0
37	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
38	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
39	76	6	76	0	71	0	88	0	94	0	76	0	100	0
40	75	0	50	0	50	0	91	0	96	0	100	0
41	76	0	71	0	76	0	91	0	91	0	88	0	80	0
42	60	0	80	0	100	0	60	0	20	0	80	0	80	0
43	76	6	76	0	71	0	88	0	94	0	94	0	100	0
44	60	20	100	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
45	76	6	76	0	71	0	79	0	82	0	94	0	100	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

	29		30		31		32		33		34		35	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
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18														
19														
20														
21														
22														
23														
24														
25														
26														
27														
28														
29														
30	100	0												
31	100	0	88	0										
32	100	0	100	0	100	0								
33	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0						
34	80	0	82	0	94	0	80	0	80	0				
35	80	0	82	0	94	0	80	0	80	0	97	0		
36	100	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	85	0	97	0
37	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0
38	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0
39	100	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	94	0
40	83	0	100	0	96	0	100	0
41	80	0	82	0	94	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	97	0
42	80	0	80	0	80	0	80	0	80	0	100	0	100	0
43	100	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	94	0
44	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0
45	100	0	88	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	82	0	82	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

	36		37		38		39		40		41		42	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
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25														
26														
27														
28														
29														
30														
31														
32														
33														
34														
35														
36														
37	100	0												
38	100	0	100	0										
39	100	0	100	0	100	0								
40	100	0	100	0						
41	94	0	80	0	80	0	94	0	96	0				
42	80	0	80	0	80	0	80	0	100	0		
43	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	94	0	80	0
44	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	80	0	80	0
45	85	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	78	0	79	0	80	0

APPENDIX B--Continued

43		44	
A	D	A	D
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40			
41			
42			
43			
44	100 0		
45	100 0	100 0	

APPENDIX C
PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGREEMENT (A) AND DISAGREEMENT (D) ON
COLONIAL ISSUES: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2	83	2												
3	40	7	51	4										
4	33	29	43	29	38	5								
5	43	29	57	24	62	5	71	5						
6	78	2	88	0	53	4	33	29	48	24				
7	62	29	62	29	62	5	71	0	76	5	62	29		
8	38	29	43	24	48	5	57	5	71	0	33	24	62	5
9	29	10	38	10	38	5	43	0	38	0	29	10	43	5
10	38	24	33	24	33	5	48	5	62	0	43	24	62	5
11	87	0	86	1	44	7	29	29	43	24	86	4	57	29
12	74	2	79	1	51	4	29	29	43	24	90	0	57	29
13	82	10	82	8	44	5	33	33	52	24	82	8	52	33
14	33	33	48	29	62	5	48	0	62	5	38	29	67	0
15	90	3	80	3	46	8	33	29	48	24	95	2	62	29
16	84	3	87	0	48	6	29	29	43	24	100	0	57	29
17	87	1	94	0	51	4	38	29	52	24	90	0	67	29
18	82	2	87	1	51	4	33	28	57	24	84	0	62	29
19	76	3	80	1	53	4	29	19	52	14	67	4	48	19
20	85	3	85	2	46	7	29	29	43	24	88	4	57	29
21	52	38	57	33	62	5	57	5	67	5	62	33	76	5
22	44	22	47	16	49	4	19	10	24	10	51	18	29	14
23	71	2	76	0	38	4	19	29	29	24	78	0	43	29
24	33	11	36	9	58	0	33	0	52	0	36	7	48	0
25	78	1	78	2	49	4	29	29	43	24	76	2	57	29
26	84	3	77	4	47	4	33	29	47	24	84	2	57	29
27	87	2	87	0	47	7	33	29	48	24	89	2	62	29
28	58	38	52	33	57	5	62	5	71	5	52	33	81	5
29	81	0	71	0	43	10	24	29	29	24	81	0	43	29
30	91	0	87	0	40	4	29	29	43	24	89	0	57	29
31	84	0	91	0	51	4	38	29	51	24	89	0	67	29
32	52	43	43	29	52	5	57	5	67	0	48	33	71	10
33	81	0	100	0	67	10	43	29	57	24	90	0	62	29
34	76	12	73	6	38	7	29	33	48	24	63	12	48	33
35	63	12	66	6	44	7	24	19	48	5	49	12	43	19
36	86	1	80	1	40	7	19	29	33	24	82	4	48	29
37	43	24	57	24	71	5	57	0	76	0	48	24	71	0
38	81	0	86	0	57	5	38	24	48	19	76	0	57	24
39	89	2	91	0	44	7	33	29	48	24	91	2	62	29
40	84	0	83	2	21	5	63	10
41	57	17	57	8	51	2	38	10	38	5	43	16	43	14
42	81	0	71	0	43	5	33	24	43	19	67	0	57	24
43	87	2	87	2	49	4	38	29	57	24	87	0	62	29
44	24	29	43	29	52	5	62	0	67	5	33	29	62	0
45	84	0	82	1	38	7	24	29	33	24	84	4	48	29

APPENDIX C—Continued

	15		16		17		18		19		20		21	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
16	100	0												
17	93	0	100	0										
18	95	0	97	0	90	1								
19	74	5	77	6	82	1	80	2						
20	95	0	100	0	90	1	87	0	85	3				
21	57	33	57	38	52	33	52	29	62	24	57	38		
22	51	18	55	19	47	16	44	13	60	13	51	22	43	19
23	80	0	87	0	82	0	78	0	65	2	84	0	33	38
24	33	8	32	10	33	7	33	7	44	7	36	11	48	0
25	90	3	100	0	77	0	76	1	72	2	81	2	48	38
26	82	5	94	0	78	2	76	3	75	4	82	3	52	38
27	90	0	100	0	93	0	91	0	80	2	100	0	52	38
28	52	33	52	38	48	33	48	29	57	24	52	38	95	0
29	81	0	86	0	76	0	71	0	57	10	86	0	43	38
30	92	0	100	0	89	0	87	0	73	4	96	0	57	38
31	87	0	94	0	96	0	92	0	76	0	93	0	51	33
32	48	33	43	48	43	33	43	29	48	19	48	38	76	0
33	90	0	86	0	95	0	90	0	76	0	86	0	51	33
34	80	13	87	10	74	5	72	6	78	6	77	10	57	33
35	54	10	61	13	64	6	65	6	73	7	68	12	43	19
36	92	0	100	0	84	0	82	1	82	3	95	2	48	38
37	48	24	43	24	51	24	57	24	51	14	43	24	71	0
38	76	0	76	0	81	0	76	0	67	5	81	0	51	33
39	95	0	100	0	91	0	91	0	80	4	100	0	51	38
40	71	0	81	0	79	2	92	2	94	3
41	44	20	45	19	57	8	54	8	60	6	62	14	48	10
42	71	0	76	0	76	0	71	0	51	5	76	0	38	33
43	90	2	97	0	82	0	82	0	69	11	82	7	57	38
44	33	29	29	29	38	29	43	29	38	19	29	29	62	0
45	90	0	97	0	82	0	80	1	81	3	93	2	48	38

APPENDIX C--Continued

	22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
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11														
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16														
17														
18														
19														
20														
21														
22														
23	38	16												
24	51	2	22	7										
25	49	13	67	0	36	7								
26	47	18	63	2	38	7	70	2						
27	40	20	84	0	29	9	84	0	76	4				
28	38	19	29	38	52	0	43	38	57	38	48	38		
29	33	24	62	0	24	5	81	0	81	0	81	0	38	38
30	40	20	80	0	27	7	82	0	78	2	89	0	51	38
31	42	13	78	0	29	4	84	0	75	0	90	0	48	33
32	38	14	24	43	51	0	38	38	51	38	43	38	86	0
33	33	14	71	0	48	0	86	0	81	0	90	0	51	33
34	58	7	52	10	38	7	68	6	73	10	69	16	62	33
35	69	2	37	10	51	2	63	6	70	10	49	16	48	19
36	42	22	78	0	24	11	84	0	77	4	91	0	43	38
37	38	10	33	29	51	0	43	24	38	24	48	24	67	0
38	29	19	67	0	48	5	81	0	81	0	86	0	51	33
39	44	20	87	0	31	11	88	0	78	4	98	0	48	38
40	25	33	100	0	10	10	78	0	73	6	63	0
41	71	0	35	16	60	0	55	8	62	14	38	20	51	10
42	19	24	71	0	38	5	76	0	81	0	81	0	43	33
43	49	13	76	0	40	7	89	0	87	0	84	0	57	38
44	24	5	14	29	38	0	29	29	24	29	33	29	57	0
45	38	22	76	0	22	11	81	0	76	3	91	0	43	38

APPENDIX C--Continued

	29		30		31		32		33		34		35	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
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25														
26														
27														
28														
29														
30	86	0												
31	76	0	87	0										
32	33 38		48 36		43 33									
33	71 0		86 0		95 0		43 29							
34	57 14		69 16		64 11		51 28		76 5					
35	38 19		47 16		49 11		51 10		48 5		75 2			
36	76 0		89 0		82 0		38 38		76 0		76 10		65 10	
37	29 24		43 24		51 24		67 0		57 24		43 24		38 5	
38	67 0		81 0		81 0		43 29		86 0		71 10		43 10	
39	81 0		91 0		89 0		43 38		90 0		71 18		51 16	
40	76 0		53 0		76 11		70 8	
41	24 29		36 20		38 13		62 10		33 14		63 5		70 3	
42	62 0		76 0		76 0		38 33		71 0		62 10		38 14	
43	71 0		80 0		82 0		48 33		90 0		76 16		58 11	
44	24 29		29 29		36 29		48 0		43 29		24 29		24 10	
45	76 0		87 0		82 0		38 38		76 0		76 10		63 10	

APPENDIX C--Continued

	36		37		38		39		40		41		42	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
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28														
29														
30														
31														
32														
33														
34														
35														
36														
37	38	24												
38	71	0	48	19										
39	96	0	48	24	86	0								
40	98	0					100	0						
41	54	14	43	5	29	19	40	20	60	11				
42	67	0	33	19	76	0	81	0			33	24		
43	82	2	48	24	90	0	87	2	69	8	49	13	81	0
44	19	29	67	0	33	24	33	29			24	5	19	24
45	94	0	33	24	71	0	93	0	98	0	53	14	76	0

APPENDIX C--Continued

43		44	
A	D	A	D
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43			
44	33 29		
45	80 2	19 29	

APPENDIX D
PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGREEMENT (A) AND DISAGREEMENT (D) ON
COLD WAR ISSUES: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2	72	0												
3	67	0	78	0										
4	15	0	8	0	8	0								
5	23	8	15	8	15	0	54	0						
6	86	0	82	0	63	0	15	0	15	8				
7	23	15	15	15	15	8	54	0	85	0	15	15		
8	15	0	8	0	8	0	54	0	54	0	15	0	54	0
9	0	20	0	20	0	0	0	0	81	0	0	40	60	0
10	15	8	8	8	8	0	62	0	85	0	15	15	77	0
11	85	0	68	2	59	1	15	0	15	8	81	0	15	15
12	35	9	37	13	43	6	15	0	15	8	49	11	15	15
13	9	21	16	21	23	11	46	0	69	0	5	23	62	0
14	0	15	0	15	0	8	46	0	62	0	0	23	69	0
15	86	0	80	0	68	0	15	0	15	8	89	0	15	15
16	67	0	54	0	50	0	8	0	8	23	71	0	8	31
17	80	0	74	0	59	1	15	0	15	8	86	0	15	15
18	84	0	79	1	62	1	0	0	0	8	86	0	0	15
19	19	22	35	27	30	20	0	0	38	0	22	30	31	0
20	50	7	53	12	59	3	15	0	15	8	66	10	15	15
21	15	15	8	15	8	8	62	0	77	0	15	23	84	0
22	7	31	18	31	20	25	0	0	23	0	8	33	31	0
23	38	23	34	23	41	23	0	0	8	0	33	26	0	0
24	15	6	27	6	34	4	62	0	85	0	25	8	77	0
25	40	21	36	24	38	19	15	0	15	15	47	26	15	23
26	18	20	29	24	36	19	0	0	23	0	22	26	15	0
27	55	4	49	4	51	0	54	0	46	8	53	4	46	15
28	15	15	8	15	8	0	62	0	77	0	15	23	85	0
29	77	0	77	8	69	8	0	0	0	8	85	0	0	15
30	74	5	67	5	59	2	15	0	15	23	69	5	15	31
31	73	0	84	0	67	0	8	0	8	8	85	0	8	15
32	15	15	8	15	8	8	62	0	77	0	15	23	85	0
33	85	0	77	0	69	0	15	0	23	8	92	0	15	23
34	21	22	33	26	33	24	0	0	31	0	18	33	38	0
35	9	27	23	31	29	25	0	0	23	0	19	34	31	0
36	67	0	48	0	49	0	62	0	54	8	55	0	54	15
37	62	8	54	8	54	0	15	0	46	0	62	15	38	0
38	23	8	23	8	23	0	62	0	85	0	23	8	85	8
39	82	0	74	0	57	0	15	0	15	8	77	0	15	15
40	90	0	64	0	48	5	69	5
41	12	26	24	29	30	23	0	0	23	0	20	34	31	0
42	23	8	15	8	15	0	62	0	77	0	23	8	77	8
43	23	2	34	2	41	0	46	0	69	0	28	2	69	8
44	46	0	38	0	31	0	62	0	54	8	46	8	54	15
45	88	0	71	0	63	0	15	0	15	8	82	0	15	15

APPENDIX D--Continued

	8		9		10		11		12		13		14	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9	0	0												
10	54	0	100	0										
11	8	0	0	40	15	15								
12	23	0	0	40	15	15	42	10						
13	38	0	100	0	85	0	5	23	26	12				
14	38	0	80	0	77	0	0	23	0	23	77	0		
15	15	0	0	40	15	15	89	0	61	11	9	23	0	23
16	8	0	0	80	8	31	71	0	58	0	0	25	0	38
17	15	0	0	40	15	15	79	2	37	13	5	23	0	31
18	0	0	0	40	0	15	81	0	36	10	5	30	0	31
19	0	0	80	0	31	0	27	23	41	11	63	0	23	0
20	15	0	0	40	15	15	55	8	61	5	19	14	0	23
21	54	0	80	0	92	0	15	23	15	23	77	0	85	0
22	0	0	80	0	31	0	7	34	23	20	61	0	38	0
23	0	0	20	0	8	0	40	22	26	18	49	0	0	0
24	54	0	100	0	100	0	12	8	32	6	60	0	77	0
25	15	0	0	60	15	23	45	21	45	10	33	7	0	31
26	0	0	60	20	23	8	17	20	50	10	58	2	15	8
27	46	0	0	40	54	15	56	6	41	3	40	7	46	23
28	54	0	80	0	92	0	15	15	15	23	77	0	85	0
29	0	0	0	40	0	15	85	0	85	0	0	31	0	23
30	15	0	0	80	15	31	74	5	51	8	12	26	0	38
31	8	0	0	40	8	15	70	0	44	11	16	23	0	23
32	54	0	80	0	92	0	15	23	15	23	77	0	85	0
33	15	0	20	40	23	15	92	0	92	0	8	15	8	23
34	0	0	60	0	23	0	13	23	35	11	54	0	31	0
35	0	0	80	0	31	0	13	28	47	14	60	0	38	0
36	54	0	0	40	62	15	66	0	30	0	27	5	46	23
37	15	0	100	0	54	0	61	15	61	15	38	0	31	0
38	54	0	60	0	85	0	23	8	23	8	69	0	69	8
39	15	0	0	40	15	15	85	0	46	13	7	23	0	23
40	84	0	23	13	10	40
41	0	0	80	0	31	0	17	27	50	14	63	0	38	0
42	54	0	60	0	85	0	23	8	23	8	69	0	69	8
43	38	0	60	0	69	0	13	2	31	2	60	0	69	8
44	54	0	20	20	69	8	54	0	46	8	54	8	54	15
45	15	0	0	40	15	15	90	0	37	6	7	23	0	23

APPENDIX D--Continued

	15		16		17		18		19		20		21	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
16	71	0												
17	84	0	67	0										
18	80	0	67	0	86	1								
19	9	41	0	50	20	30	22	27						
20	75	9	71	0	48	14	48	8	51	15				
21	15	23	8	38	15	23	0	23	23	0	15	23		
22	11	45	0	58	7	34	8	38	61	0	16	26	38	0
23	18	36	12	38	37	22	37	25	47	6	23	23	0	0
24	11	11	4	25	15	11	14	8	62	0	40	7	92	0
25	36	39	38	33	40	26	40	21	48	2	51	15	15	31
26	14	34	8	46	15	26	17	23	80	0	55	12	15	8
27	50	7	38	4	55	6	58	6	26	4	51	0	54	23
28	15	23	8	39	15	23	0	23	23	0	15	23	100	0
29	85	0	77	0	85	0	100	0	0	69	85	0	0	23
30	82	0	75	0	74	5	74	5	20	33	61	7	15	38
31	73	0	54	0	71	0	75	1	32	29	62	10	8	23
32	15	23	8	39	15	23	0	23	23	0	15	23	100	0
33	92	0	77	8	92	0	77	0	8	54	92	0	23	23
34	9	41	0	54	14	29	20	29	77	1	43	18	31	0
35	7	50	0	58	12	34	11	14	81	0	54	19	38	0
36	43	0	33	0	58	0	64	0	16	1	34	0	62	23
37	62	15	54	38	62	15	46	15	31	46	62	15	46	0
38	23	8	15	23	23	8	8	8	31	0	23	8	85	8
39	89	0	71	0	87	0	84	0	13	34	56	12	15	23
40	64	0	77	0	85	0	23	16	23	16
41	9	48	0	58	13	34	13	31	85	0	56	19	38	0
42	23	8	15	23	23	8	8	8	23	0	23	8	82	8
43	11	2	8	17	21	2	25	5	51	0	26	2	69	8
44	46	8	23	8	46	8	31	8	0	8	46	8	69	15
45	80	0	67	0	82	0	88	0	20	22	47	7	15	23

APPENDIX D--Continued

	22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
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21														
22														
23	48	2												
24	36	0	33	6										
25	43	7	63	1	33	4								
26	57	2	49	7	62	1	55	2						
27	21	8	51	4	44	4	62	3	32	3				
28	38	0	0	0	92	0	15	31	15	8	54	23		
29	0	85	8	62	0	15	31	46	8	62	38	8	0	23
30	8	36	23	26	18	12	43	28	25	28	49	5	15	23
31	16	33	29	26	33	7	37	26	36	26	47	4	8	23
32	38	0	0	0	92	0	15	31	15	8	54	23	100	0
33	8	69	0	46	23	15	46	54	15	46	38	0	23	23
34	56	0	37	7	62	1	39	5	74	1	20	10	31	0
35	66	0	42	7	68	0	53	5	81	1	25	10	38	0
36	8	5	48	0	37	4	43	1	17	1	75	0	62	23
37	31	46	8	46	54	0	15	69	23	54	8	15	46	0
38	23	8	0	0	85	0	23	15	15	0	62	8	85	8
39	8	33	28	26	16	8	39	31	15	30	49	5	15	23
40	15	38	67	7	12	7	38	13	16	18	50	10
41	64	0	52	6	63	0	53	4	81	1	27	8	38	0
42	23	8	0	0	85	0	23	15	15	0	62	8	85	8
43	33	2	41	5	75	0	34	3	51	0	54	2	69	8
44	8	15	8	0	69	8	38	8	0	8	85	8	69	15
45	8	33	40	22	12	7	39	20	16	20	56	4	15	23

APPENDIX D--Continued

	29		30		31		32		33		34		35	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
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28														
29														
30	69	0												
31	85	8	59	5										
32	0	23	15	38	8	15								
33	77	0	85	8	62	0	23	23						
34	0	77	20	34	30	27	31	0	8	62				
35	0	85	16	39	30	32	38	0	8	69	79	1		
36	38	0	46	0	48	0	62	23	46	0	17	5	8	5
37	46	15	62	31	31	15	46	0	69	15	23	46	31	46
38	8	8	23	23	38	8	85	8	31	8	31	8	23	8
39	85	0	79	5	61	0	15	23	92	0	10	34	10	41
40	57	11	62	5	18	13	12	21
41	0	85	20	38	36	26	38	0	8	69	77	0	95	0
42	8	8	23	23	38	8	85	8	31	8	23	8	23	8
43	8	23	23	5	39	2	69	8	15	8	52	3	46	2
44	31	8	31	8	62	8	69	15	38	8	0	15	8	15
45	85	0	72	5	67	0	15	23	92	0	16	23	8	27

APPENDIX D--Continued

	36		37		38		39		40		41		42	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
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36														
37	15	15												
38	69	8	38	0										
39	52	0	62	15	23	8								
40	79	0	75	0						
41	12	5	31	0	23	8	13	39	16	18				
42	69	8	38	0	92	0	23	8	15	8		
43	51	2	23	0	85	0	21	2	21	7	46	2	69	0
44	92	8	23	7	69	8	46	8	8	15	69	8
45	70	0	62	15	23	8	82	0	90	0	12	26	23	8

APPENDIX D--Continued

	43		44	
	A	D	A	D
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44	54	8		
45	18	2	46	8

APPENDIX B
PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGREEMENT (A) AND DISAGREEMENT (D) ON
GENERAL POLITICAL ISSUES: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	A D	A D	A D	A D	A D	A D	A D
2	64 4						
3	64 2	68 0					
4	13 37	33 20	30 10				
5	27 23	30 13	43 7	63 3			
6	91 0	77 4	57 2	20 37	23 23		
7	23 33	53 20	50 10	83 0	60 3	30 33	
8	27 33	37 27	40 10	60 7	73 0	30 37	93 7
9	17 48	22 30	36 22	56 0	65 0	9 44	83 4
10	20 40	40 30	37 13	67 7	67 0	23 43	93 7
11	93 0	66 5	57 6	17 43	27 33	93 0	37 50
12	73 0	77 2	64 0	37 30	33 23	77 2	63 30
13	57 14	70 9	57 7	57 23	33 23	64 14	70 20
14	23 40	30 30	33 13	63 7	70 0	23 40	90 7
15	84 2	71 4	54 2	17 37	23 20	91 4	30 43
16	83 5	63 15	51 15	13 57	13 33	88 5	23 67
17	91 0	77 5	60 2	23 40	17 23	98 0	33 43
18	89 0	73 7	58 6	20 47	20 30	92 0	30 57
19	59 11	61 12	62 8	27 17	27 17	57 17	33 13
20	84 2	64 11	55 9	13 50	20 37	91 4	23 67
21	17 37	40 30	33 10	80 3	60 0	20 40	93 7
22	32 38	46 28	34 18	53 10	43 13	34 42	63 17
23	62 9	70 9	58 9	33 30	27 37	68 9	50 47
24	21 17	30 15	34 6	47 0	47 0	23 21	57 0
25	59 7	59 11	57 11	17 33	23 40	62 9	33 50
26	54 7	70 7	72 6	37 17	43 17	55 11	60 17
27	70 0	74 4	55 6	27 37	23 37	77 2	40 53
28	20 33	37 30	30 10	67 10	53 3	20 37	90 7
29	87 0	57 7	37 3	13 43	17 23	90 3	23 47
30	80 0	64 8	50 8	10 47	17 33	98 2	20 63
31	81 4	70 6	74 6	33 30	43 30	68 6	53 37
32	20 37	43 30	37 10	70 7	60 3	23 40	93 7
33	46 0	58 0	62 0	35 15	19 19	46 4	35 15
34	54 16	57 18	60 11	47 27	50 27	49 23	67 23
35	41 27	45 20	49 13	37 23	27 13	32 32	53 17
36	66 0	64 4	51 4	27 40	17 37	79 2	37 57
37	27 30	57 20	50 7	70 0	53 3	33 30	97 0
38	33 3	57 3	67 0	37 13	43 13	30 7	77 13
39	66 0	80 4	58 6	30 37	27 37	84 2	43 53
40	86 0	79 7	82 9	100 0
41	34 29	34 23	36 17	43 10	27 13	23 34	50 17
42	43 0	73 0	57 0	40 13	37 7	53 3	70 13
43	48 0	72 0	60 0	33 20	40 23	64 2	63 20
44	20 30	37 20	30 13	67 3	57 3	27 30	87 3
45	86 0	67 7	58 6	17 43	30 33	91 0	30 60

APPENDIX E--Continued

	8		9		10		11		12		13		14	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7														
8														
9	61	0												
10	87	0	61	0										
11	30	43	13	56	23	50								
12	37	33	26	44	43	40	75	9						
13	33	30	22	30	47	30	57	18	77	5				
14	90	0	61	0	90	0	23	47	33	40	37	30		
15	37	33	13	44	27	37	82	2	64	4	59	14	27	33
16	23	43	4	65	23	57	88	5	68	15	58	24	20	50
17	23	37	13	48	27	47	89	0	82	2	64	16	20	43
18	23	40	17	56	27	50	95	0	80	5	59	18	20	48
19	20	17	9	17	27	23	50	17	64	7	66	7	20	20
20	30	47	9	56	23	53	98	2	75	11	54	23	27	47
21	80	0	61	0	93	0	20	47	40	37	43	27	83	0
22	43	20	52	0	50	20	28	46	40	28	50	23	43	17
23	30	40	17	52	40	43	72	9	76	9	68	7	37	43
24	50	3	48	0	43	3	17	24	24	13	30	11	47	3
25	20	43	13	52	23	47	70	9	70	9	61	9	17	43
26	37	17	26	17	43	23	48	16	70	4	70	4	40	23
27	27	47	13	56	30	50	83	2	85	6	68	9	27	50
28	77	0	56	0	87	3	20	43	40	33	43	23	77	3
29	27	33	4	48	23	43	80	0	60	7	50	17	23	40
30	27	43	4	56	20	50	96	0	66	10	50	20	27	47
31	40	27	30	39	37	37	70	9	80	4	59	16	33	37
32	87	0	56	0	97	0	23	47	43	37	47	27	87	0
33	23	19	19	27	31	27	42	8	73	0	62	4	23	27
34	30	27	39	22	37	33	48	27	66	11	70	11	30	30
35	30	17	48	1	40	20	34	36	48	20	46	18	33	17
36	23	50	9	56	27	53	86	2	82	5	66	9	23	53
37	67	7	52	9	77	7	30	40	57	23	63	17	67	7
38	40	17	35	22	43	20	27	17	60	0	63	3	40	20
39	30	47	13	56	33	50	88	2	84	6	68	14	23	50
40	100	0	100	0	50	0
41	33	20	39	0	40	20	23	38	38	21	39	18	33	17
42	43	20	26	17	43	20	50	13	73	0	67	0	33	20
43	37	20	26	30	40	27	60	8	80	0	64	2	30	27
44	67	3	56	0	80	3	23	40	43	30	47	20	70	3
45	33	43	17	56	27	50	100	0	77	7	57	16	27	47

APPENDIX B--Continued

	15		16		17		18		19		20		21	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2														
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11														
12														
13														
14														
15														
16	80	7												
17	86	4	88	10										
18	82	2	93	7	96	0								
19	46	16	44	22	62	16	57	16						
20	82	4	88	7	88	4	91	2	52	16				
21	23	33	20	53	23	43	23	47	23	20	20	50		
22	30	46	24	56	34	42	30	44	48	6	30	46	53	17
23	52	14	63	20	70	11	72	11	66	6	74	11	37	40
24	16	23	7	29	23	21	19	23	40	0	17	26	50	3
25	48	14	56	17	64	9	66	9	68	4	71	9	20	27
26	46	11	46	22	55	11	54	14	82	0	48	18	40	20
27	61	7	71	10	76	2	77	2	57	6	83	4	27	48
28	20	33	20	50	23	40	23	43	30	17	20	47	87	3
29	87	0	87	0	90	3	83	0	37	13	80	3	20	40
30	77	2	88	2	84	2	88	0	42	18	98	0	17	47
31	59	9	66	17	72	6	74	9	62	11	70	9	33	33
32	27	33	23	53	27	43	27	47	27	20	23	50	98	0
33	38	8	42	23	54	4	50	12	62	0	38	15	27	23
34	37	25	39	37	55	21	54	25	80	0	52	32	40	30
35	25	36	24	51	38	30	36	34	55	2	38	30	47	20
36	66	4	73	10	80	2	82	2	59	5	88	4	23	50
37	30	33	27	50	37	33	33	40	37	10	27	47	73	7
38	33	7	27	23	37	7	33	13	57	0	27	20	40	17
39	70	7	78	12	84	2	82	2	52	14	84	6	30	47
40	100	0	100	0	86	14	100	0
41	11	36	2	51	27	32	25	36	54	5	32	38	43	50
42	53	7	43	20	53	3	50	10	40	3	47	20	43	20
43	50	4	49	15	64	2	62	6	68	6	58	12	37	23
44	27	27	23	47	27	37	27	40	27	20	23	43	73	3
45	80	2	85	5	88	0	93	0	50	14	96	2	23	20

APPENDIX B--Continued

	22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
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23	42	24												
24	50	4	28	11										
25	44	20	87	0	24	11								
26	46	8	74	9	42	0	64	7						
27	36	32	85	0	21	15	79	0	64	9				
28	50	17	37	37	53	3	23	40	47	17	27	43		
29	3	60	53	10	10	23	40	10	33	7	60	7	20	37
30	26	46	74	10	18	28	64	10	48	20	82	4	17	43
31	36	26	72	15	24	9	64	13	70	9	66	8	37	27
32	53	20	40	40	47	3	23	43	43	20	30	47	83	3
33	23	19	54	12	23	4	54	8	69	0	58	8	35	15
34	62	6	64	13	40	4	66	11	77	4	55	17	47	27
35	78	0	47	19	42	2	48	12	55	5	40	24	37	17
36	36	34	83	2	21	19	77	0	57	7	96	0	23	47
37	50	17	53	27	47	0	37	30	53	10	43	33	67	7
38	30	13	50	23	40	3	53	10	73	0	53	13	43	17
39	36	40	80	6	20	20	76	8	60	10	92	0	30	43
40	80	0	100	0	46	18	93	0	64	7	100	0
41	68	0	32	19	56	4	36	14	45	7	26	26	40	17
42	33	33	47	13	40	13	40	13	57	0	60	10	40	20
43	42	14	70	6	30	6	70	8	76	2	76	6	43	20
44	43	17	33	40	30	3	20	43	40	20	30	40	67	7
45	26	44	76	9	17	23	71	9	50	16	85	2	23	43

APPENDIX B--Continued

	29		30		31		32		33		34		35	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
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28														
29														
30	83	0												
31	53	7	62	10										
32	23	40	20	47	37	33								
33	62	8	35	15	62	4	31	23						
34	23	27	40	30	66	15	37	30	58	0				
35	3	47	26	36	49	17	43	20	35	12	68	2		
36	67	7	84	4	62	9	27	50	54	8	55	16	41	23
37	27	37	23	43	50	27	80	7	50	12	47	20	47	17
38	27	10	27	20	57	7	43	16	69	0	70	7	33	7
39	63	7	82	4	70	8	33	47	58	8	52	26	34	34
40	100	0	82	0	86	7	64	0
41	0	46	12	42	32	19	43	20	39	15	59	4	70	0
42	43	7	43	17	47	10	47	0	69	0	43	10	37	27
43	40	7	56	10	68	2	40	23	69	0	68	8	40	8
44	23	33	20	40	30	33	77	3	31	23	37	30	33	17
45	77	0	94	0	72	9	27	47	42	12	48	25	34	34

APPENDIX E--Continued

	36		37		38		39		40		41		42	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
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37	40	37												
38	43	13	53	10										
39	82	0	47	33	47	13								
40	100	0	100	0						
41	30	27	40	17	37	10	22	32	79	?				
42	60	10	63	13	60	0	63	10	47	30		
43	72	6	57	13	70	3	72	6	88	0	32	10	60	0
44	30	40	63	3	40	17	33	40	37	13	47	3
45	84	2	33	40	30	17	90	2	93	0	23	36	57	13

APPENDIX E--Continued

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45	62 8	23	40

APPENDIX F
PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGREEMENT (A) AND DISAGREEMENT (D) ON
PROCEDURAL ISSUES: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7	
	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	A	D
2	69	6												
3	67	4	67	7										
4	20	30	50	30	40	10								
5	10	40	30	40	20	20	80	10						
6	85	4	70	7	63	4	30	30	30	40				
7	30	30	50	30	40	0	80	10	80	20	50	20		
8	10	50	30	30	20	20	80	10	100	0	30	40	80	20
9	0	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	40	10	20	10	20	30	10	40	10	20	30	30	20
11	71	0	77	3	74	4	40	30	20	40	74	0	40	20
12	57	3	69	3	52	7	50	30	20	40	63	4	80	20
13	72	8	60	4	44	8	30	30	40	30	80	4	50	20
14	0	50	10	40	0	20	50	10	70	0	20	40	50	20
15	68	0	68	4	68	4	40	30	20	40	68	4	40	20
16	52	30	52	22	52	22	30	40	20	60	48	44	40	40
17	77	3	69	3	63	4	40	30	20	40	71	0	40	20
18	77	3	66	3	59	4	30	30	10	40	70	4	30	20
19	46	6	43	11	41	4	50	0	30	10	41	4	40	0
20	49	29	49	26	52	19	40	30	20	40	48	33	40	20
21	20	40	30	30	20	10	50	0	40	0	40	30	50	10
22	41	30	33	22	22	22	40	10	50	0	48	26	50	10
23	41	0	37	4	44	0	50	20	50	30	44	0	50	10
24	37	11	44	11	41	7	30	0	20	0	37	7	20	0
25	43	6	46	9	56	4	50	20	30	30	41	7	50	10
26	60	6	51	11	70	4	50	10	30	20	59	0	50	0
27	59	30	59	18	56	18	40	30	20	40	52	26	40	20
28	10	40	20	40	10	20	60	0	60	0	30	40	60	10
29	80	0	80	10	60	0	30	40	20	60	70	20	40	40
30	52	33	56	18	44	18	40	30	20	40	41	33	40	20
31	52	26	63	15	48	15	50	30	30	40	48	30	50	20
32	20	50	30	40	20	20	50	10	70	0	40	40	50	20
33	70	0	80	0	70	0	30	30	20	30	60	0	30	20
34	29	40	23	31	30	26	40	10	40	20	30	44	60	0
35	37	31	23	34	22	22	60	0	70	0	48	30	60	10
36	86	3	74	6	85	0	40	30	20	40	78	4	40	20
37	40	20	50	20	60	0	60	10	50	10	40	20	60	0
38	60	0	70	0	80	0	40	20	20	30	50	0	40	10
39	67	7	48	0	48	0	50	30	30	40	48	11	50	20
40	83	0	42	0	0	50	75	0
41	46	29	31	34	33	18	50	10	70	0	59	26	60	10
42	60	0	70	0	60	0	40	30	30	30	50	0	40	20
43	52	33	52	22	52	18	50	30	30	40	44	37	50	20
44	40	10	50	0	40	0	20	20	30	20	60	0	40	10
45	86	0	77	6	78	4	40	30	20	40	78	0	40	20

APPENDIX P--Continued

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12	20	40	0	0	0	30	71	3						
13	40	30	0	0	30	30	60	4	60	8				
14	70	0	0	0	40	0	0	40	0	40	30	30		
15	20	40	0	0	0	30	84	0	68	4	52	8	0	40
16	20	6	0	0	0	50	48	22	39	26	35	44	0	60
17	20	40	0	0	0	30	74	0	63	3	48	4	0	40
18	10	40	0	0	0	30	71	0	60	3	48	8	0	40
19	30	10	0	0	20	10	43	9	34	9	40	0	20	10
20	20	40	0	0	0	30	51	26	40	31	24	36	0	40
21	60	0	0	0	40	10	20	30	20	30	30	30	50	0
22	60	0	0	0	30	10	33	30	30	26	60	12	70	0
23	30	30	0	0	0	20	44	0	30	0	32	0	10	30
24	20	0	0	0	30	10	37	11	41	11	40	4	10	0
25	30	30	0	0	0	20	54	11	43	11	32	8	0	30
26	30	20	0	0	10	20	63	11	49	9	48	0	0	20
27	20	4	0	0	0	30	59	22	44	22	32	32	0	40
28	70	0	0	0	50	10	10	40	10	40	60	30	60	0
29	20	60	0	0	0	50	80	0	80	0	40	30	0	60
30	20	40	0	0	0	30	56	22	48	26	28	36	0	40
31	30	40	0	0	10	30	56	19	44	26	28	32	10	40
32	70	0	0	0	40	10	20	40	20	40	30	30	60	0
33	20	30	0	0	10	30	90	0	90	0	50	10	0	30
34	40	20	0	0	30	20	14	37	11	37	32	32	30	20
35	70	0	0	0	50	10	23	34	23	31	56	20	60	0
36	20	40	0	0	0	30	91	3	60	6	52	8	0	40
37	50	10	0	0	20	20	60	20	60	20	30	20	20	10
38	20	30	0	0	0	20	80	20	80	20	30	0	0	30
39	30	40	0	0	10	30	52	4	41	11	40	12	10	40
40	75	0	25	0
41	70	0	0	0	30	10	29	34	23	34	60	12	60	0
42	30	30	0	0	10	30	80	0	80	0	50	0	0	30
43	30	40	0	0	0	30	52	26	37	30	32	32	0	40
44	30	20	0	0	20	20	40	0	40	0	50	0	20	20
45	20	40	0	0	0	30	97	0	66	3	52	4	0	40

APPENDIX F--Continued

	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
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21	20 30	20 50	20 30	49 23	37 14		
22	24 24	4 61	30 30	20 30	20 0	2 30	
23	36 0	30 0	37 0	30 33	37 11	11 63	40 0
24	32 12	9 26	37 15	37 4	41 0	37 26	10 20
25	52 4	48 0	37 11	37 18	74 4	18 30	30 0
26	72 0	35 22	54 17	49 9	51 9	46 3	20 20
27	52 20	83 0	56 33	54 3	60 6	46 20	20 10
28	10 40	10 60	10 40	52 33	33 11	85 0	20 30
29	80 0	100 0	80 0	10 40	40 0	10 40	60 0
30	48 20	83 0	52 30	70 0	20 20	80 0	20 50
31	44 16	74 4	59 26	48 30	22 11	85 0	20 30
32	10 40	20 60	20 40	56 26	33 15	85 0	30 30
33	90 0	70 0	90 0	20 40	20 10	20 40	70 0
34	16 24	52 13	14 51	80 0	20 10	90 0	20 30
35	28 24	9 61	34 43	14 37	40 11	57 14	30 10
36	72 4	56 22	71 3	34 29	40 11	31 49	60 0
37	60 20	40 20	60 20	69 3	40 9	49 26	20 30
38	80 0	60 0	80 0	50 20	20 0	60 20	40 10
39	52 4	61 4	44 7	70 0	40 0	80 0	20 20
40	67 0	44 0	52 0	52 0	30 30
41	24 24	9 65	34 43	67 0	58 17	33 25
42	80 0	60 0	80 0	34 29	43 14	31 54	50 0
43	52 20	83 0	44 33	70 0	20 0	80 0	20 30
44	40 0	40 20	40 0	41 33	33 11	82 4	20 30
45	72 0	48 26	77 0	40 0	30 0	40 0	40 20
				74 0	40 9	49 29	20 30

APPENDIX P--Continued

	22		23		24		25		26		27		28	
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25	11	18	48	0	37	11								
26	30	11	48	0	52	4	54	6						
27	7	48	44	0	22	18	59	0	52	22				
28	60	0	20	20	40	0	10	20	10	10	10	40		
29	0	60	40	0	20	20	60	0	50	0	80	0	10	60
30	4	52	33	0	15	26	52	0	41	22	85	0	10	40
31	11	56	33	0	26	26	48	0	37	18	82	0	20	40
32	50	0	10	3	30	0	20	30	20	20	20	40	60	0
33	0	30	50	0	40	10	70	0	60	0	90	0	20	40
34	33	37	26	4	33	15	26	3	20	17	48	7	50	10
35	67	7	15	15	48	4	14	17	34	3	11	44	90	0
36	26	30	44	0	33	7	54	11	60	14	67	22	10	40
37	20	0	50	10	40	0	70	10	70	0	60	20	40	10
38	0	20	70	0	40	0	80	0	70	0	80	2	10	20
39	15	30	44	0	37	7	63	0	52	4	63	0	20	30
40	33	33	75	0	75	0	50	8	42	25	100	0
41	85	4	18	15	52	0	17	17	43	9	15	48	70	0
42	0	20	60	0	40	0	80	0	70	0	80	0	20	30
43	7	48	44	4	22	18	59	4	52	26	89	4	10	30
44	20	10	40	0	40	0	50	0	40	0	40	0	30	20
45	30	30	41	0	37	7	54	9	60	11	59	26	10	40

APPENDIX P--Continued

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32	20	60	20	40	30	40								
33	70	0	90	0	80	0	20	30						
34	30	30	48	11	52	15	30	20	20	10				
35	10	60	7	59	15	56	60	0	20	40	57	26		
36	80	0	56	22	56	18	20	40	90	0	17	34	23	34
37	40	20	60	20	50	20	40	10	70	20	20	0	40	10
38	60	0	80	0	70	0	20	30	70	0	40	0	10	20
39	60	10	56	0	67	0	30	40	60	0	33	4	11	30
40	50	0	100	0	25	33	17	33
41	10	60	7	59	26	52	60	0	10	30	54	29	83	6
42	60	0	80	0	60	0	20	30	90	0	20	0	20	30
43	70	0	78	4	78	4	20	40	80	0	56	0	15	44
44	40	20	40	0	50	0	40	20	40	0	50	0	30	20
45	80	0	56	26	56	11	20	40	90	0	14	40	26	34

APPENDIX F--Continued

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37	60	20												
38	80	0	60	10										
39	56	0	50	20	60	0								
40	75	0	100	0						
41	29	34	30	0	10	20	18	30	25	33				
42	80	0	80	20	70	0	70	0	10	20		
43	59	26	70	20	80	0	67	4	75	25	18	48	90	0
44	40	0	30	10	50	0	50	0	30	10	40	0
45	94	3	60	20	80	0	48	4	75	0	34	31	80	0

APPENDIX P--Continued

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45	52	30	40	0

APPENDIX G

IDENTIFICATION OF ROLL-CALL VOTES BY ISSUE: SESSIONS VII THROUGH XV

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Type of Issue</u>
Session VII			
	1	13	Procedural
	2-3	67, 69	Agenda, Racial
	4-5	132	Cold War
	6-8	167-68	Cold War
	9-12	300	Cold War
	13	307	Cold War
	14	330	Racial
	15-18	333-34	Racial
	19-20	354-55	Colonial
	21	365	Cold War
	22-24	374-75	Colonial
	25-27	413-14	General Political
	28-29	425-26	Colonial
	30-32	450-51	Other
	33	450	Colonial
	34-37	471-72	Colonial
	38-39	479	Cold War
	40-42	490-95	Other
	43	530	Cold War
	44	716	Cold War
Session VIII			
	45	28	Agenda, Racial
	46-51	265-66	Colonial
	52	288	Racial
	53-54	293	Colonial
	55-57	316-20	Colonial
	58-61	324-25	Colonial
	62	417	Cold War
	63	425	Cold War
	64-66	436-37	Racial
	67	455	Colonial
	68	461	Other
Session IX			
	69	4	Cold War
	70	41	Agenda, Racial
	71	51	Agenda, Colonial
	72	60	Agenda, Colonial
	73-74	248-49	Colonial

APPENDIX G--Continued

<u>Number</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Type of Issue</u>
75-76	306-307	Colonial
77	320	Colonial
78	326	Colonial
79	361	Other
80	442	Cold War
81-83	461	Colonial
84	468	Cold War
85-87	480-81	Racial
88-89	498-99	Colonial
90	504	Other
91	549	Procedural
Session X		
92	9	Gold War
93	65	Agenda, Colonial
94	196	Agenda, Colonial
95	229	Agenda, Colonial
96-98	256-59	Procedural
99	288	Procedural
100-101	291	Procedural
102-103	369	Other
104	404	Racial
105	420	Other
106	433	Other
107-108	434	Other
109	435	Other
110-12	461-62	Colonial
113-15	464	Colonial
Special Emergency Session I		
116	34	General Political
117	71	General Political
118	126	General Political
Special Emergency Session II		
119	20	Cold War
120-30	77-79	Cold War
131-32	80	Cold War
Session XI		
133	23	Agenda, Cold War
134-35	39	Agenda, Racial
136	46	Agenda, Colonial
137	55	Procedural
138-40	83-84	Agenda, Cold War
141-44	187-88	Cold War
145-49	194-95	Cold War
150-51	306	General Political
152	343	General Political
153	527	Cold War
154	675	Cold War

APPENDIX C--Continued

<u>Number</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Type of Issue</u>
155	870	Colonial
156-57	957-58	General Political
158	965	Colonial
159-60	1021	Other
161	1094	General Political
162	1140	Agenda, Cold War
163-64	1166-79	Colonial
165	1227	Colonial
166	1237	Procedural
167	1263	Colonial
168	1476	Cold War

Session XII

169	52	Agenda, Racial
170	55	Agenda, Racial
171	59	Agenda, Colonial
172-75	129-30	Cold War
176-77	363-64	General Political
178	369	Colonial
179-80	461-62	Cold War
181-83	467, 490	Cold War
184	514	Other
185-86	517	Colonial
187	529	Other
188	535	Racial
189	541	Cold War
190	547	Colonial
191	553	Other
192-93	557	Colonial
194	588	Procedural
195	617	Procedural
196	623	Colonial

Session XIII

197	55	Agenda, Cold War
198-202	106-107	Agenda, Cold War
203	387	Other
204	410	Colonial
205-209	412-14	Racial
210-11	430	Cold War
212	443	General Political
213	451	Cold War
214	464	Other
215	478	Other
216	546	Cold War
217	565	Other
218	598	Other
219	621	Cold War
220-21	623, 27	Colonial

APPENDIX G--Continued

<u>Number</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Type of Issue</u>
Session XIV		
222-23	94-95	Agenda, Cold War
224-26	95	General Political
227-28	442	Procedural
229	452	Agenda, Cold War
230	465	Colonial
231	528	Cold War
232	559-60	Racial
233	585-86	General Political
240	600	General Political
241-42	612-13	Other
243	621	Agenda, Cold War
244	641	Other
245	647	General Political
246	704	Cold War
247	707	Cold War
248	717	Procedural
249	726	Colonial
250-56	746-47	Colonial
257-64	776	Procedural
265	777	Procedural
266	785	Procedural
Session XV, Part I, Vol. I		
267-70	467-68	General Political
271-76	559-61	Agenda, Cold War
277	611	Agenda, Cold War
278	614	Agenda, Cold War
279-80	650	Procedural
281	708	Procedural
Part I, Vol. II		
282-83	817	Procedural
284	842	Procedural
285	859	Procedural
286	877	Procedural
287	878	Procedural
288	882	Procedural
289-91	940	General Political
292-95	1273-74	Colonial
296-97	1291-93	Colonial
298	1386	Colonial
299-303	1428-30	Colonial
304-305	1478-79	General Political
306-307	1493-94	General Political
308	1504	Other
Part II		
309	44	Agenda, Colonial
310-14	273-75	Racial
315-326	322-27	General Political

APPENDIX G--Continued

<u>Number</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Type of Issue</u>
327-31	377-78	General Political, Other
332-33	434	Colonial
334-37	448-49	General Political
338-39	455-56	Colonial
340	465	Colonial
341	483-84	Other
342-46	495-97	Cold War
347-52	504-508	Other

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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